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Preface
This thesis is the result of my PhD studies at the Department of Finance at
Copenhagen Business School. The thesis consists of 4 essays covering different
aspects of the intersection of finance and real estate. Each essay is self-contained
and can be read independently.
Structure of the Thesis
The first essay examines the commonality between publicly and privately traded
commercial real estate and macroeconomic risk. The second essay investigates
the impact of corporate taxes and free cash flow agency problems on the capital
structure of companies. The third essay (co-authored with Aleksandra Rzez´nik)
uses the 2007 municipality reform in Denmark as an exogenous shock to taxes
in order to estimate the effect of both income and property taxes on residential
house prices. Lastly, the fourth essay examines the short and long effect of a
large and sudden increase in local municipal debt on residential house prices.
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Summary
This section contains English and Danish summaries of the 4 articles that make
up this PhD thesis.
Summary in English
Essay 1: The Commonality between Private and Public
Real Estate and Macroeconomic Risk
The first essay examines the relationship between publicly and privately traded
commercial real estate and macroeconomic risk. To represent publicly traded
real estate, I use exchange listed US Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs),
and to proxy for direct and privately traded real estate, I use a transaction based
index (TBI) based on the data in the NCREIF database.
Because the fundamental asset of the two investment types are the same, it
seems reasonable to assume that they should be related in the long run. In the
short run there are, however, several investment-vehicle specific reasons why this
need not be the case. For example, REITs are publicly listed on stock exchanges,
and are thus expected to share a lot of commonalities with other publicly traded
stocks. This is in fact also found by Goetzmann and Ibbotson [1990], Ross
and Zisler [1991], and Myer and Webb [1994]. The fact that REITs are traded
on exchanges makes them more liquid than direct real estate investments, and
investors might therefore accept a lower risk premium for holding REITs, than
for holding direct real estate. However, the lower contemporaneous correlation
between direct real estate and the general stock market gives direct real estate
a diversification benefit that may make investors accept a lower risk premium
for investing in direct real estate.
If returns are driven by a factor model as the Arbitrage Pricing theory (APT)
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of Ross [1976], then it is intuitively more appealing to let these factors relate
to the overall economy, than to simple portfolios of financial assets such as the
Fama and French [1993] factors, since this would constitute a more fundamental
explanation of what determines returns. Furthermore, the fact that real estate
by nature is a “real” asset, also favors relating it to the real economy.
I use a large macroeconomic dataset of 122 time series and extract the un-
derlying factors by the asymptotic principal components method of Stock and
Watson [2002b], Stock and Watson [2002a], and Bai and Ng [2002]. I use these
factors to explain the time series behaviour of both REIT and direct real estate
excess returns. I find that the 122 data series can be described by 4 underlying
factors, which I interpret as a recession factor, a housing and credit factor, an
inflation factor, and an interest rate factor.
The results show that REITs are driven by stock market factors and the
interest rate factor. REITs lead private real estate, and private real estate
also reacts with a lag to the interest rate factor and a recession factor. REITs
and private real estate are thus related both directly through their lead-lag
relationship and indirectly through a common exposure to US interest rates.
Essay 2: Testing the Effect of Taxes and Free Cash Flow
Problems on Capital Structure: Evidence from REITs
The second essay examines the effect of the tax advantage of debt and the miti-
gating effect of debt on free cash flow agency problems on firm capital structure
choices. Specifically, I examine how the two effects affect the level of leverage
and the tendency of firms to employ dynamic target leverage ratios that they
revert to, as predicted by the dynamic Trade-off theory. I do this by compar-
ing publicly listed real estate investment trust (REITs), which are effectively
tax exempt and not prone to free cash flow agency problems, because they are
required to pay out at least 90% of their taxable income as dividends and can
deduct the dividends from their taxable income, to regular listed real estate
companies without the REIT status (non-REITs). The only differences between
the two groups of companies are the tax exemption and the 90% payout re-
quirement. By examining the level of leverage and testing the target adjustment
behaviour of these two groups of firms, I am able to identify the effect of taxes
and free cash flow agency problems. I also include regular industrial companies
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not related to the real estate industry, to pick up any real estate industry effects.
The REITs do not need two of the most prominent benefits of debt, namely,
the tax advantage and the reduction in free cash flow agency problems. So, if
these indeed are the most important benefits of debt, one should expect RE-
ITs to finance their operations by less debt than similar non-REIT real estate
companies.
Furthermore, according to the Trade-off theory firms trade off the benefits
and costs of debt to maximize firm value, and thus have an optimal capital
structure that they revert back to. The primary benefits of debt are again the
tax advantage and the reduction in free cash flow agency problems. If REITs
have less benefits of debt, one should expect that REITs have lower target
leverage ratios - if any targets at all - than similar non-REIT real estate firms.
Contrary to expectation, I find that REITs have similar or even higher lever-
age ratios than similar non-REIT real estate firms. More so, I document that
REITs have higher target leverage ratios than non-REITs, and that the speed
at which they revert to the targets are equal for the two groups. This is not line
with the largest benefits of debt being the tax advantage and the reduction in
free cash flow agency problems, as is often mentioned in the literature, and it
could suggest that firms have other benefits of debt.
Essay 3: House Prices and Taxes (co-authored with Aleksan-
dra Rzez´nik, CBS)
The third essay deals with the effect of municipal income and property tax
rates on residential house prices. By utilizing the 2007 municipality reform in
Denmark as an exogenous shock to municipal income and property tax rates,
we are able to estimate the influence of taxes on house prices.
The idea behind the 2007 municipality reform was to better exploit econo-
mies of scale at the municipal level by merging smaller municipalities. With
the exemption of only four small islands, all municipalities below 20,000 inhab-
itants had to merge with one or more nearby municipalities in order to create a
new municipalities of at least 30,000 inhabitants. After the reform, the merged
municipalities had to set a new and common tax rate, and if the merging mu-
nicipalities did not all have equal tax rates prior to the reform, the common rate
would institute a change for at least one of the merging municipalities.
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The new municipalities had to set the new tax rates equal to or lower than
an average of the previous tax rates plus an adjustment for changes in the public
service task handled by the municipalities1. The so called maximum allowed rate.
Only a few municipalities chose to set the new rates lower than the maximum
allowed rate. The addition due to changes in public service tasks handled by
the municipalities were effectively not real changes, because any addition was
offset by an equal reduction in the state tax rates. Hence, to control for this, we
instrument the income and property tax rates with the average of the previous
rates in the merging municipalities.
The tax changes were, however, not the only factor affecting house prices
that changed as part of the reform. The municipalities were free to adjust the
level of public service. We therefore control for public service, and instrument
this variable by education expenditure, since the quality of public service is hard
to measure.
We find that a 1%-point increase in the income tax rate lead to a drop in
house prices of 7.9% and a 1-point increase in the property tax rate lead to
a 1.1% drop in house prices. The simple present value of a 1%-point perpetual
income tax increase and of a 1-point property tax increase, relative to the me-
dian house price correspond to 7% and 3.3%, repectively. Our findings are thus
in line with predicted values. This indicates that the housing market efficiently
incorporates taxes into house prices.
Essay 4: House Prices and Local Public Debt
The fourth essay examines the efficiency of the residential housing market by
utilizing the 2002 case of fraud in the Danish municipality of Farum as an ex-
ogenous shock to municipal debt. In February 2002 journalists discovered that
illegal accounting practices had led to an artificially high liquidity buffer. An
unreported loan of 250 million DKK was uncovered, and the Danish Ministry
of the Interior granted Farum a long term loan of 750 million DKK, to recover
from the financial distress. Effectively, the debt in Farum rose by 1 billion DKK
or about 125 million USD in the month of February 2002. The increase in debt
was approximately 6600 USD per capita. The municipality in question, Farum,
1In connection with the reform some public service task previously defined as state tasks
were taken over by the municipalities.
x
had no long term debt prior to the increase, but the average long term debt for
the surrounding municipalities in 2002 was about 1000 USD per capita. The
municipal debt increase was thus substantial.
The repayment of the debt increase has to be financed either by tax increases
and/or public service reductions. If, for example, the debt is repaid by increased
income and or property taxes, this would affect home owners, since you pay mu-
nicipal income and property tax in the municipality where you reside. Similarly,
public service reductions could affect school quality or other variables relevant
to home owners. Therefore, one should expect house prices to drop as an effect
of the debt increase. Because the value of the total debt increase is easily ob-
served, I will know whether the aggregate house price reaction is exaggerated
or understated. A rational drop in house prices should equal the expected part
of future tax increases attributable to home ownerships. It is, of course, hard
to define exactly how big a part of future tax increases is attributable to home
ownerships, since aside from property taxes, Danish municipalities also finance
public service by e.g. income taxes, which affect all residents in the municipality
and not just home owners2. Nonetheless, the aggregate price reaction should
not exceed the increase in debt. The public debt increase thus functions as a
cap on a rational aggregate price effect.
If the residential housing market is completely efficient, house prices should
adjust instantaneously and correctly to new information relevant for the pricing
of residential real estate. However, the nature of the residential housing market,
with each transaction being slow, and where most market participants are regular
people without much financial prowess, suggests that the market will be slow in
reacting to news, and that the reaction might be over- or understated.
I find that the average house price dropped between 13.6% and 16.0% due to
the debt increase in the 3 months after the debt revelation. The aggregate effect
corresponds to between 100% and 118% of the total debt increase. Furthermore,
I document that the initial 1-month aggregate price drop equals about 175% of
the total debt increase, and that the reaction is dampened in the following
months to between 37% to 75% of the total debt increase. This shows that
the housing market initially overreacts to the debt increase but quickly adjusts
2It should be noted, however, that renters easier can move to another municipality than
home owners, and hence avoid the tax increase. And so, one could argue that home owners
will carry a larger part of the future tax burden.
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to more rational levels. The speed at which the housing market reacts to the
increased public debt indicates a very efficient housing market, and the initial
overreaction can be fully rational, if the housing market initially fears further
debt revelations.
Dansk Resume´
Essay 1: Sammenhægen mellem Offentlig og Privat Fast
Ejendom og Makroøkonomisk risiko
Essay 1 undersøger sammenhængen imellem børsnoteret og unoteret kommerciel
fast ejendom og makroøkonomisk risiko. Til at repræsentere børsnoteret fast
ejendom benytter jeg børsnoterede amerikanske Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITs), og som proxy for direkte ejet og unoteret fast ejendom, bruger jeg et
handelsbaseret indeks (TBI), baseret p˚a data fra NCREIF databasen.
Da det fundamentale aktiv er det samme for begge investeringstyper, m˚a det
antages rimeligt, at de to investeringer vil samvariere p˚a lang sigt. P˚a kort sigt
behøver dette imidlertid ikke være tilfældet p˚a grund af konstruktionen af de
to investeringsformer. For eksempel er REITs børsnoterede og vil derfor have
en del fællestræk med andre børsnoterede aktier. Dette er netop dokumenteret
af Goetzmann and Ibbotson [1990], Ross and Zisler [1991] og Myer and Webb
[1994]. Det faktum, at REITs are børsnoterede, gør dem mere likvide end direkte
investeringer i fast ejendom, og det kan derfor tænkes at investorer vil kræve en
lavere forrentning for at investere i REITs. Den lavere korrelation mellem direkte
investeringer i fast ejendom og det børsnoterede aktiemarked giver imidlertid
direkte investeringer i fast ejendom en diversifikationsfordel, som modsat kan
resultere i et lavere forrentningskrav til direkte investeringer i fast ejendom.
Hvis finansielle afkast er genereret af en faktormodel, som eksempelvis “Ar-
bitrage Pricing”-teorien (APT) fra Ross [1976], s˚a er det intuitivt tiltalende, at
disse faktorer afhænger af den generelle økonomi, da det er naturligt at antage
at afkast p˚a finansielle aktiver fundamentalt er drevet af makroøkonomien. Det
faktum, at fast ejendom af natur er et reelt aktiv, gør det endnu mere oplagt at
relatere ejendomsafkast til realøkonomien.
Jeg benytter et stort makroøkonomisk datasæt best˚aende af 122 tidsræk-
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ker og estimerer de underliggende faktorer ved hjælp af “Asymptotic Principal
Components”-metoden udledt i Stock and Watson [2002b], Stock and Watson
[2002a] og Bai and Ng [2002]. Jeg benytter disse faktorer til at forklare tids-
serie variationen i merafkastene for b˚ade REITs og direkte investeringer i fast
ejendom. Jeg finder, at de 122 tidsrækker kan repræsenteres ved hjælp af 4 under-
liggende faktorer, som jeg fortolker som hhv. en recessionsfaktor, en ejendoms-
og kreditfaktor, en inflationsfaktor og en rentefaktor.
Resultaterne viser, at REITs er drevet af aktiemarkedsfaktorer og af rentefak-
toren. REITs leder det unoterede ejendomsmarked, og det unoterede ejendoms-
marked reagerer ogs˚a med en forsinkelse p˚a rentefaktoren og recessionsfaktoren.
De børsnoterede ejendomsinvesteringer og det unoterede ejendomsmarked er der-
for b˚ade relaterede direkte igennem en “leder/følger”-sammenhæng, og indirekte
igennem en fælles eksponering mod amerikanske renter.
Essay 2: Test af Skatter og Problemer ved Frie Penge-
strømmes Effekt p˚a Virksomhedens Kapitalstruktur: Do-
kumentation fra REITs
Essay 2 omhandler effekten af skattefordelen ved gæld og den mitigerende effekt
af gæld p˚a agenturproblemer vedrørende de frie pengestrømme p˚a virksomhe-
ders valg af kapitalstruktur. Jeg undersøger mere specifikt hvordan de to effekter
p˚avirker niveauet af gæld og tendensen til at virksomheder har et optimalt dyna-
misk gearingsniveau, som de vender tilbage til, som forudsagt af den dynamiske
Trade-off teori.
Det gør jeg ved at sammenligne børsnoterede Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITs), som effektivt er skatteundtagede og ikke i samme grad p˚avirket af
agenturproblemer ved frie pengestrømme (da de skal udbetale mindst 90% af
deres skattepligtige indkomst som udbytter, og kan fratrække udbytter fra deres
skattepligtige indkomst) med almindelige børsnoterede virksomheder der inve-
sterer i fast ejendom uden REIT status (non-REITs). Den eneste forskel p˚a disse
to virksomhedstyper er skatteundtagelsen og kravet om mindst 90% udbyttebe-
taling. Ved at sammenligne de to typers gældsniveau og undersøge tendensen til
at justere kapitalstrukturen imod et optimalt gearingsforhold, kan jeg identifice-
re effekten af skatter og agenturproblemer ved frie pengestrømme. Jeg inkluderer
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ogs˚a almindelige børsnoterede virksomheder, som ikke er relaterede til fast ejen-
dom, for at kontrollere for mulige ejendomsspecifikke effekter.
REITs har ikke brug for to af de mest prominente fordele ved gæld, nem-
lig, skattefordelen og reduktionen af agenturproblemer ved frie pengestrømme.
S˚a, hvis disse er de største fordele ved gæld, bør man forvente, at REITs vil
finansiere deres aktiver med mindre gæld end sammenlignelige non-REIT ejen-
domsvirksomheder. Jævnfør Trade-off teorien vil virksomheder afveje fordele og
omkostninger ved gæld, for at maksimere den enkelte virksomheds værdi, og
derved opn˚a en optimal kapitalstruktur eller et gearingsm˚al, som de vender til-
bage til. De primære fordele ved gæld er igen skattefordelen og reduktionen i
agenturproblemer vedrørende frie pengestrømme. Da REITs har færre fordele
ved gæld, bør man forvente, at REITs vil have lavere gearingsm˚al - hvis de da
ophovedet har en optimal gearing - end sammenlignelige ejendomsvirksomheder
uden REIT status.
Imod forventning finder jeg, at REITs har sammenlignelige eller endda højere
gældsniveau end sammenlignelige non-REIT ejendomsvirksomheder. Ydermere
dokumenterer jeg, at REITs har højere gearingsm˚al end non-REITs og hastig-
heden hvormed de regresserer imod m˚alene er ens for de to virksomhedstyper.
Dette st˚ar i kontrast til, at de største fordele ved gæld skulle være skattefordelen
og reduktionen af agenturproblemer ved frie pengestrømme, som ofte nævnes i
litteraturen, og det kunne tyde p˚a, at virksomheder har andre fordele ved gæld.
Essay 3: Huspriser og Skatter (medforfatter Aleksandra Rzez´-
nik, CBS)
Essay 3 omhandler effekterne af kommunale indkomst- og ejendomsskatter p˚a
huspriserne. Ved at udnytte kommunalreformen fra 2007 i Danmark som et ekso-
gent stød til de kommunale indkomst- og ejendomsskattesatser, kan vi estimere
skatternes indflydelse p˚a huspriserne.
Baggrunden for kommunalreformen i 2007 var bedre at udnytte stordrifts-
fordele i kommunerne ved at sammenlægge sm˚a kommuner. Med undtagelse af
4 sm˚a øer, blev alle kommuner med under 20,000 indbyggere sammenlagt til nye
kommuner med mindst 30,000 indbyggere. Efter reformen blev de sammenlagte
kommuner nødt til at sætte nye og fælles skattesatser, og hvis ikke de havde ens
skattesatser før reformen, medførte reformen nødvendigvis skatteændringer for
xiv
mindst e´n af de sammenlagte kommuner.
De nye kommuner var nødsagede til at sætte de nye skattesatser lig med eller
mindre end gennemsnittet af de sammenlagte kommuners tidligere skattesatser,
plus et tillæg for ændringer i de offentlige velfærdsopgaver som varetages af kom-
munerne3; den s˚akaldte maksimalt tilladte skattesats. Kun enkelte kommuner
valgte at sætte satserne lavere end den maksimalt tilladte skattesats. Tillægget
som følge af ændringer i offentlige velfærdsopgaver varetaget af kommunerne
var ikke en reel skatteændring, da tillægget blev modsvaret af en tilsvarende
reduktion i de statslige satser. For at kontrollere for dette, instrumenterer vi
skattesatserne med gennemsnittet af de tidligere skattesatser i de sammenlagte
kommuner.
Ændringerne i skattesatserne var, imidlertid, ikke den eneste kommunale æn-
dring som p˚avirkede huspriserne, da kommunerne frit kunne justere velfærdsni-
veauet. Vi kontrollere derfor for velfærdsniveauet, og instrumenterer denne vari-
abel med uddannelsesudgifter, da det er vanskeligt at m˚ale kvaliteten af offentlig
velfærd.
Vi finder, at en 1%-points forøgelse af indkomstskattesatsen medfører et pris-
fald p˚a huspriserne p˚a 7.9%, og en 1-points forøgelse af grundskyldspromillen
medfører et prisfald p˚a 1.1%. Den simple tilbagediskonterede værdi af en evigt
løbende forøgelse af indkomstskattesatsen p˚a 1%-point og en 1-points forøgel-
se af grundskyldspromillen relativt til median husprisen, svarer til 7% og 3.3%,
respektivt. Vores resultater er p˚a linie med de beregnede værdier. Dette indike-
rer, at boligmarkedet effektivt inkorporerer de kommunale skatter i huspriserne.
Essay 4: Huspriser og Lokal Offentlig Gæld
Essay 4 undersøger effektiviteten af boligmarkedet ved at udnytte bedragerisa-
gen i Farum kommune fra 2002, som et eksogent stød til den kommunale gæld. I
februar 2002 opdagede journalister, at ulovlige regnskabsmetoder dækkede over
en overtrædelse af den kommunale kassekreditregel. Ydermere blev et urapporte-
ret l˚an uden om byr˚adet p˚a 250 millioner DKK opdaget, og Indenrigsministeriet
bevilgede Farum et l˚an p˚a 750 millioner DKK for at kunne overholde kasse-
kreditreglen. Effekten blev at gælden i Farum steg med 1 milliard DKK eller
3I forbindelse med reformen blev nogle velfærdsopgaver flyttet fra at være statslige opgaver
til at være kommunale opgaver.
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omkring 125 millioner USD i februar 2002. Gældsforøgelsen var omkring 6600
USD per indbygger. Farum have ikke tidligere registreret nogen langsigtet gæld,
men gennemsnittet for de omkringliggende kommuner var omkring 1000 USD
per indbygger. Gældsforøgelsen var s˚aledes af betydelig størrelse.
Tilbagebetalingen af gældsforøgelsen m˚a nødvendigvis finansieres ved hjælp
af skattestigninger og/eller en reduktion af den kommunale velfærd. En forhø-
jelse af de kommunale indkomst- og ejendomsskatter vil p˚avirke husejerne, da
man betaler kommunal indkomst- og ejendomsskat i bopælskommunen. Even-
tuelle reduktioner i den kommunale velfærd vil for eksempel p˚avirke kvaliteten
af folkeskolen eller andre forhold og er ligeledes relevante for husejerne. Man m˚a
derfor forvente et fald i huspriserne som følge af gældsforøgelsen. Da værdien af
den totale gældsforøgelse er observerbar, vil jeg automatisk vide om den aggrege-
rede husprisreaktion er overdrevet eller underdrevet. Et rationelt fald bør svare
til husejernes forventede andel af tilbagebetalingen. Det er selvfølgelig svært
præcist at definere hvor stor en andel, der skal tilskrives husejerne, da danske
kommuner udover ejendomsskatter ogs˚a kan finansiere offentlig velfærd gennem
eksempelvis indkomstskatter, som p˚avirker alle indbyggere i kommunen og ikke
alene husejere4. Ikke desto mindre bør det samlede husprisfald ikke overg˚a den
totale gældsforøgelse. Gældsforøgelsen fungerer derfor som en øvre grænse for
en rationel prisreaktion.
Hvis boligmarkedet er fuldstænding effektivt, bør huspriserne reagere øje-
blikligt p˚a ny relevant information. Boligmarkedet er imidlertid karakteriseret
ved langsommelige handler, og aktøerne p˚a markedet har typisk ikke særlig stor
finansiel viden. Det kunne indikere at boligmarkedet vil være lang tid om at in-
korporere ny information i huspriserne, og at reaktionen muligvis vil være over-
eller underdrevet.
Jeg finder, at den gennemsnitlige huspris faldt med mellem 13.6% og 16.0%
pga. gældsforøgelsen i de 3 m˚aneder efter gælden blev afdækket. Den aggregere-
de effekt svarer til mellem 100% og 118% af den totale gældsforøgelse. Ydermere
dokumenterer jeg, at det initiale aggregerede prisfald i den første m˚aned svarede
til omkring 175% af gældsforøgelsen, og at reaktionen blev dæmpet i de efterføl-
gende m˚aneder til mellem 37% og 75% af den totale gældsforøgelse. Dette viser,
4Det bør dog nævnes, at lejere lettere kan flytte til en anden kommune end husejere, og
dermed undg˚a en eventuel skattestigning. S˚aledes kan man argumentere for at husejere vil
bære den største del af den fremtidige skattebyrde.
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at boligmarkedet initialt overreagerer som følge af gældforøgelsen, men hurtigt
justerer reaktionen til et mere rationelt niveau. Hastigheden hvormed markedet
reagerer indikerer et meget effektivt boligmarked, og den initiale overreaktion
kan være fuldt ud rationel, hvis markedet frygtede flere gældsafsløringer.
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Introduction
Real estate is one of the worlds largest asset classes and the single largest invest-
ments of most households. Hence, real estate impacts everyone both directly
and indirectly through its influence on the overall economy. The 2008 finan-
cial crisis was preceded by a large price depreciation in the US housing market
(see for example Taylor [2009]), and many times before have housing markets
triggered recessions and financial crises (non-exhaustive examples of theoretical
and empirical papers examining the relationship between real estate markets
and the real economy are Quigley [2001], Quigley [1999], and Allen and Gale
[2000]). Thus, both from an academic and a practical point of view, research in
real estate is highly relevant.
Empirical research in real estate is in nature hampered by the availability of
data, since most real estate is privately traded. And so, many of the questions
already answered for other financial markets such as the stock and bond markets,
are left unanswered. Furthermore, the difficulty of setting up controlled exper-
iments - a difficulty in most social sciences - requires the real estate researcher
to look elsewhere for answers.
The universal relevance of real estate as an asset class, together with the
many unanswered empirical questions, and the availability of high quality Danish
data, was what made me pursue a PhD within real estate finance.
This thesis deals with many aspects of real estate markets, from trying to
understand the commonalities and differences between publicly and privately
traded commercial real estate and macroeconomic risk, through utilizing the
special institutional nature of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) to esti-
mate the effect of corporate taxes and agency problems on the capital structure
of companies, to the effect of local municipal taxes and debt on residential house
prices.
Essay 1 examines the relationship between publicly and privately traded com-
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mercial real estate and macroeconomic risk. Investors can invest in real estate
indirectly by purchasing stocks or bonds in publicly listed REITs. However, in-
vestors can also choose to invest directly in real estate by buying and operating
real estate properties. The first article examines how these two investment types
relate to each other and to the macro economy. Since the fundamental asset of
both investments is real estate properties, the two investments should be related
in the long run. However, since one asset is publicly traded and the other is
privately traded, there could be several investment-vehicle related reasons why
this need not be the case in the short run. Furthermore, if one believes that
asset returns are driven by a factor model such as the Arbitrage Pricing The-
ory (APT) of Ross [1976], and since real estate is indeed a very ”real” asset, it
seems natural to expect that the underlying factors should be related to the real
economy. More so, return generating factors related to the macro economy are
intuitively appealing and more fundamental than portfolios of assets, such as
the Fama and French [1993] factors.
To proxy the macro economy, I use a dataset of 122 data series much like
that of Bernanke et al. [2005] and Ludvigson and Ng [2009]. The dataset is not
completely similar, since I have monthly observation, and they have quarterly
observations. To avoid data mining and multicollinearity issues, I extract the
underlying factors of this dataset using the Asymptotic Principal Components
method of Stock and Watson [2002b], Stock and Watson [2002a], and Bai and
Ng [2002].
I find that the macreconomic dataset can be described by 4 underlying factors
through the 3 information criteria in Bai and Ng [2002]. Together, the 4 factors
describe 58.3% of the variation in the dataset. I interpret the four factors as a
recession factor, a housing and credit factor, an inflation factor, and an interest
rate factor.
Contemporaneously, I find no relation between publicly and privately traded
real estate. REITs are explained by stock market risk factors, but also have an
exposure to the interest rate factor, and this relation is robust to all the different
specifications in the paper. The privately traded real estate, proxied by the MIT
transaction based index (TBI), is not contemporaneously related to the stock
market nor the macroeconomic factors. However, the TBI does react to both
REIT returns and the interest rate factor with a lag, suggesting that REITs,
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being publicly traded, are more informationally efficient than the private real
estate market. The public and private real estate markets are hence related
both directly through a lead/lag relationship and indirectly through a common
exposure to US interest rates.
The second essay examines the effect of corporate taxes and free cash flow
agency problems on the capital structure of companies. Since firms can deduct
their interest payments from their taxable income, there is a tax advantage
of financing companies with debt compared to equity. Furthermore, Jensen
[1986] argues that the issuance of debt instead of equity oblige managers to pay
out future free cash flows more effectively than promises of future dividends.
Financing investments with debt instead of equity thus reduces the agency costs
of free cash flows. However, employing high levels of leverage also increases
the risk of bankruptcy, which is costly. The Trade-off theory of firm capital
structure, thus, predict that firms trade off the benefits and costs of debt to
maximize firm value. As a result, each company will have an optimal capital
structure which it will revert to. See for example Fischer et al. [1989], Leland
[1994], Leland and Toft [1996] for more on the Trade-off theory.
I compare publicly listed real estate investment trust (REITs), which are
effectively tax exempt and not prone to free cash flow agency problems, because
they are required to pay out at least 90% of their taxable income as dividends
and can deduct their dividends from their taxable income, to regular listed real
estate companies without the REIT status (non-REITs). The only differences
between the two groups of companies are the tax exemption and the 90% payout
requirement. By examining the level of leverage and testing the target adjust-
ment behaviour of these two groups of firms, I am able to identify the effect
of taxes and free cash flow agency problems. More so, I also include regular
publicly listed US industrial companies not related to real estate, to identify any
real estate industry effects.
I find that REITs on average employ more leverage than similar non-REITs,
and they also adjust their capital structure towards a dynamic target leverage
ratio at a similar rate as non-REITs. This is surprising, since REITs as men-
tioned effectively are tax exempt and have to pay out at least 90% of their
taxable income, and thus have less benefits of debt than non-REIT real estate
companies. It might suggest that firms have other benefits of debt than the tax
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advantage and mitigation of free cash flow agency problems. The results are
robust to all the modifications in Hovakimian and Li [2011] meant to reduce
the potential bias in the tests, using both book and market leverage, different
estimation methodologies, excluding industrial firms, and over a subsample from
1992 to 2011.
In the third essay (co-authored with Aleksandra Rzez´nik) we use the 2007
municipality reform in Denmark as a natural experiment in which the tax
changes are completely exogenous, and thus provide unbiased estimates of the
effects of taxes on house prices.
The purpose of the 2007 municipality reform was to better exploit economies
of scale at the municipal level by merging smaller municipalities. With the
exemption of only four small islands, all municipalities below 20,000 inhabitants
had to merge with one or more nearby municipalities in order to create a new
municipality of at least 30,000 inhabitants. The merged municipalities had to
set common tax rates, and if the merging municipalities did not all have equal
tax rates prior to the reform, the common rate would institute a change for at
least one of the merging municipalities.
The new municipalities had to set the new tax rates equal to or lower than an
average of the tax rates of the municipalities participating in the merger plus an
adjustment for changes in the public service task delivered by the municipalities5.
Only a few municipalities chose to set the new rates lower than the average of
the previous rates plus the addition due to change in public service tasks. The
addition due to changes in public service tasks handled by the municipalities were
effectively not real changes, since any addition was offset by an equal reduction
in the state tax rates. Hence, to control for this, we instrument the income
and property tax rates with the average of the previous rates in the merging
municipalities.
Furthermore, since the municipalities were free to adjust the level of mu-
nicipal public service, we also control for public service, and instrument this
variable by education expenditure, because the quality of public service is hard
to measure.
We find that a 1%-point increase in the income tax rate lead to a drop in
house prices of 7.9% and a 1-point increase in the property tax rate lead to
5In connection with the reform some public service task previously defined as state tasks
were taken over by the municipalities.
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a 1.1% drop in house prices. The simple present value of a 1%-point perpetual
income tax increase and of a 1-point property tax increase, relative to the
median house price correspond to 7% and 3.3%, repectively. Our findings are
thus in line with predicted values. This indicates that the housing market ef-
ficiently incorporates taxes into house prices, similar to the findings of Palmon
and Smith [1998].
The fourth essay uses the 2002 case of fraud in the Danish municipality of
Farum as an exogenous shock to municipal public debt, and examines whether
the housing market efficiently incorporate the new information. In February 2002
journalists discovered that illegal accounting practices had led to an artificially
high liquidity buffer. An unreported loan of 250 million DKK was uncovered,
and the interior ministry granted Farum a long term loan of 750 million DKK, to
recover from the financial distress. Effectively, the debt in Farum rose by 1 billion
DKK or about 125 million USD in the month of February 2002. The increase
in debt was approximately 6600 USD per capita. The municipality in question,
Farum, had no long term debt prior to the increase, but the average long term
debt for the surrounding municipalities was about 1000 USD per capita. Thus,
the municipal debt increase was substantial.
Since debt is a signal of future taxes, and because the value is easily observed,
I will automatically know whether the house price reaction is exaggerated or un-
derstated. A rational drop in house prices should equal the expected part of
future tax increases attributable to home ownerships. It is, of course, hard to
define exactly how big a part of future tax increases is attributable to home
ownerships, since aside from property taxes, Danish municipalities also finance
public service by for example income taxes, which affect all residents in the mu-
nicipality and not just home owners6. Nonetheless, the aggregate price reaction
should not exceed the increase in debt. The public debt increase thus functions
as a cap on a rational aggregate price effect.
I find that the average home ownership lost between 13.6% and 16.0% in the
3 months after the debt increase. The aggregate effect corresponds to between
100% and 118% of the total debt increase. I further document that the initial
1-month aggregate price drop equals about 175% of the total debt increase, and
6It should be noted, however, that renters easier can move to another municipality than
home owners, and hence avoid the tax increase. And so, one could argue that home owners
will carry a larger part of the future tax burden.
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that the reaction is dampened in the following months to between 37% to 75% of
the total debt increase. This shows that the housing market initially overreacts
to debt increases but quickly adjusts to long-run levels. The speed at which
the housing market reacts to the increased public debt indicates a very efficient
housing market, and the initial overreaction can be fully rational if the housing
market initially fears further debt revelations.
Summing up: The overall theme of this thesis is real estate finance. The first
essay examines the commonality between publicly and privately traded commer-
cial real estate and macroeconomic risk. The second essay estimates the effect
of corporate taxes and free cash flow agency problems on firm capital structure.
The third essay determines the effect of municipal income and property tax rates
on residential house prices. The fourth essay examines the efficiency of the resi-
dential housing market, by estimating the short and longer term effect of a large
and sudden increase in municipal debt on residential house prices.
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Essay 1
The Commonality between
Private and Public Real Estate
and Macroeconomic Risk1
1I wish to thank my supervisor Jesper Rangvid and seminar participants at Copenhagen
Business School and PenSam Liv A/S for helpful comments. I gratefully acknowledge the
financial support of PenSam Liv A/S. All remaining errors are my own.
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Abstract
In this paper I examine how both indirect investments in real estate
through publicly traded real estate investment trusts (REITs) and pri-
vately traded direct real estate investments are related to macroeconomic
risk, by extracting a few underlying factors from a large macroeconomic
dataset of a 122 time series. I find that REITs are driven by stock mar-
ket factors and an interest rate factor. REITs lead private real estate,
and private real estate also reacts with a lag to the interest rate factor
and a recession factor. REITs and private real estate are thus related
both directly through their lead-lag relationship and indirectly through a
common exposure to US interest rates.
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1.1 Introduction
It is a well established fact that indirect investments in real estate through
publicly traded real estate investment trusts (REITs) lead direct and privately
traded real estate investments2. However, I am the first to relate REITs and
unsecuritized real estate to macroeconomic risk, by extracting the underlying
factors of a large macroeconomic dataset. I show that REITs and private real
estate are also indirectly related through a common exposure to US interest rates.
REITs react contemporaneously to an interest rate factor whereas private real
estate reacts with a lag. Furthermore, I find that private real estate reacts with
a lag to a recession factor, and to some extent contemporaneously to a housing
and credit factor.
Ever since Giliberto [1990] documented a significant correlation between RE-
ITs and direct real estate when controlling for stock and bond factors, many
articles have examined the commonality between direct and indirect real estate
investments. The approaches have split into two paths; a short-run and a long-
run comparison. The previous literature on the “long-run” approach all find
that direct and indirect real estate investments are co-integrated, ie. they share
a common stochastic trend, so that in the long run, the two investments exhibit
similar behaviour. The “short-run” literature examines the correlation between
direct and indirect real estate and the findings are weaker. Generally, REITs
are mainly driven by stock market risk, and indirect real estate is not.
This study adds to the existing literature by examining how both REITs and
direct real estate investments relate to macroeconomic risk. I am the first to use
a large macroeconomic dataset of 122 time series and extract the underlying
factors by the asymptotic principal components method of Stock and Watson
[2002b], Stock and Watson [2002a], and Bai and Ng [2002]. I use these factors
to explain the time series behaviour of both REIT and direct real estate excess
returns. Furthermore, I am the first to use quarterly REIT returns de-levered
by actual interest expenses instead of using a corporate bond index as proxy.
If direct and indirect real estate are unrelated, then from a diversification
argument, it could be optimal to hold both assets in a well diversified portfolio.
If, on the other hand, they are related, they might serve as substitutes for each
2See for instance Goetzmann and Ibbotson [1990], Ross and Zisler [1991], and Myer and
Webb [1994].
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other, and difference in investor preferences might explain the need for both.
Hence, for investors it is important to determine the relationship between REITs
and private real estate since it will affect their asset allocation.
The findings of the current study suggests that REITs and private real estate
are neither perfect substitutes nor completely unrelated. Using REITs as a liquid
substitute for direct real estate will give the investor an considerable exposure
to stock market risks. On the other hand, including both REITs and private
real estate in a investment portfolio will duplicate some of the risk exposures
with REITs reacting faster to news than private real estate investments. This
makes sense since the assets of REITs and direct real estate are fundamentally
the same, but the trading of the two investment vehicles differ. Given the fact
that commercial real estate often involves long term leases, it is not surprising
that the returns both REITs and direct real estate are driven by interest rate
risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides a brief
summary of the related literature, section 1.3 describes the US commercial real
estate market, section 1.4 explains the methodology, section 3.4 describes the
data, the summary statistics, and the extracted macroeconomic factors, section
3.6 presents the results, and section 3.7 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
Several other papers have examined the relationship between direct and indirect
real estate investments in both the short and long run. The previous literature
on the long run comparison of direct and indirect real estate all agree that in
the long run direct and indirect real estate are related. Ang et al. [2012] find
evidence of a long run real estate factor common to both direct and indirect
real estate returns. Similarly, Oikarinen et al. [2011] and Hoesli and Oikarinen
[2012] find that the total return indexes of direct and indirect real estate are co-
integrated, ie. they share a common stochastic trend. Hence, direct and indirect
real estate co-move in the long run.
In the short run the relationship is not as strong. However, most of the
previous literature still find a correlation between REITs and direct real estate
investments. Giliberto [1990] finds that the residuals from regressions of both
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direct and indirect real estate returns on stock and bond market factors are
significantly correlated, indicating that direct and indirect real estate share a
common factor. Mueller and Mueller [2003] and Brounen and Eichholtz [2005]
find, however, that the contemporaneous correlation between direct and indirect
real estate is relatively low. Mei and Lee [1994] find some evidence that REITs
and direct real estate are driven by a common factor. Clayton and MacKinnon
[2001] find that REITs are related to value and small-cap stock market factors,
and to a lesser extent a private real estate factor.
From a theoretical point of view it seems reasonable to expect that direct
and indirect real estate are related, since they both involve investing in actual
properties. However, there might be several investment vehicle specific reasons
why this need not be the case in the short run. First of all, REITs are publicly
listed on stock exchanges, and are thus expected to share a lot of commonalities
with other publicly traded stocks. This is in fact also found by Goetzmann and
Ibbotson [1990], Ross and Zisler [1991], and Myer and Webb [1994]. The fact
that REITs are traded on exchanges makes REITs more liquid than direct real
estate investments, and investors might therefore accept a lower risk premium for
holding REITs than for holding direct real estate. However, the lower contem-
poraneous correlation between direct real estate and the general stock market
gives direct real estate a diversification benefit that may make investors accept
a lower risk premium for direct real estate. Nonetheless, Pagliari et al. [2005]
find that the mean returns of direct and indirect real estate are not significantly
different.
Another possible source of distortion is the differing informational efficiency
of direct and indirect real estate. REITs are generally thought of as more infor-
mationally efficient than direct real estate, because REITs are traded on public
exchanges and thus will react faster to new information than privately traded
direct real estate. The difference in informational efficiency of REITs and direct
real estate, implies that REIT returns should lead direct real estate returns.
Gyourko and Keim [1992], Barkham and Geltner [1995] and Oikarinen et al.
[2011] find such a lead-lag relationship between indirect and direct real estate.
These short-run deviations should, however, cancel out in the long run, since
the fundamental assets are the same.
This paper adds to the existing literature by examining how REITs and
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direct real estate is related to macroeconomic risk.
1.3 The Commercial Real Estate Market
The overall size of the US commercial real estate market was as of December
2010 estimated to be approximately $6.5 trillion, making it the third largest
investable asset class in the US.3 This includes both debt and equity investing.
The focus in this paper is on equity investing.
To represent the return on publicly listed real estate I use total returns data
from the CRSP Ziman REIT database. The total capitalization of publicly
traded equity REITs as of December 2011 was more than $390 billion. Real
Estate Investment Trust is a US tax label granting tax treatment much like that
of mutual funds. The REITs can deduct dividends from their taxable income
given that they pay out 90% of their taxable income as dividends. Further-
more, they are restricted to primarily invest in either real estate equity (equity
REITs), real estate debt (mortgage REITs) or a mixture of the two (hybrid
REITs). Originating from the 1960s, the REITs where primarily meant as an
investment vehicle for small and medium size investors, that otherwise could not
get exposure to commercial real estate. Thus, the REITs are restricted to have
a broad based ownership structure. Since the early 1990s the ownership changed
because new legislation made it possible for institutional investors such as pen-
sion funds to count all their investors/pensioners as owners of the REITs. As a
result, the REIT industry has expanded significantly from a total capitalization
of approximately $12 billion in 1992 to more than $390 billion as of December
2011.
Investing in private/non-listed real estate can be done through funds that are
either open-end or close-end, through private partnerships, or through directly
owning and managing the real estate properties. I focus on the investment in
direct non-listed US real estate. I use data from the National Council of Real
Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF). The NCREIF database is made up of
property level appraisal, transactions and income returns reported by participat-
ing companies with US real estate under management. The returns are reported
on a non-leveraged basis. Note, that since the REITs are free to use debt financ-
3Source: Prudential Real Estate Investors. See Investors [2011]
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ing, the REIT returns will generally be levered. As of July 2011 the NCREIF
database consisted of 6267 income-producing properties worth over $250 billion.
The primary and most widely used index for benchmarking direct real estate
investments is the NCREIF Property Index (NPI) and is based on income and
appraisals of individual properties. It is well establish in the literature (see as
an example Geltner [1993] and Geltner [2000]) that using appraisals instead of
transaction prices makes the NPI suffer from “stale appraisals” and “appraisal
smoothing“.
The “stale appraisals” effect stems from the fact that most properties are
only appraised once a year, but the appraisals are reported on a quarterly basis.
Thus, properties that have not been appraised in a given quarter will contribute
to the index as if the properties have been re-appraised at the same value. This
induces artificial volatility dampening in the index. For more on this see Geltner
[2000].
The “appraisal smoothing“ effect comes from the way appraisers work. Ap-
praisers need to trade off their updated estimate of the property value and the
uncertainty that the estimate could be wrong. Thus, Quan and Quigley [1989]
and Quan and Quigley [1991] show that it is in fact optimal for the appraisers to
make their appraisal a weighted average of their current price estimate and the
previous appraisals. “Appraisal smoothing” thus causes the NPI to suffer from
artificial autocorrelation.
Because of these effects, and I prefer using an index that is based on pure
trading prices for some properties, to an index based on appraisals for all prop-
erties, I choose to use the MIT Transaction Based Index (TBI) to represent
direct real estate investments. It is computed using only actual sales prices from
the NCREIF database, and thus avoids the problems applicable to appraisal
data. The transaction prices are used to estimate a transaction price model at
all times through hedonic regression, to account for the difference in quality of
the properties sold. The model is then used on all the properties in the database
that have not transacted at a given time. The TBI, thus, consists of either actual
or estimated transaction prices for all properties in the NCREIF properties.4
If direct and indirect real estate are unrelated, then from a diversification
perspective, it could be optimal to hold both assets in a well diversified portfolio.
4See Fisher et al. [2007] or http://web.mit.edu/cre/research/credl/tbi.html for more
on the methodology.
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If, on the other hand, they are related, they might serve as substitutes for each
other, and difference in investor preferences might explain the need for both.
As an example, small private investors may not have the funds to obtain a well
diversified real estate portfolio by direct real estate investments and thus prefer
REITs. Other investors might choose REITs because they value liquidity highly.
Finally, large institutional investors, such as pension funds, might not have the
same liquidity constraints and thus prefer direct real estate, since they can reap
the illiquidity premium. However, if REITs only resemble direct real estate in
the long run, then the liquidity argument for substituting direct real estate with
REITs does not hold. It is therefore relevant to clarify the short-run relation
between REITs and direct real estate.
1.4 Methodology
I will estimate a linear factor model along the lines of the Arbitrage Pricing
Theory of Ross [1976] and the Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model of
Merton [1973], to try to explain the excess returns of both an equal weighted
index of equity REITs and the equal weighted TBI. Specifically, I will run the
following time series regression of each of the two indices
ri,t = αi +
K∑
k=1
βi,kFk,t + εi,t, (1.1)
where ri,t is the excess-return at time t for the ith index, Fk,t denotes the time
t value of k economic variables, and εi,t is the idiosyncratic or residual risk,
specific to each of the two indices.
I will use both traditional financial variables such as the Fama and French
[1993] factors, and macroeconomic variables as explanatory variables. I will
extract a few underlying macroeconomic factors through an approximate factor
model of the type in Stock and Watson [2002b], Stock and Watson [2002a], or
Bai and Ng [2002] and use the factors as explanatory variables in equation (1.1).
I assume that the macroeconomic variables contained in Xt, which is a p× 1
vector of observed variables at time t = 1, . . . , T , can be efficiently described by
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the following approximate factor model with time-invariant loadings
Xt = ΛFt + t, (1.2)
where Ft is a q×1 vector of underlying factors with E(Ft) = 0 and E(FtF ᵀt ) = Iq,
where q << p. Λ is p × q matrix of factor loadings, and t is a p × 1 vector
of unobserved errors, which is assumed independent of the factors, and having
E(t) = 0 and variance-covariance matrix Ψ.
The variance-covariance matrix of X is given as
Σ = E[(ΛFt + t)(ΛFt + t)
′] = E[ΛFtF ′tΛ
′ + t′t] = ΛΛ
′ + Ψ,
since E(FtF
′
t) = Iq, and Ft and t are independent of each other. Note, that
the factor model is not uniquely identified. Consider, as an example, a q × q
orthogonal matrix Q, and let Λ∗ = ΛQ and F ∗t = Q
′Ft, then equation (1.2) can
be written as
Xt = ΛQQ
′Ft + t = Λ∗F ∗ + t, (1.3)
and (1.3) will meet all the requirements of the factor model in (1.2), namely that
E(F ∗t F
∗ᵀ
t ) = Q
′E(FtF
ᵀ
t )Q = Iq, and that
Σ = E[(Λ∗F ∗t + t)(Λ
∗
tF
∗
t + t)
′] = ΛΛ′ + Ψ.
Thus, by simply observing X it is not possible to distinguish between Λ and the
rotated loadings, Λ∗ = ΛQ.
The model is typically either estimated by maximum likelihood methods, as
in Anderson [2003], by Bayesian methods as in Otrok and Whiteman [1998] or by
the asymptotic principal components method as in Stock and Watson [2002b].
To use maximum likelihood and Bayesian methods one needs to assume that the
errors are cross-sectionally uncorrelated. Using the asymptotic principal compo-
nents method, however, allows for a small degree of cross-sectional correlation.5
In this paper I choose to estimate the factor model by the asymptotic prin-
cipal components method mainly because of its tractability. The different es-
timation methods should not alter the results significantly. For a thorough
5More specifically, the ratio of the covariance of the errors to the total covariance of X has
to be bounded by a constant. See Stock and Watson [2006] and Ludvigson and Ng [2009] for
more on this.
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explanation of the asymptotic principal components method see appendix 1.9.
1.5 Data and Summary Statistics
To illustrate that the NPI suffers from both “stale appraisals” and “appraisal
smoothing”, and that the TBI is thus a more reasonable proxy for direct real
estate, I have included the NPI in the summary statistics. The TBI is an equal
weighted index and the NPI is value-weighted. Both of the series are quarterly
indexes. The NPI goes back to 1978, and the TBI goes back to 1984. The CRSP
Ziman REIT database has REIT data back to 1980. I compose a equal weighted
equity REIT index. I use quarterly data since this is the highest frequency of
both the NPI and the TBI. The data covers the 2nd quarter of 1984 through to
the 1st quarter of 2011.
Since the REITs are free to use debt financing, REITs will generally be
leveraged. The NCREIF collects unleveraged returns, so to properly compare
the two indices, I need to account for the leverage in the REITs. I follow the
methodology used in Pagliari et al. [2005]. It is based on the Modigliani and
Miller [1958] transformation of levered equity returns:
runl = rl(1− LR) + rd(LR), (1.4)
where runl is the unlevered equity return, rl is the levered equity return, LR is
the ratio of debt-to-assets, and rd is the cost of indebtedness. As the REITs are
tax-exempt, there is no debt interest rate tax shield to consider. In order to use
equation (1.4), I need to estimate both the cost of indebtedness and the ratio of
debt-to-assets for each company. The cost of indebtedness is calculated at each
quarter, t, for each firm as
rd,t =
IEt + PDt
TDt+TDt−1
2
+ PSt+PSt−1
2
, (1.5)
where IEt is the interest expense for each company in quarter t, PDt is the
preferred dividends payed in that quarter, PSt is the value of preferred stock at
the end of quarter t, and TDt is the total value of debt for each firm at the end
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of that quarter. It is calculated as
TDt = LTDt +DCLt +max(0, CLt −DCLt − CAt).
LTDt is the long term debt, DCLt is the value of debt in current liabilities,
CLt is current liabilities, and CAt is current assets. All values are at the end of
quarter t. The ratio of debt-to-assets of each company is calculated as
LRt =
TDt+PSt
TDt+PSt+Capt
+ TDt−1+PSt−1
TDt−1+PSt−1+Capt−1
2
, (1.6)
where Capt is the market capitalization of each REIT at the end of each quarter.
The only exceptions to equation (1.5) and (1.6) are when the balance sheet values
in both equations for each firm become available for the first time. In this case
the denominator of equation (1.5) is not an average of time t and t − 1 values,
but simply the time t values, and likewise equation (1.6) is simply time t values.
The balance sheet items are from the Compustat Database. Since I use
quarterly observations, and not yearly observations like Pagliari et al. [2005],
not all balance sheet values are available for all the REITs for the entire period.
Instead of excluding all the REITs without balance sheet items, I calculate an
equal weighted cost of indebtedness and ratio of debt-to-assets at all points in
time. These are then applied to the time series returns of the equal weighted
equity REIT index. This not too different from Hoesli and Oikarinen [2012], who
also calculate average debt-to-assets ratios through time, but use corporate bond
yields to proxy cost of indebtedness, and use it to lever the direct real estate
returns instead of de-levering REIT returns. My approach has the advantage
of using actual REIT interest expenses, and not the proxy bond yields. Figure
1.1 shows the time series plot of both the equal weighted cost of indebtedness
estimated from actual interest expenses and the Moody’s Baa rated corporate
bond yields. The two time series deviate with as much as approximately 1
percentage point in the beginning of the period. Thus, using the Moody’s Baa
rated corporate debt yields, might not give the same results as using actual
interest expenses.
To illustrate the artificial nature of the appraisal based NPI, I have included
the NPI in the summary statistics in table 1.1. As seen from the table, the
REIT index has the highest mean return of 2.59%, but it is not too different
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from the mean return of the TBI and NPI, and differences of the means are not
significantly different from 0. As expected, the NPI is the least volatile of the
three with a quarterly standard deviation of 2.3%. The TBI, which does not
suffer from stale appraisals or appraisal smoothing, has a standard deviation
of 4.55%. The lower volatility is due to the appraisal nature of the NPI. The
equity REIT index returns has been de-levered and has a standard deviation of
4.73%, which is quite comparable to that of the TBI. The levered REIT mean
return and standard deviation are not listed in the table, but are respectively
3.10% and 10.6%, and so correctly accounting for leverage is very important
when comparing REITs to direct real estate investments. The Sharpe ratio is a
little higher for the equity REIT index than for both the NPI and the TBI, but
given the fact that the differences in means are not statistically significant from
0, it seems that neither REITs nor direct real estate outperform the other in
terms of mean return and standard deviation. This is in line with Pagliari et al.
[2005], who find that, when accounting for leverage and the appraisal effects of
the NPI6, the mean and standard deviation of indirect and direct real estate
returns are similar.
According to the NCREIF organization, the number of properties sold in
times of crisis drops significantly, suggesting that in crisis times investors with
liquidity needs probably firstly tries to sell more liquid assets like bonds and
stocks, and only investors unable to meet their liquidity needs by selling these
assets will liquidate their direct real estate investments. Since REITs are stocks
and trade on exchanges, this could mean that during times of crisis REITs
experience a bigger price drop than the direct real estate market, simply because
the direct real estate market freezes. Figure 1.2 shows that during the financial
crisis the drop in the TBI return was indeed not as big as the drop in the equity
REIT return, but the subsequent recovery was not as big either.
The summary statistics in table 1.1 show that the three time series are not
very correlated. The TBI and NPI has the highest correlation of 53%, while the
correlation between the equity REIT index and the TBI and NPI is 24% and
15%, respectively. As expected the trade based index is closer to the REIT index
than the appraisal based, which suffers from the above mentioned “appraisal
smoothing” and “stale appraisals”.
6Note that Pagliari et al. [2005] uses the NPI and not the TBI, but tries to remove the
appraisal effects through statistical techniques.
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From the autocorrelations in table 1.1, it is clear to see how the appraisals
induce autocorrelation in the NPI. At the first lag the autocorrelation is as high
as 79%, and even at the fourth lag the autocorrelation is 36.8%. While the
autocorrelations of the TBI are not above 19% at any lags.
1.5.1 Fundamental Macroeconomic Factors
To explain the commercial real estate returns of the equity REIT index and
the TBI, I will extract the underlying factors of 122 macroeconomic variables
through the asymptotic principal components methodology of Stock and Watson
[2002b], Stock and Watson [2002a] and Bai and Ng [2002]. Together, these 122
variables contain most of the US macroeconomic information. These variables
are very similar to the variables used in both Bernanke et al. [2005] and Ludvig-
son and Ng [2009]. The variables are not completely the same, since Bernanke
et al. [2005] and Ludvigson and Ng [2009] have monthly observations and data
from the IHS Global Insights database, whereas I have quarterly observations
and use data from the Federal Reserve Bank St. Louis FRED database. The
variables that are not stationary are transformed to induce stationarity. A com-
plete list of the variables and the transformations used is available in appendix
1.10.
Extracting the factors underlying the macroeconomy has the advantage of
extracting most the macroeconomic information in only a few variables. How-
ever, it of course comes at a few costs. For example, it adds estimation error,
since the factors are unobserved. Furthermore, a clear interpretation of the fac-
tors can be difficult, because the factors generally will load on many of the 122
macroeconomic variables.
I find that the 122 macro variables can be described by 4 underlying factors
by the information criteria of Bai and Ng [2002]. All three information criteria
agree on 4 underlying factors. The 4 factors together describe 58.3% of the
variation in the 122 variables. I scale the 4 factors to unit variance to ease
comparability.
To attach economic interpretation to the 4 factors I regress each of the 122
variables on each of the factors one at a time and report the R2. The results
are shown in figure 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6. The first factor loads heavily on
employment and industrial production variables, and hence measures the overall
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economic activity. Furthermore, the time series plot of the 1st factor in figure
1.7, shows that the factor peaks in recessions. I thus dub it the recession factor.
Figure 1.4 shows that the second factor loads heavily on housing and credit
variables. The time series plot in figure 1.8 shows that the housing and credit
factor is highly related to the number of new privately owned housing units
started. I name it the housing and credit factor.
The 3rd factor loads heavily on prices variables as seen from figure 1.5. The
price variables are all transformed to changes in natural logarithms, hence, the
3rd factor is really an inflation factor. The time series graph in figure 1.9 shows
that the factor in fact closely the inversion of the change in the log of the
consumer price index, all items (CPI). Thus, an increase in the 3rd/inflation
factor corresponds to a drop in inflation.
The 4th and last factor is related to changes in US Treasury yields and
US Treasury spread levels as seen from figure 1.6. I thus dub the 4th factor,
the interest rate factor. In fact, the time series dynamics of this factor closely
resembles the movements of the changes in the 3 month US Treasury constant
maturity rate as seen from figure 1.10.
1.6 Results
Table 1.2 shows the results from regressions of the excess return of the REIT
index and the excess return of the TBI against each other and different stock
market factors. The reported standard errors are Newey and West [1987] stan-
dard errors. The second column shows (not conditioned on other factors) that
REITs and direct real estate are contemporaneously correlated. The estimated
TBI beta coefficient is 0.291 and the regression has an adjusted R2 of 6.7%. This
is in line with the time series graph in figure 1.2 showing a connection between
the REIT index and the TBI.
As seen from the third column the effect of the market portfolio7 is much
stronger than the TBI effect in line with a classic CAPM model. The fourth
column, shows that the TBI excess return remains significant when including
the market portfolio. However, including the TBI excess return only raise the
7The market portfolio along with the SMB and HML portfolios are from Kenneth R.
French’s webpage. The market portfolio is a value-weighted index of all the CRSP firms
incorporated in the US and listed on either the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ.
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adjusted R2 from 32.2% to 34.7%. This indicate at most a weak relation between
REITs and direct real estate.
Including the Fama and French [1993] SMB and HML portfolios in the 5th
and 6th column of table 1.2 eliminates the effect of the TBI. If one were to argue
that the SMB and the HML portfolios do not represent fundamental risk factors,
but simply profitable portfolios, it might be too harsh a demand to require
the TBI to remain significant in such a specification. Especially, considering
the limited number of observations due to the quarterly frequency of the TBI.
Nevertheless, including the Fama and French [1993] SMB and HML portfolios
does raise the adjusted R2 to 71.2%, and hence shows that REITs are primarily
related to the stock market.
Column 7 and 8 in table 1.2 shows that the TBI is not at all driven by
stock market risk factors, since both the market portfolio, the SMB, and the
HML portfolios are statistically insignificant. Given that REITs and direct real
estate are respectively publicly and privately traded, it is natural to include lags
of the REIT index and the stock market factors, to test for a lagged relation
between the two investments. Column 9 and 10 in table 1.2 shows that the 1
quarter lagged REIT excess return is statistically significant, and including both
the contemporaneous and lagged REIT excess return raise the adjusted R2 to
11.4%. Including the 1 quarter lagged Fama and French [1993] factors results in
an adjusted R2 of only 2.7%. Indicating the TBI is reacting to the real estate
specific information in the REIT index, and not stock market information. This
is in line with the findings of Gyourko and Keim [1992], Barkham and Geltner
[1995] and Oikarinen et al. [2011]. In unreported results I find, in line with
Barkham and Geltner [1995], that the Granger causality runs from publicly
listed REITs and to direct and privately traded but not the other way.
Given that real estate is a “real” asset, and that the assets held by REITs
are in fact real estate, an obvious hypothesis is that both REITs and direct
real estate are driven by macroeconomic risk. To examine this, I include the
4 macroeconomic factors extracted by asymptotic principal components as ex-
planatory variables in regressions explaining the REIT and TBI excess returns.
The results are shown in table 1.3.
From table 1.3 it is seen that the REITs are exposed to the interest rate
factor. The factor is even robust to the inclusion of the Fama and French [1993]
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factors. Comparing the 2nd column of table 1.3 to the same specification, just
without the macro factors, in table 1.2 shows that including the macroeconomic
factors increases the adjusted R2 from 32.2% to 38.2%. This is a nontrivial
increase, and shows that the interest rate factor is also economically significant.
Since the macroeconomic factors are scaled to have unit variances, a 1 standard
deviation increase in the interest rate factor leads to a 1.3%-point increase in the
quarterly REIT excess return. REITs thus perform better in times of raising
interest rates. From a theoretical perspective there are at least two ways in
which interest rates affect returns. Firstly, when interest rates go up, the present
valuation of the future cash flows goes down, and higher interest rates should
thus imply that returns go down. Secondly, however, interest increase are often
associated with good economic times, which would lead to higher returns. One
interpretation of the of the estimated positive loading on the interest rate factor,
is that the latter effect dominates the valuation effect.
However, it is worth noting that the REITs are not exposed to the recession
factor. This could be because the recession factor is more related to the real
economy and the interest rate factor is closer related to the financial markets.
The TBI excess return is on the other hand not related to the interest rate
factor in any of the specifications. It is related to the recession factor in the first
specification. A 1 standard deviation increase in the recession factor reduces the
TBI excess return by 1.1%-points. Thus, bad real economic times, are related to
lower TBI excess returns. In the last column the HML portfolio is statistically
significant, but the economic significance is limited. The adjusted R2 increases
only marginally from 7.7% to 8.4%. Direct real estate is at most weakly related
to the contemporaneous macroeconomic risk factors.
However, the lead-lag relationship between REITs and direct real estate doc-
umented in Gyourko and Keim [1992], Barkham and Geltner [1995] and Oikari-
nen et al. [2011] and the significant lagged REIT excess return in column 9 and
10 in table 1.2 suggest adding lagged time series of the macroeconomic factors in
explaining the TBI excess returns. The results from regressions including lagged
terms of the macroeconomic factors and the REIT excess return are shown in
table 1.4. In column 2-5 up to 4 quarters lags of the 4 factors are included
one at a time along with the 1 quarter lag of the REIT excess return. The 1
year lags of the recession factor and the interest rate factor are significant both
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statistically and economically. The adjusted R2 increases from 6.0% in column
9 of table 1.2 to 12.9% and 14.2% for the recession factor and the interest rate
factor respectively. And, a 1 standard deviation increase in the two factors will
lead to a 1.5%-point drop and a 1.7%-point increase in the quarterly excess
return, respectively. The lagged REIT excess return is significant in all these
specifications.
Including the 1 year lags of both the recession factor and the interest rate
factor in column 5 results in only the interest rate factor being significant. This
suggests that the significance of the 4th lag of the recession factor in column 2
was due multicollinearity with one or more of the other lags. In fact, the last
column in table 1.4 shows the best specification including the recession and the
interest rate factor. It includes the 1st lag of the recession factor and the 4th
lag of the interest rate factor. The adjusted R2 is 18.4%. Caution is probably
warranted in putting too much emphasis on the specific lag structure, but the
results in table 1.4 do show that controlling for lagged REIT excess returns,
direct real estate reacts to both the recession and the interest rate factor with a
lag.
As a robustness check, I try forming simple macroeconomic factors as equal
weighted averages of the variables that each factor loads heavily on. Thus, the
simple mean or average recession factor is the equal weighted average of all the
output and income and employment and earnings variables. The mean housing
and credit factor is the equal weighted average of all the housing variables and
the money and credit variables. The mean inflation factor is the equal weighted
average of all the price variables. And finally, the mean interest rate factor is the
average of all the US Treasury rates and spreads against the US federal funds
rate.
The simple mean factors are substituted for the extracted macroeconomic
factors in the regression specification used in table 1.3. The results are shown in
table 1.5. The mean interest rate factor is again the only factor affecting REIT
excess returns. This further strengthens the result that REITs are related to an
interest rate factor.
The most notable difference from using the extracted macroeconomic factors,
is that the housing and credit factor becomes significant for the TBI. The factor
is significant in all the specifications, and a 1 standard deviation increase in the
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factor leads to 1.1-1.2%-point increase in the TBI excess return. Furthermore,
using the simple mean factors increases the adjusted R2 from 7.8% (in column
6 of table 1.3 using extracted factors) to 16.1% in the corresponding column in
table 1.5. This suggests that the TBI excess return is contemporaneously related
to a housing and credit factor.
However, table 1.6 presenting the results from regressing lags of the sim-
ple average macroeconomic factors instead of extracted factors shows that only
the contemporaneous simple inflation factor is significant, and the adjusted R2
is only 6.0%. This suggests that the factors extracted by asymptotic princi-
pal components entail important information not contained in the simple mean
factors.
Overall, I find that REIT excess returns are related to stock market factors
and to the interest rate factor describing the change in the short term US interest
rates. Furthermore, REITs lead the direct real estate market, measured by the
TBI, by about 1 quarter. The TBI is is driven by lags of the recession and the
interest rate factors even when controlling for the lagged REIT excess returns.
Hence, REITs and direct real estate are related through a lag both directly and
via a common exposure to the interest rate factor.
1.7 Conclusion
I have examined the commonality between publicly traded real estate invest-
ments via REITs, privately traded direct real estate investments, measured by
the TBI, and the macro economy by extracting the factors underlying a large
dataset of a 122 macroeconomic variables by the asymptotic principal compo-
nents method of Stock and Watson [2002b], Stock and Watson [2002a], and Bai
and Ng [2002].
I de-lever the REIT returns using actual interest expenses, contrary to earlier
studies using the yield on Baa rated debt as a proxy, to make REIT returns
comparable to the TBI which is reported on an unlevered basis.
I find not only that REITs lead private real estate, but also that they are
related through a common exposure to an interest rate factor. REITs react
contemporaneously to the interest rate factor and private real estate reacts with
a lag, consistent with REITs being more informationally efficient than the private
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real estate market.
Furthermore, I find that REITs are mainly driven by stock market risk, and
that private real estate is driven by a lagged recession factor and, to some extent,
a housing and credit factor.
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1.8 Figures and Tables
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Figure 1.1: Comparison of the cost of indebtedness proxied by Moody’s Baa rated corporate
debt yields, and calculated as an equal weighted average interest cost from actual REIT interest
expenses.
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Figure 1.2: Time-series plot of the returns of the NPI, the TBI, and the all equity REIT
index. Shaded areas indicate NBER recessions.
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Figure 1.7: Time-series plot of the recession factor (1st factor). Shaded areas indicate NBER
recessions.
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Figure 1.8: Time-series plot of the housing and credit factor (2nd factor), and the log of the
of new privately owned business units started. Both series are scaled to have unit variance
to increase comparability. The scale on y-axis thus have no economic meaning. Shaded areas
indicate NBER recessions.
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Figure 1.9: Time-series plot of the inflation factor (3rd factor), and the difference in the log
of the CPI:All Items. Both series are scaled to have unit variance to increase comparability.
The scale on y-axis thus have no economic meaning. Shaded areas indicate NBER recessions.
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Figure 1.10: Time-series plot of the interest rate factor (4th factor), and the change in the
US Treasury 3 month constant maturity rate. Both series are scaled to have unit variance to
increase comparability. The scale on y-axis thus have no economic meaning. Shaded areas
indicate NBER recessions.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics for the total return time-series: Equity REITs, the NPI, and the TBI.
REITs TBI NPI
Mean (%) 2.59 1.96 1.84
Std. dev. (%) 4.73 4.55 2.30
Sharpe Ratios 0.298 0.171 0.288
Correlations Equity REITs 1.00 0.24 0.15
TBI 0.24 1.00 0.53
NPI 0.15 0.53 1.00
Autocorrelations 1st lag (%) 6.6 3.0 79.0
2nd lag (%) -3.7 19.0 67.4
3rd lag (%) -7.2 8.6 47.8
4th lag (%) 14.1 12.9 36.8
Table 1.2: Regressions of REIT and TBI excess returns on each other and stock market factors. Newey
and West [1987] standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0.1% confidence
level, ** significance at the 1% confidence level, and * denotes significance at the 5% confidence level.
Dependent variable
Unlevered REIT excess return TBI excess return︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷
Intercept 0.012** 0.008. 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
TBIt − Rft 0.291*** 0.189* 0.087
(0.074) (0.087) (0.077)
Rmktt − Rft 0.319*** 0.301*** 0.332*** 0.323*** 0.094* 0.107
(0.080) (0.082) (0.042) (0.047) (0.043) (0.055)
SMBt 0.373*** 0.368*** 0.056
(0.051) (0.050) (0.083)
HMLt 0.435*** 0.425*** 0.117*
(0.053) (0.053) (0.049)
RREITt − Rft 0.236
(0.129)
RREITt−1 − Rft−1 0.246** 0.220**
(0.083) (0.078)
Rmktt−1 − Rft−1 0.079
(0.102)
SMBt−1 0.001
(0.115)
HMLt−1 0.172*
(0.066)
N 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 107 107 107
Adj. R2 6.7% 32.2% 34.7% 71.2% 71.6% 2.3% 2.9% 6.0% 11.4% 2.7%
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Table 1.3: OLS regressions of the REIT and TBI excess return on stock market factors and the 4 extracted
macroeconomic factors, the recession factor (Recession), the housing and credit factor (Housing), the inflation
factor (Inflation), and the interest rate factor (Interest rate). Newey and West [1987] standard errors are shown
in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0.1% confidence level, ** significance at the 1% confidence level,
and * denotes significance at the 5% confidence level.
Dependent variable
Unlevered REIT excess return TBI excess return︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷
Intercept 0.009* 0.008* 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.007 0.006
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
TBI − Rf 0.193* 0.090
(0.074) (0.078)
Rmkt − Rf 0.279*** 0.270*** 0.314*** 0.309*** 0.049 0.051
(0.060) (0.067) (0.036) (0.041) (0.058) (0.076)
SMB 0.314*** 0.305*** 0.100
(0.047) (0.047) (0.106)
HML 0.433*** 0.424*** 0.099*
(0.045) (0.046) (0.038)
Recession -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.011* -0.009 -0.01
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Housing -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004** 0.008 0.009 0.008
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Inflation 0.005 0.006* 0.001 0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Interest rate 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.005 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
N 108 108 108 108 108 108 108
Adj. R2 38.2% 40.7% 73.2% 73.6% 7.8% 7.7% 8.4%
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Table 1.4: OLS regressions of the TBI excess return on the lagged REIT excess return and lags of the 4
extracted macroeconomic factors, the recession factor (Recession), the housing and credit factor (Housing), the
inflation factor (Inflation), and the interest rate factor (IR). Newey and West [1987] standard errors are shown
in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0.1% confidence level, ** significance at the 1% confidence level,
and * denotes significance at the 5% confidence level.
Dependent variable
TBI excess return︷ ︸︸ ︷
Intercept 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
RREITt−1 −Rft−1 0.201* 0.248** 0.208** 0.232* 0.215* 0.164
(0.076) (0.075) (0.073) (0.106) (0.094) (0.086)
Recessiont 0.011
(0.008)
Recessiont−1 -0.019 -0.01*
(0.016) (0.004)
Recessiont−2 -0.003
(0.014)
Recessiont−3 -0.014
(0.011)
Recessiont−4 0.015* -0.005
(0.006) (0.004)
Housingt 0.024
(0.014)
Housingt−1 -0.001
(0.018)
Housingt−2 -0.001
(0.016)
Housingt−3 -0.032
(0.016)
Housingt−4 0.018
(0.014)
Inflationt -0.006
(0.006)
Inflationt−1 0.000
(0.009)
Inflationt−2 0.000
(0.006)
Inflationt−3 0.000
(0.011)
Inflationt−4 0.008
(0.008)
IRt 0.005
(0.006)
IRt−1 -0.011
(0.008)
IRt−2 0.012
(0.007)
IRt−3 -0.007
(0.007)
IRt−4 0.017* 0.015*** 0.012**
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
N 104 104 104 104 104 104
Adj. R2 12.9% 10.6% 5.5% 14.2% 15.5% 18.4%
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Table 1.5: OLS regressions of the REIT and TBI excess return on stock market factors and 4 simple
macroeconomic factors. The macroeconomic factors are simply the equal weighted means of the variables with
the highest loadings in figure 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 denoted the average recession factor (Avg. Recession),
the average housing and credit factor (Avg. Housing), the average inflation factor (Avg. Inflation), and the
average interest rate factor (Avg. IR). Newey and West [1987] standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***
denotes significance at the 0.1% confidence level, ** significance at the 1% confidence level, and * denotes
significance at the 5% confidence level.
Dependent variable
Unlevered REIT excess return TBI excess return︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷
Intercept 0.009* 0.008* 0.004 0.003 0.008* 0.007 0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
TBI − Rf 0.155 0.079
(0.084) (0.079)
Rmkt − Rf 0.291*** 0.285*** 0.319*** 0.316*** 0.042 0.039
(0.073) (0.072) (0.040) (0.046) (0.056) (0.069)
SMB 0.354*** 0.348*** 0.081
(0.052) (0.048) (0.091)
HML 0.426*** 0.421*** 0.061
(0.059) (0.059) (0.054)
Avg. Recession -0.007 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.013* -0.011 -0.011
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Avg. Housing 0.004 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.012* 0.012* 0.011*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Avg. Inflation -0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Avg. IR 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.004* 0.004** 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
N 108 108 108 108 108 108 108
Adj. R2 40.0% 38.2% 71.1% 71.3% 16.1% 15.8% 15.3%
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Table 1.6: OLS regressions of the TBI excess return on the lagged REIT excess return and lags of the 4
simple macroeconomic factors. The macroeconomic factors are simply the equal weighted means of the variables
with the highest loadings in figure 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 denoted the average recession factor (Avg. Recession),
the average housing and credit factor (Avg. Housing), the average inflation factor (Avg. Inflation), and the
average interest rate factor (Avg. IR). Newey and West [1987] standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***
denotes significance at the 0.1% confidence level, ** significance at the 1% confidence level, and * denotes
significance at the 5% confidence level.
Dependent variable
TBI excess return︷ ︸︸ ︷
Intercept 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Rmktt−1 −Rft−1 0.135 0.213* 0.260*** 0.235*
(0.079) (0.099) (0.064) (0.118)
Avg. Recessiont -0.005
(0.006)
Avg. Recessiont−1 -0.01
(0.008)
Avg. Recessiont−2 -0.009
(0.006)
Avg. Recessiont−3 0.006
(0.007)
Avg. Recessiont−4 -0.003
(0.004)
Avg. Housingt -0.005
(0.020)
Avg. Housingt−1 0.004
(0.023)
Avg. Housingt−2 0.018
(0.025)
Avg. Housingt−3 0.031
(0.023)
Avg. Housingt−4 -0.034
(0.019)
Avg. Inflationt 0.009*
(0.004)
Avg. Inflationt−1 0.001
(0.005)
Avg. Inflationt−2 0.005
(0.005)
Avg. Inflationt−3 0.001
(0.008)
Avg. Inflationt−4 0.004
(0.005)
Avg. IRt -0.005
(0.005)
Avg. IRt−1 0.000
(0.007)
Avg. IRt−2 -0.003
(0.007)
Avg. IRt−3 0.005
(0.007)
Avg. IRt−4 0.007
(0.005)
N 104 104 104 104
Adj. R2 17.7% 13.6% 6.0% 6.0%
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1.9 Asymptotic Principal Components
The method of asymptotic principal components is a quasi-MLE method, mean-
ing that the estimators are proven under strict assumptions, but consistency is
proved under weaker nonparametric assumptions. Here I just derive the factors
and factor loadings. For more on the consistency of the estimated factors see
Stock and Watson [2002a] and Bai and Ng [2006].
Under the assumptions that t in
Xt = ΛFt + t,
is iid. as N(0, σ2 ) (both independent in the time series and the cross-sectional
dimension), where Xt is the p×1 vector of variables at time t, Λ is the p×q matrix
of factor loadings, and the stacked factors, F , is a T × q dimensional unknown
nonrandom parameter to be estimated, the maximum likelihood estimator of
(Λ, Ft) for a given number of factors, k, solves the following nonlinear least
squares problem
min
Fk,Λk
V (F k,Λk) =
∑p
i=1
∑T
t=1
(
Xi,t − ΛkiF kt
)2
pT
. (1.7)
Here the superscript, k, represents the number of factors in the estimation, such
that Fˆ k is a T × k matrix of estimated factors. The first order conditions leads
to the following expression for the minimizers of equation (1.7), (Fˆ k, Λˆk),
Λˆkᵀi =
(
T∑
t=1
Fˆ kt Xi,t
)(
T∑
t=1
Fˆ kt Fˆ
kᵀ
t
)−1
(1.8)
Fˆ kt =
(
T∑
t=1
ΛˆkᵀXi,t
)(
T∑
t=1
ΛˆkᵀΛˆk
)−1
. (1.9)
One solution is obtained by imposing the restriction ΛkᵀΛk/p = Ik and substi-
tuting equation (1.9) into equation (1.7), and then minimizing with respect to
Λk. The objective function is minimized at Λˆk equal to
√
p times the eigenvec-
tors corresponding to the k largest eigenvalues of the p × p matrix X ′X. The
normalization implies that Fˆ k = XΛˆk/p.
Another solution is obtained by instead assuming that F kᵀF k/T = Ik, and
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then substituting equation (1.8) into (1.7), and then minimizing with respect to
F k. This illustrates the rotational indeterminacy of factor models.
Bai and Ng [2002] propose three information criteria for determining the
number of underlying factors, and show that the number of underlying factors
can be consistently estimated by all three criteria. The three criteria are
IC1(k) = ln(V (k, Fˆ k)) + k
(
p+ T
pT
)
ln
(
pT
p+ T
)
IC2(k) = ln(V (k, Fˆ k)) + k
(
p+ T
pT
)
lnC2pT
IC3(k) = ln(V (k, Fˆ k)) + k
(
lnC2pT
C2pT
)
,
where C2pT = min{p, T} and
V (k, Fˆ k) =
∑p
i=1 σ
2
i
p
=
∑p
i=1 eˆ
′
ieˆi/T
p
,
where eˆi are the i’th estimated residuals.
The information criteria are calculated for k = 1, . . . , kmax underlying fac-
tors. The number of factors yielding the lowest information criteria corresponds
to the estimate of the number of underlying factors.
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1.10 Macroeconomic Variables
The 122 variables used in this paper are listed below. Data was collected from the
St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank FRED database. In the tables below“SA”means
that the time series is seasonally adjusted, “ln”means that the natural logarithm
was taken to induce stationarity, ei. ln(Xi,t), “lvl” means that no transformation
was performed, “∆lvl” means “difference in levels”, ei. Xi,t −Xi,t−1, and “∆ln”
means “difference in logs”, ei. ln(Xi,t)− ln(Xi,t−1).
Output and Income
∆ln Personal Income, SA
∆ln Disposable Personal Income, SA
∆ln Personal Income Excluding Current Transfer Receipts, SA
∆ln Gross Domestic Product, SA
∆ln Industrial Production Index - Total Index, SA
∆ln Industrial Production Index - Durable Manufacturing, SA
∆ln Industrial Production Index - Final Products, SA
∆ln Industrial Production Index - Consumer Goods, SA
∆ln Industrial Production Index - Durable Consumer Goods, SA
∆ln Industrial Production Index - Nondurable Consumer Goods, SA
∆ln Industrial Production Index - Business Equipment, SA
∆ln Industrial Production Index - Materials, SA
∆ln Industrial Production Index - Durable Goods Materials, SA
∆ln Industrial Production Index - Nondurable Goods Materials, SA
∆ln Industrial Production Index - Manufacturing, SA
lvl NAPM Production Index, SA
lvl Capacity Utilization, SA
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Employment, Hours, and Earnings
∆ln Civilian Labor Force, SA
∆ln Civilian Employment, SA
∆lvl Unemployed, SA
∆lvl Average Duration of Unemployment, SA
∆ln Civilians Unemployed - Less than 5 weeks, SA
∆ln Civilians Unemployed - 5-14 weeks, SA
∆ln Civilians Unemployed - 15 weeks and over, SA
∆ln Civilians Unemployed - 15-26 weeks, SA
∆ln Civilians Unemployed - 27 weeks and over, SA
∆ln All Employees: Total Nonfarm, SA
∆ln All Employees: Total Private Industries, SA
∆ln All Employees: Goods-Producing Industries, SA
∆ln All Employees: Mining and Logging, SA
∆ln All Employees: Construction, SA
∆ln All Employees: Manufacturing, SA
∆ln All Employees: Durable Goods, SA
∆ln All Employees: Nondurable Goods, SA
∆ln All Employees: Service-Providing Industries, SA
∆ln All Employees: Trade, Transportation and Utilities, SA
∆ln All Employees: Wholesale Trade, SA
∆ln All Employees: Retail Trade, SA
∆ln All Employees: Financial Activities, SA
∆ln All Employees: Government, SA
∆ln All Employees: Information Services, SA
∆ln All Employees: Professional and Business Services, SA
lvl Average Weekly Hours of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Goods
∆lvl Average Weekly Hours of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Construction
lvl NAPM Employment Index, SA
∆ln Average Hourly Earnings of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Goods
∆ln Average Hourly Earnings of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Construction
∆ln Average Hourly Earnings of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Manufacturing
∆ln Average Hourly Earnings of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Total Private
Housing
ln Housing Starts Total: New Privately Owned Housing Units Started, SA
ln Housing Starts in Midwest Census Region, SA
ln Housing Starts in Northeast Census Region, SA
ln Housing Starts in South Census Region, SA
ln Housing Starts in West Census Region, SA
ln New One Family Houses Sold: United States, SA
ln New Private Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits, SA
ln New Privately-Owned Housing Units Under Construction, SA
ln New Homes Sold in the United States
lvl Median Number of Months on Sales Market
lvl Ratio of Houses for Sale to Houses Sold, SA
Consumption, Orders, and Inventories
lvl Purchasing Managers’ Index, SA
lvl New Orders Index, SA
lvl Supplier Deliveries Index, SA
lvl Inventories Index, SA
∆ln Personal Consumption Expenditures, SA
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Money and Credit
∆ln Commercial and Industrial Loans at All Commercial Banks, SA
∆ln Consumer (Individual) Loans at All Commercial Banks, SA
∆ln Currency Component of M1, SA
∆ln M1 Money Stock, SA
∆ln M2 Money Stock, SA
∆ln Real Estate Loans at All Commercial Banks, SA
lvl Personal Savings Rate, SA
∆ln Total Consumer Credit Outstanding, SA
∆ln Home Mortgages - Liabilities - Balance Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Organisations
∆ln Household Sector: Liabilities: Household Credit Market Debt Outstanding, SA
∆ln Debt Outstanding Domestic Nonfinancial Sectors - Household, Consumer Credit Sector, SA
∆ln Debt Outstanding Domestic Nonfinancial Sectors - Household, Home Mortgage Sector, SA
∆ln Owners’ Equity in Household Real Estate - Net Worth - Balance Sheet of Households and
Nonprofit Organizations
∆ln Real Estate - Assets - Balance Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Organizations
Bond and Exchange Rates
∆lvl Interest Rate: Federal Funds Rate
∆lvl Interest Rate: US Treasury Bills, Sec. Mkt., 1m
∆lvl Interest Rate: US Treasury Bills, Sec. Mkt., 3m
∆lvl Interest Rate: US Treasury Bills, Sec. Mkt., 6m
∆lvl Interest Rate: US Treasury Const. Mat., 1y
∆lvl Interest Rate: US Treasury Const. Mat., 3y
∆lvl Interest Rate: US Treasury Const. Mat., 5y
∆lvl Interest Rate: US Treasury Const. Mat., 7y
∆lvl Interest Rate: US Treasury Const. Mat., 10y
∆lvl Interest Rate: 30y Conventional Mortgage Rate
∆lvl Bond Yield: Moody’s AAA Corporate
∆lvl Bond Yield: Moody’s BBB Corporate
lvl Spread: 3m - Federal Funds Rate
lvl Spread: 6m - Federal Funds Rate
lvl Spread: 1y - Federal Funds Rate
lvl Spread: 3y - Federal Funds Rate
lvl Spread: 5y - Federal Funds Rate
lvl Spread: 7y - Federal Funds Rate
lvl Spread: 10y - Federal Funds Rate
lvl Spread: AAA - Federal Funds Rate
lvl Spread: BAA - Federal Funds Rate
lvl Spread: BAA - AAA
∆ln Foreign Exchange Rate: Canadian Dollars to One US Dollar
∆ln Foreign Exchange Rate: Japanese Yen to One US Dollar
∆ln Foreign Exchange Rate: US Dollars to One British Pound
∆ln Foreign Exchange Rate: Swiss Francs to One US Dollar
Prices
∆ln Producer Price Index: Crude Materials for Further Processing, SA
∆ln Producer Price Index: Finished Consumer Foods, SA
∆ln Producer Price Index: Finished Goods, SA
∆ln Producer Price Index: Intermediate Materials: Supplies and Components, SA
∆ln CPI-U: All Items, SA
∆ln CPI-U: Housing, SA
∆ln CPI-U: Transportation, SA
∆ln CPI-U: Commodities, SA
∆ln CPI-U: Durables, SA
∆ln CPI-U: Nondurables, SA
∆ln CPI-U: All Items Less Food, SA
∆ln CPI-U: All Items Less Shelter, SA
∆ln Spot Oil Price: West Texas Intermediate, SA
∆ln Personal Consumption Expenditures: Chain-type Price Index, SA
∆ln Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator, SA
Stock Market
∆ln S&P Composite Index Level
∆ln Dow Jones Industrial Average
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Essay 2
Testing the Effect of Taxes and
Free Cash Flow Problems on
Capital Structure: Evidence
from REITs1
1I thank Jesper Rangvid, Stefan Hirth and seminar participants at Copenhagen Business
School, the 2014 Nordic Finance Network PhD workshop, and PenSam Liv A/S for helpful
comments. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of PenSam Liv A/S. All remaining
errors are my own.
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Abstract
Utilizing the fact that Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are
effectively tax exempt and have to pay out at least 90% of their taxable
income as dividends, I show that even in the absence of tax advantages of
debt and free cash flow agency problems, firms still adjust their capital
structure towards a dynamic target leverage ratio as predicted by the
Trade-off theory. Furthermore, REITs on average tend to have higher
leverage ratios than similar real estate firms without the REIT status.
This suggests that firms have other benefits of debt than the tax advantage
and mitigation of free cash flow agency problems.
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2.1 Introduction
In this article I examine the effect of the tax advantage of debt and the mitigating
effect of debt on free cash flow agency problems on firm capital structure choices.
Specifically, I examine how the two effects affect the level of leverage and the
tendency of firms to have dynamic target leverage ratios that they revert to
as predicted by the dynamic Trade-off theory. I do this by comparing publicly
listed real estate investment trust (REITs) to regular listed real estate companies
without the REIT status (non-REITs). REITs are effectively tax exempt and not
prone to free cash flow agency problems, because they are required to pay out at
least 90% of the taxable income as dividends and can deduct their dividends from
their taxable income. The only differences between the two groups of companies
are the tax exemption and the 90% payout requirement. By examining the level
of leverage and testing the target adjustment behaviour of these two groups of
firms, I am able to identify the effect of taxes and free cash flow agency problems.
I find that REITs on average have higher leverage ratios than similar non-
REITs, and they still adjust their capital structure towards a dynamic target
leverage ratio. This suggests that firms have other benefits of debt than the tax
advantage and mitigation of free cash flow agency problems. The results are
robust to all the modifications in Hovakimian and Li [2011] (meant to reduce
the potential bias in partial adjustment tests), to using both book and market
leverage, to using different estimation methodologies, to excluding industrial
firms2, and to using a subsample from 1992 to 2011.
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) can deduct their dividends from their
taxable income, and since most REITs payout 100% of their taxable income
as dividends, they are effectively exempt from paying corporate income tax.
Furthermore, REITs are required to pay out at least 90% of their taxable income
as dividends, and are therefore less prone to free cash flow agency problems than
other firms.
Thus, two of the most noted arguments for issuing debt in the Trade-off
theory, the tax advantage of interest payments and the reduction of free cash
flow agency problems, are basically not relevant for REITs. REITs do, however,
2The group of industrial firms are defined as firms in the CRSP/Compustat Merged
database not being utility companies (SIC codes 4900-4999), financial firms (SIC codes 6000-
6999), REITs, limited partnerships, nor companies with real estate SIC or NAICS codes. For
more on the data definitions see section 3.4.
55
issue debt, and thus propose an interesting setup for testing the predictions of
the Trade-off theory. Basically, the idea of this article is; if taxes and free cash
flow problems are the main benefits in the Trade-off theory, REITs should act
less in line with the Trade-off theory than other real estate firms without the
REIT status. Or at least they should have a lower target leverage level than
other real estate firms without the REIT status.
I employ a target adjustment model of the type in Fama and French [2002]
and Flannery and Rangan [2006] to test the central prediction of the Trade-off
model that firms have target leverage levels that they revert to. I incorporate
the firm type of REIT or non-REIT to estimate the effect of taxes and free cash
flow agency problems on capital structure choices. I also include industrial firms
to examine whether a real estate industry effect affects the results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews related
literature, section 2.3 shortly presents the main predictions the Trade-off theory,
and states the empirical framework which is used to test the predictions. Section
3.4 presents the data and summary statistics. Section 3.6 presents the results
and section 3.7 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
Since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller [1958] much research have dealt
with the capital structure of companies both from a theoretical and empirical
perspective. One of the most prominent theories of capital structure is the Trade-
off theory (see e.g. Fischer et al. [1989], Leland [1994], Leland and Toft [1996]).
This paper is not the first to test the predictions of the Trade-off theory. Some
of the most notable studies testing the implications of the Trade-off theory are
Fischer et al. [1989], Shyam-Sunder and Myers [1999], Fama and French [2002],
Welch [2004], Leary and Roberts [2005], and Flannery and Rangan [2006]. The
results vary substantially. In the one end Welch [2004] finds that companies
do not dynamically re-balance their capital structure to offset changes in the
market value of equity even over long periods. Similarly, Shyam-Sunder and
Myers [1999] finds little evidence of target adjustment behaviour of firms and
shows that the target adjustment tests often applied in testing implications of
the Trade-off theory, suffer from low statistical power. Fama and French [2002]
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find some evidence in favor of the Trade-off theory, and Leary and Roberts [2005]
find that firms do dynamically re-balance their capital structure towards a target
range. At the other end, Flannery and Rangan [2006] find not only that firms
have a target capital structure, but also that the rate at which they revert to
the target, is as much as one third per year.
Graham and Harvey [2001] survey 392 CFOs about capital structure and
capital budgeting, and they find some support for the Trade-off theory. By
simulating company specific marginal tax rates Graham [1996] find that firms
with high marginal tax rates employ more debt than firms with low marginal tax
rates. However, Graham [2000] estimate that firms could double the tax benefit
from debt by issuing more debt, indicating that the tax advantage of debt is not
the primary reason for using debt.
A few other papers have utilized REITs and other corporate tax exempt
entities in estimating the effect of the tax advantage of debt on the capital
structure. However, no other papers have examined the validity of the Trade-
off theory in the absence of tax advantages of corporate debt. Barclay et al.
[2012] utilizes the corporate tax exempt status of REITs to estimate the degree
of leverage due to the tax advantages of debt by comparing the leverage to that
of similar industrial companies. They find at most a tax effect on leverage of
5%. Nevertheless, they pool REITs and limited partnerships which are also tax
exempt but have no pay-out restriction. They, hence, confound the tax benefit
and the reduction of free cash flow agency problems. Gentry [1994] find that
corporate tax exempt Public Traded Partnerships (PTPs) in the real estate and
oil and gas industries have 30% lower leverage ratio than regular corporations.
However, Gentry [1994] fail to control for industry effects that might affect the
capital structure.
The current study differs from the these studies by testing the effect of the tax
advantages of debt and free cash flow agency problems on the amount of leverage
and the prediction of the Trade-off theory that firms have target leverage ratios
that they revert to.
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2.3 Empirical Strategy
The overall empirical strategy is to use REITs as the treatment group, with the
treatment being tax exemption and the 90% dividend payout requirement. The
non-REIT real estate firms will be the control group, being tax liable and having
no payout requirement. By comparing these two groups I will estimate the effect
of corporate taxes and free cash agency problems on firm capital structure. As
an extra control, and to pick up any real estate industry effects, I add regular
industrial firms not related to real estate.
2.3.1 The Partial Adjustment Test
Since firms can deduct their interest payments from their taxable income, there
is a tax advantage of financing companies with debt compared to equity. Fur-
thermore, Jensen [1986] argues that managers of companies with large free cash
flows, might initiate projects yielding private benefits to the manager, but that
are not in the best interest of the owners. Jensen [1986] suggests that the is-
suance of debt instead of equity oblige managers to pay out future free cash flows
more effectively than promises of future dividends. Financing investments with
debt instead of equity thus reduces the agency costs of free cash flows. However,
employing high levels of leverage also increases the risk of bankruptcy, which
is costly. The bankruptcy costs include both direct costs, such as salaries to
lawyers etc., and indirect costs such as customers and subcontractors refusing to
do business with firms close to bankruptcy, since they risk not receiving goods
or payments in the case of bankruptcy.
To illustrate the tax advantage of debt for the end-investor, consider the
following small example. Let earnings before interest and taxes at time t be
defined as ξt. Then, for the tax liable (non-REIT) firm, the cash flow available
for the equity and debt investor (assuming no retained earnings) equals
E : (1− τd) [(1− τc) [ξt − ct]]
E : (1− τe)ξt − (1− τe)ct
D : (1− τi)ct.
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In total this becomes
(1− τe)ξt + (τe − τi)ct
where ct is the interest payment to debt at time t, τd is the taxation of dividend,
τc is the corporate tax rate, τi is the tax rate applicable for interest income, and
(1 − τe) = (1 − τd)(1 − τc). Thus, as long as τe is bigger than τi, there is a tax
advantage of debt financing of (τe − τi)ct. If dividends are taxed at the same
rate as interest income, this will always be the case.
For the corporate tax-exempt company (REIT) τc = 0, and the above col-
lapses to
(1− τd)ξt + (τd − τi)ct.
Thus, as long as dividends and interest income are taxed alike, there is no tax
advantage of debt. If dividends are taxed at a higher rate, there will still be a
tax advantage of debt, and if dividends are taxes at a lower rate than interest
income there will even be a tax disadvantage of debt. Whether REITs have a
tax advantage or not, hence, depends on tax regime of the end-investor.
Under the current US tax law, (most) dividends qualify to be taxed as long
term capital gains as long as the investor has held the stock for more than 60
days during the 121-day period that begins 60 days before the ex-dividend date3.
Interest income from corporate bonds are, however, taxed as ordinary income.
Since the long term capital gains tax rate is lower than ordinary income tax rate,
there is actually a tax disadvantage of debt for REITs for the US end-investor.
In the Trade-off theory, firms trade off the previously mentioned advantages
and disadvantages of debt, and thus have a possibly time-varying optimal lever-
age ratio. This notion is often tested through variation of the following target
adjustment model (see for example Fama and French [2002] or Flannery and
Rangan [2006]):
LRt − LRt−1 = α0 + α1 (TLt − LRt−1) + εt, (2.1)
where LRt is the current observed leverage ratio, TLt is the current target
leverage ratio, and εt is the residual. Firm subscripts have been suppressed.
α1 determines the speed of adjustment towards the target leverage ratio, TLt.
3See the United States Internal Revenue Code for the specific requirements for qualified
dividends.
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In the extreme case of full adjustment in each period, α0 is 0 and α1 equals 1.
The leverage ratios are either defined in terms of book or market values, and I
will examine the target adjustment behaviour of both book and market leverage
ratios. That is, I will define LRt as both
Lt
At
and Lt
Vt
, where Lt is the total value
of debt at the end of the fiscal year t, At is the total book value of assets, and
Vt is the total market value of assets. The precise variable definitions are in
appendix 2.8. The target leverage ratio is, however, unobserved, and thus have
to be estimated. TLt in equation (2.1) is often defined as the fitted values from
the following regression:
TLt = βXt−1 (2.2)
where Xt−1 contains lagged variables relevant for explaining the observed lever-
age level, such as firm size, asset tangibility, market-to-book, and research and
development (R&D) expenses. The target leverage ratio is thus allowed to be
time-varying. Substituting βXt−1 from equation (2.2) for TLt in equation (2.1)
yields
LRt = α0 + α1βXt−1 + (1− α1)LRt−1 + εt. (2.3)
Equation (2.3) can be estimated in one step. To isolate the effect of the tax
advantage of debt and free cash flow agency problems on the target adjustment
behaviour of firm leverage ratios, I interact the lagged leverage ratio, LRt−1, in
equation (2.3) with a dummy variable equalling 1 if the firm type is REIT and
0 otherwise. To control for industry effects, I also interact the lagged leverage
ratio, LRt−1, with a dummy variable equalling 1 if the firm group is industrial
and 0 otherwise (neither REIT nor non-REIT real estate firm). The base group
is thus the non-REIT real estate companies. The equation becomes
LRt = α0 + α1βXt−1 + αbaseLRt−1 + αREITLRt−1 · 1REIT
+ αIndustrialLRt−1 · 1Industrial + εt, (2.4)
so that the estimate of the the speed of target adjustment for non-REITs, REITs,
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and industrial firms thus becomes:
Adjnon−REIT = 1− αbase (2.5)
AdjREIT = 1− (αbase + αREIT ) (2.6)
AdjIndustrial = 1− (αbase + αIndustrial). (2.7)
If observed leverage ratios exhibit mean reversion not related to target adjust-
ment, then the estimate of α1 in both equation (2.1), (2.3), and 2.4 might be
positive even when companies do not have target leverage ratios. Chang and
Dasgupta [2009] argue that since leverage ratios are limited between 0 and 1,
leverage ratios close to either 0 or 1 will exhibit mechanical mean reversion.
Furthermore, Shyam-Sunder and Myers [1999] argue that leverage ratios may
be mean reverting due to positively serially correlated capital investments and
cyclical cash flows. Hovakimian and Li [2011] suggest allowing for different co-
efficients for the target leverage ratio and the lagged observed leverage ratio in
equation (2.1) to deal with the mean reversion bias:
LRt − LRt−1 = α0 + α1TLt + α2LRt−1 + εt (2.8)
This specification, however, excludes the possibility for a one-step estimation,
since a1 and a2 differ. Instead the target leverage ratio will be estimated as the
fitted values from the following regression
TLt = βXt−1 + t (2.9)
Similar to the 1-step methodology, I interact the target leverage ratio in equation
(2.8) with a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is a REIT real estate
company and 0 otherwise, to identify the effect of tax advantages of debt and
free cash flow agency costs on the adjustment towards a target leverage ratio. I
also add a term where I interact the target leverage ratio with a dummy variable
that equals 1 if the firm is an industrial firm (neither REIT nor a non-REIT real
estate company) to pick up any potential real estate industry effect. The non-
REIT real estate firms hence serve as the base group in the regression. Equation
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(2.8) thus becomes
LRt − LRt−1 = α0 + α1TLt + α2TLt · 1REIT + α3TLt · 1Industrial
+ α4LRt−1 + εt. (2.10)
I will use both the one-step specification in equation (2.4) and the two-step
approach allowing for different coefficients in front of the target leverage and the
lagged observed leverage in equation (2.10). I follow the previous literature (see
e.g. Fama and French [2002] or Flannery and Rangan [2006]) in defining Xt.
Substituting for Xt−1 in equation 2.9 yields
LRijt = βi + β1LR
IndustryMedian
jt−1 + β2
Vit−1
Ait−1
+ β3
PPEit−1
Ait−1
+ β4
ETit−1
Ait−1
+
β5
Dpit−1
Ait−1
+ β6
RDit−1
Ait−1
+ β7RDDit−1 + β8log(Ait−1) + it, (2.11)
where i denotes the firms, t denotes time, and j indexes the industries. The
variables have been shown to determine leverage ratios in previous studies (e.g.
Fama and French [2002], Flannery and Rangan [2006], and Hovakimian and Li
[2011]), and proxies for investment opportunities and profitability. LRIndustryMediant−1
is the lagged median industry leverage ratio included to capture possible indus-
try effects. The industry is classified according to the 49 industries in Fama and
French [1997]. PPEit−1
Ait−1
is property, plant and equipment to the book value of
assets, and measures the tangibility of the firm’s assets. Vt−1
At−1
is the market value
of the firm’s assets to the book value of assets. It is assumed to be a driver
for expected investment opportunities, and profitability. ETt−1
At−1
is the earnings
before interest and taxes to the book value of assets, and is assumed to measure
profitability. Dpt−1 is depreciation.
RDt−1
At−1
is the R&D expenditures to the book
value of assets, and is a proxy for expected investment opportunities, since re-
search and development investments generate future investments. Since many
companies do not have research and development expenses, I include a dummy
variable, RDDt−1, indicating whether the firm had any R&D expenditures in
the previous year. log(At−1) is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets,
and is a measure of size.
Shyam-Sunder and Myers [1999] and Chang and Dasgupta [2009] show that
the partial adjustment model of equation (2.8) can lead to significantly positive
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speed of adjustment parameters, even when the data is constructed not to exhibit
target adjustment behaviour. And even though the specification in equation
(2.10) deals with the mean reversion bias by allowing for different coefficients
for the target leverage and the lagged leverage, estimating the target leverage
(equation (2.11)) on the entire dataset will create look-ahead bias.
Some previous studies (e.g. Fama and French [2002]) have used the entire
dataset to estimate the target leverage. Hovakimian and Li [2011] show that this
can lead to an artificially high degree of target adjustment. They propose to
only estimate the target adjustment data on past data. I follow their suggestion
and estimate the target leverage from running a firm fixed effects estimation of
equation (2.11) on past values.
Hovakimian and Li [2011] also suggest removing observed leverage ratios
above 0.8 to reduce the effect of mechanical mean reversion without reducing
the size of the dataset too much. Hovakimian and Li [2011] report that excluding
leverage ratios above 0.8 only reduces their sample by 0.8%. As a robustness
check, I also exclude leverage ratios above 80%. Hovakimian and Li [2011]
show that these modifications can increase the statistical power of the partial
adjustment test.
2.4 Data
I identify three groups of firms; publicly listed Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITs), publicly listed non-REIT real estate firms, and traditional publicly
listed firms, which I dub industrial firms. The term ’REIT’ is a real estate
company label under U.S. Federal income tax law much similar to that of US
mutual funds. The main advantage of the REIT status is to avoid double tax-
ation. REITs are exempt from paying corporate tax if they pay out 100% of
their taxable income as dividends. The main requirements to qualify as a REIT
are that at least 75% of the company’s assets are in real estate, that at least
75% of the income derive from real estate (e.g. real estate rents, interest on real
estate mortgages, or from sales of real estate properties), and finally that the
company pay out at least 90% of their taxable income as dividends. The REITs
are identified in the CRSP Ziman REIT database and cash flow and balance
sheet information are from the CRSP/Compustat Merged database.
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The non-REIT real estate firms are used to examine the effect of corporate
income taxes on capital structure, and the industrial firms are included to make
the results comparable to previous studies.
The non-REITs are from the CRSP/Compustat Merged database, and iden-
tified as the companies with real estate SIC codes 6512-6519, or 7011 or NAICS
codes 531120, 531110, 531190, or 721110, and not being REITs or limited part-
nerships, since these are also exempt from corporate taxation.4 Data on indus-
trial companies are from the CRSP/Compustat Merged database, and excludes
utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999), financials (SIC codes 6000-6999), REITs, limited
partnerships, and companies with real estate SIC or NAICS codes.
The sample covers 1980 to 2011. I define annual observations on the basis of
fiscal years since firms use a variety of fiscal year-ends. I require firms to report
fiscal year end stock price, end of fiscal year shares outstanding, total book value
of asset, total long-term liabilities, depreciation and amortization, total income
taxes, and dividends to common equity. The REIT group consist of 5305 firm
year observations. The non-tax-exempt real estate group consists of 1194 firm
year observations, and the industrial firm group consists of 132648 firm year
observations. The data is unbalanced since companies are not required to exist
over the entire sample period.
Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics for both REITs, non-REIT (tax-
liable) real estate companies, and industrial firms. Comparing REITs and non-
REITs, REITs on average tend to be a marginally bigger than their non-REIT
counterparts with a mean market value of assets of 1,873 million USD as opposed
to 1,777 million USD. However, the difference is not statistically significant. The
REITs do have more debt than the non-REITs and this difference is statistically
significant. The REITs also have a higher book leverage and market leverage
than the non-REITs, and the differences are also statistically significant. This
contradicts the Trade-off theory, since REITs - having no tax advantage of debt
and being less prone to free cash flow agency problems - should have lower levels
of leverage than similar non-REIT real estate firms. Industrial firms have on
average a much lower leverage ratio than both REITs and non-REIT real estate
companies. This applies both to market leverage and book leverage.
Payout ratio, defined as the cash dividends to the taxable income, is far
4The limited partnerships are excluded from this study, since they do not have the require-
ment of paying out at least 90% of their taxable income.
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from symmetrically distributed. A lot of firms do not pay dividends and some
pay very high dividends. The median payout ratio for the REITs are 1.093.
This is possible for some real estate firms because of the properties they own
exhibit high depreciation making their taxable income smaller than their free
cash flow. The non-REITs on the other hand, have a median payout ratio of
0, as do the industrial firms. It is clear that the 90% payout requirement of
REITs make them pay out much more dividends than the non-REITs and the
industrial firms.
As seen from figure 2.1 both the median book and market leverage have
been significantly higher for real estate firms than for industrial firms for the
entire period. The median book leverage for the REITs is lower than for the
non-REITs until 1992. After 1992 the relationship reverses, and REITs have
higher median leverage than non-REITs. In the early 1990s the REIT market
experienced a tremendous growth both in the number of REITs and in the total
market capitalization. Most of the growth was due to initial public offerings of
capital constrained private real estate firms sitting on highly levered properties
following the overbuilding in the late 1980s. See Block [2011] or Chan et al.
[2002] for more on the history of REITs. The median market leverage ratios for
REITs and non-REITs are very similar during the entire period.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 The Partial Adjustment Test
Table 2.2 presents the results from the 1-step estimation of the partial adjust-
ment regression model in equation (2.4) on both book leverage and market lever-
age. The regressions are estimated by both Fama and MacBeth [1973] type
regressions (Fama-MacBeth), classic OLS, and OLS including firm fixed effects.
The determinants of target leverage vary a bit in the existing literature.
Frank and Goyal [2009] examine the determinants of corporate leverage and find
the median industry leverage to have a positive influence on the level of leverage,
that more profitable firms (high ETt−1/At−1) tend to have lower leverage than
less profitable firms, that firms with a higher market-to-book value of assets
(high Vt−1/At−1) tend to have a lower leverage than firms with low Vt−1/At−1,
that companies with more tangible assets (high PPEt−1/At−1) tend to have
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higher leverage than firms with less tangible assets, and that bigger firms on
average have a higher degree of leverage than smaller firms.
The results in table 2.2 share their findings for the median industry lever-
age which is significantly positive in all the specifications. The firm size is also
positively related to the level of leverage in the specifications where it is statis-
tically significant. Both the tangibility of assets and the market-to-book value
of assets reliably show the opposite signs from the findings of Frank and Goyal
[2009], with high market-to-book firms tending to have more leverage, and firms
with more tangible assets tending to have lower levels of leverage. Flannery and
Rangan [2006] also employ the 1-step estimation method, and find the estimate
for market-to-book value of assets to be close to 0 as in table 2.2. Similarly, they
find that firms with higher depreciation and amortizations tend to have lower
levels of leverage and that more research intensive firms tend to have higher
levels of leverage both agreeing with most of the results in table 2.2.
The non-REIT real estate firms have a degree of target adjustment between
10% and 15%5 a year for the Fama-MacBeth and OLS specifications, but as
much 35% for the specification including firm fixed effects. Fama and French
[2002] advocate using the Fama-Macbeth methodology to avoid understating
standard errors due to cross-firm correlation and year-to-year correlation. The
Fama-MacBeth methodology, however, ignores much of the time-series informa-
tion available in the panel data. Flannery and Rangan [2006] argue that the
firm fixed effects specification is more relevant when firms have relatively stable
unobserved factors affecting leverage targets. While the choice of estimation
methodology have significant impact on the degree of target adjustment for the
base group (the non-REIT real estate firms), the interaction term between the
lagged leverage ratio and the REIT dummy is not significant in all but one
specification. This means that there is no significant difference between the tar-
get adjustment speed of REITs and the base group (the non-REIT real estate
firms). The only exception is in the firm fixed effects estimation on book lever-
age. In this specification the REITs still adjust towards their target leverage
ratio, with a degree of target adjustment of as much as 26.9% percent a year
(1-(0.645+0.086)). The fact that REITs seem to have target leverage ratios that
5From equation (2.4) is seen that the degree of target adjustment for non-REITs is recovered
from the results as Adjnon−REIT = 1 − αbase, where αbase is the coefficient in front of the
lagged leverage ratio.
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they revert to in the same order of magnitude as similar tax-liable real estate
firms more prone to free cash flow agency problems, indicates that neither the
tax benefit of debt nor the mitigating effect of debt on free cash flow agency
problems are the primary reasons why firms have target leverage ratios.
In some of the specifications industrial firms have a statistically significant
higher degree of target adjustment, but economically the difference to the base
group (the non-REIT real estate firms) is at most 4.8% percentage points a year.
The last three columns, presenting the results where leverage ratios above 80%
have been removed, only drops 160 and 581 observations from the book and
market leverage regressions respectively, and the results are not different from
including them. This is probably because the data is already trimmed at the
top and bottom 0.5%.
The 1-step methodology could be affected by mean reversion bias described
in section 2.3.1 stemming from mean reversion in the observed leverage ratios not
related to firms having target leverage ratios. Employing the 2-step methodol-
ogy, where the target leverage ratio is estimated in a 1st step as the fitted values
from equation (2.11) and used as the target leverage in the 2nd step estimation
of equation (2.10), is robust to the mean reversion bias, since the coefficient
for the lagged observed leverage is allowed to differ from the coefficient for the
target leverage.
In the 2-step methodology the target leverage is estimated as the fitted values
from regressing equation (2.11) on past values only and including firm fixed
effects. Hence, the dataset on which the target leverage is estimated increases
for every year. The results of the last 1st-step regression (using data from 1980
till 2011) are shown in table 2.3.
Contrary to the results from the 1-step approach, the determinants of the
target leverage all have the same signs as in Frank and Goyal [2009]. The reason
why some of the 1-step results differ from the results in Frank and Goyal [2009] is
probably because it included the lagged leverage, which is a strong determinant
of current leverage. The specification in Frank and Goyal [2009] does not include
the lagged leverage ratio. Again, excluding the leverage ratios above 80% does
not change the results.
Figure 2.2 shows the time series of the median estimated target leverage for
book and market values of leverage. As expected from the plots of the observed
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leverage in figure 2.1, both the REITs and the non-REIT real estate firms have
similar target leverage ratios, whereas the industrial firms tend to have lower
target leverage ratios.
The results from the 2nd step (the actual target adjustment test) in table
2.4 show lower levels of target adjustment for the base group (the non-REIT
real estate firms) than the 1-step approach. The degree of target adjustment
ranges from 7-22% per year. This indicates, as expected, that some of the target
adjustment in the 1-step approach, is due to mean reversion in the observed
leverage not related to firms having target leverage ratios.
The REITs still revert to a target leverage ratio, and in fact their degree of
target adjustment is not different from the similar non-REIT real estate firms in
any of the specifications. Along with the results from the 1-step approach, this
again shows that neither the tax advantage of debt, nor the mitigating effect of
debt on free cash flow agency problems, are the main reasons why companies
have target leverage ratios, as is often mentioned as a motivation for the Trade-
off theory.
Opposing the results of the 1-step approach, the industrial firms have a
significantly lower degree of target adjustment than the real estate firms. The
low levels of target adjustment are in line with the findings of Hovakimian and
Li [2011] and Welch [2004]. The lower degree of target adjustment for industrial
firms in the 2-step approach is probably more reliable than the results from the
1-step approach, since these are robust to mean reversion bias and, hence, have
more statistical power.
Overall, the results show that when properly accounting for the biases in par-
tial adjustment models, industrial firms show low degrees of target adjustment.
Furthermore, the target adjustment behaviour is not driven by the tax advantage
of debt nor the mitigating effect of debt on free cash flow agency problems, since
REITs (not having the tax benefit of debt nor prone to free cash flow agency
problems) have the same degree of target adjustment as similar non-REIT real
estate firms.
Table 2.5 and 2.6 shows the one-step and the two-step target adjustment test
excluding the industrial firms, to make sure that industrial firms are not driving
the results. The results of the one-step approach in table 2.5 are similar to the
results including the industrial firms in table 2.2. The REITs do not have differ-
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ent speeds of target adjustment than non-REITs in any of the six specifications
except for the firm fixed effects specification on book leverage where REITs have
8.4% and 8.1% lower degree of target adjustment than non-REITs. However, in
these specifications REITs still have speed of adjustment coefficients of 28.2%
and 28.1% per year. This is a large degree of target adjustment considering
that REITs lack the benefits of debt usually attributed to why firms have target
leverage ratios. Generally, both non-REITs and REITs exhibit target adjust-
ment behaviour in the order of approximately 8% to 35% a year depending on
whether the specification includes firm fixed effects.
The results of the two-step approach in table 2.6 shows that the speed of
target adjustment of REITs and non-REITs are not different in any of the six
specifications for neither book nor market values of leverage. Both REITs and
non-REITs exhibit target adjustment behaviour in the magnitude of approxi-
mately 5% to 13.5% a year in all the specifications except in the specifications
estimated by the Fama and MacBeth [1973] methodology. In these cases the
speed of adjustment is positive but statistically insignificant. Doing repeated
cross sectional regressions and then averaging over time, as in the Fama and
MacBeth [1973] methodology, dismisses much of the time series variation in the
estimation. This is probably why the speed of adjustment is not statistically
significant, since all other specifications are statistically bigger than 0.
To address the potential concern of using data both before and after the
boom in REIT initial public offerings in the beginning of the 1990s, I redo the
analysis on data from 1992 and onwards. As seen from the time series plot in
figure 2.1, starting in 1992, the book leverage for REITs rises significantly. From
1992 and on REITs have higher median leverage than non-REITs.
The results of the one-step approach estimated on data from 1992 to 2011
are shown in table 2.7. In all the specifications there is no statistically significant
difference between the speed of adjustment of REITs and the non-REITs. Both
REITs and non-REITs have target adjustment in the order of approximately 11%
to 40% per year, depending on the specification and book or market leverage.
The results from the second step in the two-step approach estimated on data
from 1992 to 2011 are shown in table 2.8. The results are similar to using the
entire dataset. Both REITs and non-REITs show significant degrees of target
adjustment, and there is still no statistically significant difference between the
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speed of adjustment for REITs and non-REITs. Hence, the results are not bias
by using data before and after the REIT IPO boom in the early 1990s.
Overall, I find that both REITs and non-REITs alike have optimal leverage
ratios which they revert to. The speed at which they revert to their targets
are not significantly different. And the results are robust to the modifications
suggested in Hovakimian and Li [2011] to improve statistical power, definitions
of book or market leverage, different estimation methodologies, to excluding in-
dustrial firms, and over a sub sample from 1992 to 2011. Together with the fact
that REITs on average have a bit higher leverage than non-REITs - especially
from 1992 and on - this indicates that the tax advantage of debt and the reduc-
tion of free cash flow agency problems are not the primary benefits of debt, since
REITs are effectively tax exempt and are required to payout at least 90% of their
taxable income as dividends. Furthermore I document that industrial firms on
average employ less leverage and exhibit slower degrees of target adjustment in
many of the specifications. This could indicate an asset related explanation of
both the level of leverage and the target adjustment behaviour.
2.6 Conclusion
I have examined the effect of the tax advantage of debt and the mitigating
effect of debt of free cash flow agency problems on the level of leverage and
the tendency to follow a target adjustment behaviour, by comparing REITs to
similar non-REIT real estate firms.
Firstly, I show that REITs on average do not have lower leverage levels
than non-REIT real estate firms. Furthermore, I show that REITs and non-
REIT real estate firms alike have target leverage ratios, and that their degrees
of target adjustment are not significantly different. This suggests that firms have
other benefits of debt than the tax advantage and mitigation of free cash flow
agency problems that they trade off against the costs and thus display target
adjustment behaviour.
The results are robust to the modifications suggested in Hovakimian and
Li [2011] to improve statistical power, definitions of book or market leverage,
different estimation methodologies, to excluding industrial firms, and over a sub
sample from 1992 to 2011.
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Finally, I document that the real estate industry is more levered than general
industrial firms, and that they have a higher degree of target adjustment than
industrial firms, which could indicate an industry or asset related benefit of debt.
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2.7 Figures and Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics. The sample includes all the REITs, non-REIT real estate firms, and
industrial firms used in either the financing deficit test or the partial adjustment test. The dataset covers the
years 1980 to 2011. Total debt is total assets minus book equity. Market capitalization is share price times
shares outstanding. Book equity is total assets minus total liabilities + deferred taxes and investments tax
credit minus the value of preferred stock. Market value is total liabilities minus deferred taxes and investments
tax credit plus the value of preferred stock and market cap. Book value is total assets. Size is the natural log
of total assets. Market leverage is total debt over market value. Book leverage is the total debt over book
value. All values are in million USD.
REITs Mean Std.
dev.
1st
Qu.
Median 3rd
Qu.
Total Debt 1010 3064 31 184 836
Book value of assets 1683 4201 89 396 1552
Market value of assets 1873 4579 86 451 1758
Book value of equity 541 1181 38 146 519
Market value of equity 790 1814 39 182 716
Size, log(A) 6.3 1.7 5.1 6.4 7.6
BookLeverage, LA 0.462 0.247 0.312 0.480 0.628
MarketLeverage, LV 0.432 0.249 0.264 0.430 0.604
Payout Ratio, DIV/Taxable Income 1.863 6.550 0.775 1.093 1.550
Non-REIT (tax-liable) real estate firms
Total Debt 694 2685 10 70 387
Book value of assets 1581 5500 33 156 866
Market value of assets 1777 5563 34 152 996
Book value of equity 584 2218 10 38 307
Market value of equity 889 2380 14 57 431
Size, log(A) 5.6 2.1 4.0 5.6 7.1
BookLeverage, LA 0.406 0.234 0.230 0.411 0.577
MarketLeverage, LV 0.373 0.232 0.198 0.359 0.546
Payout Ratio, DIV/Taxable Income 0.832 7.654 0.000 0.000 0.168
Industrials
Total Debt 612 5582 1 15 143
Book value of assets 2137 13404 26 115 610
Market value of assets 3186 18740 40 169 887
Book value of equity 893 5430 11 52 255
Market value of equity 2071 11978 22 104 572
Size, log(A) 5.3 2.2 3.7 5.2 6.8
BookLeverage, LA 0.230 0.203 0.046 0.199 0.357
MarketLeverage, LV 0.183 0.184 0.022 0.131 0.289
Payout Ratio, DIV/Taxable Income 0.229 3.563 0.000 0.000 0.164
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Figure 2.1: Time series evolution the average book and market leverage for both REITs,
Tax liable real estate firms, and industrial companies.
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Table 2.2: Results of the one-step the estimation of the partial adjustment model in equation (2.4). The
first part uses market leverage, that is the book value of debt divided by the sum of the book value of debt
and the market value of assets. The second part uses book values, that is the book value of debt divided
by the book values of both debt and assets. In each regression, the current leverage is regressed upon the
determinants of leverage, the lagged leverage times a dummy variable equaling 1 if the firm is a REIT real
estate firm, and the lagged leverage times a dummy variable equaling 1 if the firm is an industrial firm. The
data is trimmed at the top and bottom 0.5%, and in the last three columns leverage ratios above 90% are also
removed to avoid mechanical mean reversion. The regression are estimated by Fama and MacBeth [1973] type
regressions (Fama-MacBeth), by pooled OLS (OLS), and by fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are shown in
parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0.1% confidence level, ** significance at the 1% confidence level,
and * denotes significance at the 5% confidence level.
Market Leverage
All values Leverage ratios above 80% excluded
Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE
Intercept 0.031*** 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.037***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
LR
IndustryMedian
t−1 0.058*** 0.043*** 0.074*** 0.059*** 0.044*** 0.074***
(0.011) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011) (0.004) (0.007)
Vt−1/At−1 0.000 0.001*** 0.000** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PPEt−1/At−1 -0.003 -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.003 -0.003*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
ETt−1/At−1 -0.009** -0.003* -0.008*** -0.009** -0.003* -0.008***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Dpt−1/At−1 -0.031** -0.039*** -0.036*** -0.033** -0.039*** -0.035***
(0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007)
RDt−1/At−1 -0.04*** -0.025*** -0.001 -0.04*** -0.025*** -0.001
(0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004)
RDDt−1 -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.002 -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
log(At−1) 0.001 0.000* 0.017*** 0.001 0.000* 0.017***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LRt−1 0.894*** 0.893*** 0.648*** 0.891*** 0.890*** 0.645***
(0.014) (0.008) (0.023) (0.014) (0.008) (0.023)
LRt−1 · 1REIT -0.005 -0.003 0.031 -0.009 -0.007 0.014
(0.014) (0.009) (0.026) (0.014) (0.009) (0.027)
LRt−1 · 1Industrial -0.026* -0.033*** -0.048* -0.024* -0.03*** -0.046*
(0.010) (0.008) (0.023) (0.011) (0.008) (0.023)
N 108923 108923 108923 108763 108763 108763
R2 76.0% 74.4% 80.7% 75.7% 74.0% 80.4%
Book Leverage
All values Leverage ratios above 80% excluded
Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE
Intercept 0.021* 0.034*** 0.022* 0.034***
(0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001)
LR
IndustryMedian
t−1 0.091*** 0.086*** 0.142*** 0.093*** 0.085*** 0.142***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009)
Vt−1/At−1 0.011*** 0.000 0.000** 0.010*** 0.000 0.000**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
PPEt−1/At−1 -0.011*** -0.003*** -0.004** -0.01*** -0.003*** -0.003*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
ETt−1/At−1 -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.02*** -0.021***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Dpt−1/At−1 0.173** -0.024** -0.035*** 0.154*** -0.026*** -0.037***
(0.016) (0.007) (0.010) (0.015) (0.007) (0.009)
RDt−1/At−1 -0.058*** -0.041*** -0.026*** -0.06*** -0.041*** -0.025***
(0.014) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.004) (0.005)
RDDt−1 -0.002*** -0.008*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.007*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
log(At−1) 0.003** 0.000 0.009*** 0.003** 0.000 0.009***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
LRt−1 0.872*** 0.877*** 0.645*** 0.857*** 0.873*** 0.648***
(0.016) (0.008) (0.028) (0.016) (0.008) (0.028)
LRt−1 · 1REIT -0.028 0.000 0.086** -0.035 -0.004 0.083*
(0.017) (0.009) (0.032) (0.019) (0.009) (0.033)
LRt−1 · 1Industrial 0.013 -0.028*** -0.045 0.014 -0.027*** -0.051
(0.017) (0.008) (0.028) (0.016) (0.008) (0.028)
N 108019 108019 108019 107438 107438 107438
R2 61.3% 72.6% 79.4% 61.1% 72.4% 79.1%
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Table 2.3: Results of the first stage of the estimation of the partial adjustment model in equation (2.11)
- estimating the target leverage. The current leverage is regressed against the lagged market-to-book value of
assets, Vt−1/At−1, the lagged median industry leverage ratio, LRIndustryMediant−1 , the lagged ratio of property,
plant and equipment to the book value of assets, PPEt−1/At−1, the lagged ratio of earnings before interest and
taxes to book value of assets, ETt−1/At−1, the lagged depreciation to book value of assets, Dpt−1/At−1, the
lagged R&D expenditures to book value of assets, RDt−1/At−1, a lagged dummy variable indicating whether
the firm had any R&D expenditures last year, and the lagged natural log of book value of assets, log(At−1).
Equation (2.11) is estimated on past data only. The target leverage for 1982 is estimation on data from 1980
till 1982, the 1983 target leverage on data from 1980 till 1983 etc. The estimated coefficients change over time.
Below the estimation from 1980 till 2011 is presented. The first part uses market leverage, that is the book
value of debt divided by the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of assets. The second part
uses book values, that is the book value of debt divided by the book values of both debt and assets. The data
is trimmed at the top and bottom 0.5%. In the 3rd and 5th column leverage ratios above 90% are also trimmed
to avoid mechanical mean reversion. *** denotes significance at the 0.1% confidence level, ** significance at
the 1% confidence level, and * denotes significance at the 5% confidence level.
Market Leverage Book Leverage
All values Leverage ratios
above 80%
excluded
All values Leverage ratios
above 90%
excluded
LRIndustryMediant−1 0.472*** 0.470*** 0.488*** 0.487***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Vt−1/At−1 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PPEt−1/At−1 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
ETt−1/At−1 -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.069*** -0.068***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dpt−1/At−1 0.005 0.006 0.078*** 0.062***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
RDt−1/At−1 -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.053*** -0.053***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
RDDt−1 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005* -0.005*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log(At−1) 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.032*** 0.031***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 108923 108794 108229 107766
R2 71.2% 70.9% 68.5% 68.3%
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Figure 2.2: Time series evolution the estimated target market and book leverage for both REITs, Tax
liable real estate firms, and industrial companies. The estimation is done on past values only. The 1983 target
leverage is estimated on data from 1980 till 1983 and the 1984 target leverage is estimated on data from 1980
till 1984 etc. Thus, the coefficients determining the target leverage change over time.
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Table 2.4: Results of the second stage of the estimation of the partial adjustment model in equation (2.10).
The first part uses market leverage, that is the book value of debt divided by the sum of the book value of
debt and the market value of assets. The second part uses book values, that is the book value of debt divided
by the book values of both debt and assets. In each regression, the current change in leverage is regressed
upon the target leverage (the fitted values from the first stage regression of equation (2.11)), the past leverage,
the target leverage times a dummy variable equaling 1 if the firm is a REIT real estate firm, and the target
leverage times a dummy variable equaling 1 if the firm is an industrial firm. In the first three columns all
values are used, and in the last three columns leverage ratios above 90% are trimmed to avoid mechanical
mean reversion. The regression are estimated by Fama and MacBeth [1973] type regressions (Fama-MacBeth),
by pooled OLS (OLS), and by fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at the 0.1% confidence level, ** significance at the 1% confidence level, and * denotes significance
at the 5% confidence level.
Market Leverage
All values Leverage ratios above 80% excluded
Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE
Intercept 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
TLt 0.072*** 0.077*** 0.222*** 0.073*** 0.077*** 0.216***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.050) (0.013) (0.007) (0.051)
LRt−1 -0.119*** -0.127*** -0.401*** -0.12*** -0.129*** -0.403***
(0.012) (0.002) (0.003) (0.012) (0.002) (0.003)
TLt · 1REIT -0.002 0.001 -0.008 -0.004 -0.002 -0.08
(0.012) (0.008) (0.059) (0.012) (0.008) (0.060)
TLt · 1Industrials -0.041*** -0.05*** -0.08 -0.041*** -0.049*** -0.076
(0.009) (0.007) (0.051) (0.009) (0.007) (0.051)
Firm Fixed Effects? No No Yes No No Yes
N 103520 103520 103520 103366 103366 103366
R2 7.2% 4.9% 29.5% 7.2% 5.0% 29.6%
Book Leverage
All values Leverage ratios above 80% excluded
Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE
Intercept 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
TLt 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.215** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.202**
(0.018) (0.010) (0.076) (0.017) (0.010) (0.076)
LRt−1 -0.14*** -0.138*** -0.402*** -0.143*** -0.141*** -0.403***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
TLt · 1REIT -0.012 0.005 -0.005 -0.012 -0.001 -0.03
(0.017) (0.011) (0.088) (0.015) (0.011) (0.089)
TLt · 1Industrials -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.044 -0.061*** -0.062*** -0.041
(0.013) (0.010) (0.076) (0.012) (0.010) (0.076)
Firm Fixed Effects? No No Yes No No Yes
N 102635 102635 102635 102064 102064 102064
R2 6.2% 5.5% 30.2% 6.4% 5.7% 30.2%
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Table 2.5: Results of the one-step the estimation of the partial adjustment model but excluding the
industrial firms. The first part uses market leverage, that is the book value of debt divided by the sum of the
book value of debt and the market value of assets. The second part uses book values, that is the book value of
debt divided by the book values of both debt and assets. In each regression, the current leverage is regressed
upon the determinants of leverage, the lagged leverage times a dummy variable equaling 1 if the firm is a REIT
real estate firm. The data is trimmed at the top and bottom 0.5%, and in the last three columns leverage ratios
above 90% are also removed to avoid mechanical mean reversion. The regression are estimated by Fama and
MacBeth [1973] type regressions (Fama-MacBeth), by pooled OLS (OLS), and by fixed effects (FE). Standard
errors are shown in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0.1% confidence level, ** significance at the
1% confidence level, and * denotes significance at the 5% confidence level.
Market Leverage
All values Leverage ratios above 80% excluded
Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE
Intercept 0.048** 0.024* 0.047** 0.028*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
LR
IndustryMedian
t−1 - -0.043 0.012 - -0.047 0.006
- (0.027) (0.030) - (0.027) (0.030)
Vt−1/At−1 0.000 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.001 0.014*** 0.017***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
PPEt−1/At−1 -0.01 -0.007 0.022* -0.01 -0.007 0.022
(0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011)
ETt−1/At−1 -0.066 -0.021 -0.015 -0.06 -0.02 -0.014
(0.039) (0.013) (0.014) (0.039) (0.013) (0.014)
Dpt−1/At−1 -0.134 -0.131 -0.364* -0.128 -0.095 -0.302
(0.148) (0.111) (0.171) (0.143) (0.112) (0.174)
RDt−1/At−1 -0.13 0.156 -1.152** -0.148 0.152 -1.166**
(0.746) (0.265) (0.437) (0.740) (0.265) (0.435)
RDDt−1 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005
(0.010) (0.011) (0.019) (0.010) (0.012) (0.019)
log(At−1) 0.002 0.004*** 0.029*** 0.002 0.004** 0.028***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Leveraget−1 0.915*** 0.923*** 0.641*** 0.914*** 0.916*** 0.640***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.029) (0.015) (0.014) (0.029)
Leveraget−1 · 1REIT -0.018 -0.015 0.037 -0.018 -0.015 0.025
(0.013) (0.012) (0.032) (0.013) (0.012) (0.033)
N 3035 3035 3035 2925 2925 2925
R2 84.1% 81.8% 86.7% 82.7% 79.7% 85.2%
Book Leverage
All values Leverage ratios above 80% excluded
Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE
Intercept 0.040** 0.016 0.043** 0.020
(0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015)
LR
IndustryMedian
t−1 - -0.002 -0.060 - -0.005 -0.059
- (0.034) (0.040) - (0.034) (0.040)
Vt−1/At−1 0.003 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.002 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
PPEt−1/At−1 -0.006 0.000 0.017 -0.007 -0.002 0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011)
ETt−1/At−1 -0.076 -0.032* -0.014 -0.079 -0.033** -0.016
(0.036) (0.012) (0.014) (0.036) (0.012) (0.014)
Dpt−1/At−1 0.047 0.025 -0.076 0.022 0.007 -0.047
(0.134) (0.105) (0.165) (0.129) (0.106) (0.167)
RDt−1/At−1 -0.152 0.054 -0.707 -0.197 0.030 -0.715
(0.800) (0.248) (0.415) (0.757) (0.242) (0.404)
RDDt−1 -0.008 -0.008 -0.013 -0.007 -0.006 -0.013
(0.008) (0.011) (0.018) (0.008) (0.011) (0.018)
log(At−1) 0.002 0.004** 0.019*** 0.002 0.003** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Leveraget−1 0.909*** 0.908*** 0.634*** 0.912*** 0.907*** 0.638***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.029) (0.014) (0.012) (0.029)
Leveraget−1 · 1REIT -0.005 0.000 0.084* -0.008 -0.004 0.081*
(0.010) (0.011) (0.033) (0.010) (0.011) (0.033)
N 3010 3010 3010 2871 2871 2871
R2 85.8% 83.9% 87.8% 84.9% 82.6% 86.9%
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Table 2.6: Results of the second stage of the estimation of the partial adjustment model but excluding
industrial firms. The first part uses market leverage, that is the book value of debt divided by the sum of the
book value of debt and the market value of assets. The second part uses book values, that is the book value of
debt divided by the book values of both debt and assets. In each regression, the current change in leverage is
regressed upon the target leverage (the fitted values from the first stage regression of equation (2.11)), the past
leverage, the target leverage times a dummy variable equaling 1 if the firm is a REIT real estate firm. In the
first three columns all values are used, and in the last three columns leverage ratios above 90% are trimmed to
avoid mechanical mean reversion. The regression are estimated by Fama and MacBeth [1973] type regressions
(Fama-MacBeth), by pooled OLS (OLS), and by fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*** denotes significance at the 0.1% confidence level, ** significance at the 1% confidence level, and * denotes
significance at the 5% confidence level.
Market Leverage
All values Leverage ratios above 80% excluded
Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE
Intercept 0.039* 0.021* 0.026** 0.026**
(0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
TLt 0.018 0.053** 0.136* 0.049 0.049** 0.136*
(0.028) (0.018) (0.061) (0.019) (0.019) (0.060)
LRt−1 -0.098*** -0.101*** -0.312*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.324***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015)
TLt · 1REIT -0.004 0.000 0.024 -0.003 -0.003 -0.033
(0.010) (0.009) (0.071) (0.009) (0.009) (0.071)
Firm Fixed Effects? No No Yes No No Yes
N 3035 3035 3035 2925 2925 2925
R2 8.2% 4.8% 28.9% 8.3% 5.1% 29.6%
Book Leverage
All values Leverage ratios above 80% excluded
Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE
Intercept 0.038** 0.016** 0.040** 0.020**
(0.012) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006)
TLt 0.058 0.084*** 0.118** 0.049 0.079*** 0.116**
(0.045) (0.017) (0.041) (0.042) (0.017) (0.041)
LRt−1 -0.093*** -0.094*** -0.285*** -0.095*** -0.098*** -0.282***
(0.012) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.008) (0.015)
TLt · 1REIT -0.01 0.002 -0.004 -0.009 -0.002 -0.019
(0.015) (0.011) (0.049) (0.014) (0.011) (0.050)
Fixed Effects? No No Yes No No Yes
N 3110 3110 3110 2871 2871 2871
R2 7.4% 5.1% 27.6% 7.3% 5.2% 27.8%
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Table 2.7: Results of the one-step the estimation of the partial adjustment model in equation (2.4) on
datat from 1992 to 2011. The first part uses market leverage, that is the book value of debt divided by the
sum of the book value of debt and the market value of assets. The second part uses book values, that is the
book value of debt divided by the book values of both debt and assets. In each regression, the current leverage
is regressed upon the determinants of leverage, the lagged leverage times a dummy variable equaling 1 if the
firm is a REIT real estate firm, and the lagged leverage times a dummy variable equaling 1 if the firm is an
industrial firm. The data is trimmed at the top and bottom 0.5%, and in the last three columns leverage ratios
above 90% are also removed to avoid mechanical mean reversion. The regression are estimated by Fama and
MacBeth [1973] type regressions (Fama-MacBeth), by pooled OLS (OLS), and by fixed effects (FE). Standard
errors are shown in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0.1% confidence level, ** significance at the
1% confidence level, and * denotes significance at the 5% confidence level.
Market Leverage
All values Leverage ratios above 80% excluded
Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE
Intercept 0.024*** 0.031*** 0.024*** 0.031***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
LR
IndustryMedian
t−1 0.074*** 0.051*** 0.061*** 0.075*** 0.051*** 0.062***
(0.012) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.005) (0.009)
Vt−1/At−1 0.000 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PPEt−1/At−1 -0.004 -0.003*** -0.004** -0.004 -0.003*** -0.004**
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
ETt−1/At−1 -0.007 -0.004** -0.01*** -0.007 -0.004** -0.01***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Dpt−1/At−1 -0.04** -0.042*** -0.032*** -0.039** -0.041*** -0.032***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008)
RDt−1/At−1 -0.017* -0.019*** 0.001 -0.017* -0.019*** 0.001
(0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
RDDt−1 -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.006* -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.006*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
log(At−1) 0.001* 0.001*** 0.021*** 0.001* 0.001*** 0.021***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Leveraget−1 0.890*** 0.893*** 0.623*** 0.887*** 0.889*** 0.616***
(0.020) (0.010) (0.031) (0.020) (0.010) (0.031)
Leveraget−1 · 1REIT 0.002 -0.004 -0.012 0.001 -0.006 -0.022
(0.020) (0.011) (0.038) (0.021) (0.011) (0.039)
Leveraget−1 · 1Industrial -0.014 -0.029** -0.074* -0.011 -0.026** -0.068*
(0.011) (0.010) (0.031) (0.012) (0.010) (0.032)
N 68367 68367 68367 68275 68275 68275
R2 77.4% 74.8% 82.3% 77.0% 74.4% 82.0%
Book Leverage
All values Leverage ratios above 80% excluded
Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE
Intercept 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.022*** 0.027***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
LR
IndustryMedian
t−1 0.074*** 0.083*** 0.144*** 0.073*** 0.083*** 0.144***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) (0.012)
Vt−1/At−1 -0.001 0.000 -0.001** -0.001 0.000 -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PPEt−1/At−1 -0.003 -0.002** 0.000 -0.003 -0.002* 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
ETt−1/At−1 -0.02*** -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.014***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Dpt−1/At−1 -0.011 -0.021* -0.032** -0.01 -0.019* -0.027*
(0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012)
RDt−1/At−1 -0.024* -0.029*** -0.016** -0.025* -0.028*** -0.014**
(0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005)
RDDt−1 -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.005 -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
log(At−1) 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.011*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.011***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Leveraget−1 0.881*** 0.875*** 0.607*** 0.880*** 0.874*** 0.614***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.042) (0.008) (0.011) (0.042)
Leveraget−1 · 1REIT 0.011 0.008 0.046 0.008 0.007 0.067
(0.011) (0.012) (0.049) (0.011) (0.012) (0.050)
Leveraget−1 · 1Industrial -0.027** -0.024* -0.051 -0.031** -0.026* -0.06
(0.009) (0.011) (0.042) (0.008) (0.011) (0.042)
N 67786 67786 67786 67422 67422 67422
R2 75.2% 74.0% 81.5% 74.8% 73.6% 81.2%
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Table 2.8: Results of the second stage of the estimation of the partial adjustment model on data from
1992 to 2011. The first part uses market leverage, that is the book value of debt divided by the sum of the
book value of debt and the market value of assets. The second part uses book values, that is the book value of
debt divided by the book values of both debt and assets. In each regression, the current change in leverage is
regressed upon the target leverage (the fitted values from the first stage regression of equation (2.11)), the past
leverage, the target leverage times a dummy variable equaling 1 if the firm is a REIT real estate firm, and the
target leverage times a dummy variable equaling 1 if the firm is an industrial firm. In the first three columns
all values are used, and in the last three columns leverage ratios above 90% are trimmed to avoid mechanical
mean reversion. The regression are estimated by Fama and MacBeth [1973] type regressions (Fama-MacBeth),
by pooled OLS (OLS), and by fixed effects (FE). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** denotes
significance at the 0.1% confidence level, ** significance at the 1% confidence level, and * denotes significance
at the 5% confidence level.
Market Leverage
All values Leverage ratios above 80% excluded
Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE
Intercept 0.010* 0.013*** 0.009* 0.014***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
TLt 0.092*** 0.094*** 0.475*** 0.090*** 0.094*** 0.479***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.087) (0.016) (0.009) (0.096)
Leveraget−1 -0.114*** -0.126*** -0.446*** -0.108*** -0.128*** -0.469***
(0.018) (0.003) (0.006) (0.019) (0.002) (0.007)
TLt · 1REIT 0.003 -0.003 -0.103 0.007 -0.007 -0.231
(0.016) (0.014) (0.131) (0.017) (0.010) (0.148)
TLt · 1Industrials -0.04*** -0.049*** -0.237** -0.035** -0.048*** -0.185
(0.010) (0.012) (0.088) (0.011) (0.008) (0.096)
Fixed Effects? No No Yes No No Yes
N 72048 72048 72048 71946 71946 71946
R2 7.5% 4.7% 32.7% 6.9% 4.7% 33.7%
Book Leverage
All values Leverage ratios above 80% excluded
Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE Fama-
MacBeth
OLS FE
Intercept 0.010* 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
TLt 0.135*** 0.129*** 0.425*** 0.139*** 0.132*** 0.436***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.118) (0.012) (0.012) (0.122)
Leveraget−1 -0.14*** -0.141*** -0.438*** -0.145*** -0.144*** -0.44***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003)
TLt · 1REIT 0.018 0.017 -0.098 0.016 0.014 -0.121
(0.012) (0.013) (0.139) (0.012) (0.014) (0.145)
TLt · 1Industrials -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.161 -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.179
(0.009) (0.011) (0.119) (0.008) (0.011) (0.123)
Fixed Effects? No No Yes No No Yes
N 71437 71437 71437 71050 71050 71050
R2 6.3% 5.7% 33.0% 6.5% 5.9% 32.9%
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2.8 Variable Definitions
Table 2.9: Variable definitions for the partial adjustment test to examine the empirical
validity of the Trade-off theory.
Description Xpressfeed name(s) in Compustat
BEt Book value of equity at the end of
fiscal year t
AT − LT + TXDITC
ETt Earnings before interest and taxes
during fiscal year t
IB +XINT + TXT
At Total book value of assets at the
end of fiscal year t
AT
Dpt Depreciation and amortization in
fiscal year t
DPC
Lt Total debt at the end of fiscal year t DLC +DLTT
RDt Research and development expenses
in fiscal year t
XRD
MEt Market value of equity at the end of
fiscal year t
PRCC F ∗ CSHO
PPEt Total (gross) property, plant and
equipment in fiscal year t
PPEGT
PrefStockt Preferred stock liquidation value if
available, else redemption value if
available, else carrying value
PSTKL or PSTKRV or PSTK
Vt Market value of assets at the end of
fiscal year t
LT −TXDITC +PrefStock+ME
DIVt Cash dividends paid in fiscal year t DV
EBTt Taxable income IB + TXT
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House Prices and Taxes1
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Abstract
By using the 2007 municipality reform in Denmark as an exogenous
shock to municipal tax rates, we find that a 1%-point increase in income
tax rates lead to a drop in house prices of 7.9% and a 1-point increase
in the property tax rates lead to a 1.1% drop in house prices. The simple
present values of a 1%-point perpetual income tax increase and a 1-
point property tax increase, relative to the median house price, are 7% and
3.3%, repectively. Our findings are thus in line with the predicted median
tax loss. This indicates that the housing market efficiently incorporates
taxes into house prices. The exogeneity of the shock to taxes and the size
of the dataset is an improvement over earlier studies.
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3.1 Introduction
It is difficult to measure the effect of taxes on house prices. Since the seminal
work of Oates [1969] many researchers have tried to estimate the degree of
property tax capitalization into house prices. That is, the extent to which higher
property taxes, all else equal, lead to lower house prices. Full capitalization
is said to occur when the change in house prices exactly corresponds to the
present value of a change in taxes. The common approach (as in Palmon and
Smith [1998], Oates [1969], Oates [1973], Edel and Sclar [1974], and Rosen and
Fullerton [1977]) in the literature has been to use cross-sectional data on house
sales in one or a few counties with varying taxes. Besides the small sample size
and the small geographical area, the main problem with this type of analysis is
controlling for public service, which varies significantly between counties. This
is because it is hard to measure the quality of public service.
Another approach (as in Wicks et al. [1968] and Smith [1970]) would be
to use tax changes from one year to another, where differences in the quality of
public service are arguably much smaller than in the cross section. However, this
approach introduces a potential bias if the change in taxes are not completely
exogenous to house prices. For example, if the factors driving the tax changes
might also influence house prices directly, the estimates will be biased.
In this paper we use the 2007 municipality reform in Denmark as a natural
experiment in which the tax changes are completely exogenous, and thus provide
unbiased estimates of the effects of taxes on house prices.
Much of the previous literature on taxes and house prices estimates the degree
of tax capitalization. Taxes are fully capitalized into house prices if, all else
equal, the change in house prices exactly equals the present value of the change
in taxes. That is, when accounting for all other factors, the change in house
prices completely equals:
N∑
n
∆Tax
(1 + i)n
,
where i is the relevant discount factor and N the lifetime of the house. For large
N , as is reasonable to assume for houses, the present value of the changes in taxes
are well approximated by ∆Tax
i
. Thus the degree of housing capitalization deliver
insights to the rationality and efficiency of the housing market. If the residential
housing market is completely rational and efficient, then only future unexpected
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tax changes can be transferred to future home owners, and we should have full
tax capitalization. The current study uses both cross-sectional differences and
time changes in the nominal tax rates to estimate the capitalization of taxes.
We argue that the tax changes in relation to the 2007 municipality reform in
Denmark were completely exogenous of any factors plausibly influencing house
prices.
Whereas the earlier literature only focuses on property taxes, we also look at
the capitalization of municipal income taxes. Since Danes pay municipal income
taxes in the municipality where they reside, everything else equal, one should
prefer living in a municipality with lower taxes.
The purpose of the 2007 municipality reform was to better exploit economies
of scale at the municipal level by merging smaller municipalities. With the
exemption of only four small islands, all municipalities below 20,000 inhabitants
had to merge with one or more nearby municipalities in order to create a new
municipality of at least 30,000 inhabitants. The new municipalities set the new
tax rates equal to an average of the tax rates of the municipalities participating
in the merger plus an adjustment for changes in the public service task offered by
the municipalities2. The new municipalities had the option to set the tax rates
lower than this average plus an adjustment, but only 9 of the 98 municipalities
chose to set the income tax rates below the maximum allowed rate, and only 11
chose to set the property tax rates below the allowed maximum. We instrument
the tax rates after the reform with the average of the merging municipalities
previous tax rates, since this average is closely related to the chosen tax rate,
and is independent of any factors that might influence house prices, like the
economic situation in the municipality.
Of course the municipalities were free to change the level of public service
provided, and so we control for the level of public service. Because the quality
of public service is hard to measure, we instrument our service variable with the
total school expenditure and the total education expenditure in the municipality.
We find that a 1%-point increase in the income tax rate lead to a drop in
house prices of 7.9% and a 1-point increase in the property tax rate lead to
a 1.1% drop in house prices. The simple present value of a 1%-point perpetual
income tax increase and of a 1-point property tax increase, relative to the
2In connection with the reform some public service task previously defined as state tasks
were taken over by the municipalities.
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median house price correspond to 7% and 3.3%, repectively. Our findings are
thus in line with predicted. This indicates that the housing market efficiently
incorporates taxes into house prices, similar to the findings of Palmon and Smith
[1998].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly reviews re-
lated literature, section 3.3 explains the municipality reform, section 3.4 discusses
the data and summary statistics, section 3.5 lays out the estimation strategy,
3.6 presents the results, and section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
Oates [1969] was the first to formally test the extent of property tax capitaliza-
tion. Where full capitalization is said to occur, when controlling all other factors
such as public service and housing characteristics, the present value of tax differ-
ences equal the differences in house prices. Oates [1969] used cross-sectional data
on US property taxes. The study was criticized by Pollakowski [1973] for not
properly accounting for the difference in public service levels. Since then many
papers have attempted to estimate the degree of property tax capitalization,
with differing findings and limited controls for the quality of public service.
Chinloy [1978] and Gronberg [1979] find limited capitalization effects, whereas
Oates [1969], Edel and Sclar [1974], Gustely [1976], and Yinger et al. [1988] re-
port varying degrees of tax capitalization. Oates [1973], Reinhard [1981], and
Gallagher et al. [2013] find close to full or even over capitalization.
Palmon and Smith [1998,b] are the first study to properly control for public
service except schooling. They construct a quasi-experiment by subdividing
houses into municipal utility districts (MUDs) that have similar service levels
(except for school quality), but varying effective property taxes. This is an
important improvement compared to earlier identification strategies, but still
fails to effectively control for public school quality, which is shown to be priced
by home owners in Black [1999].
The current study uses both variation in the cross-section of municipalities
and over time to estimate the capitalization of taxes. To our knowledge this is
the first study to have completely exogenous variation over time due to the mu-
nicipality reform. Having both cross-sectional and time-series variation should
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give us a better estimate of the effect of taxes on house prices.
3.3 The Danish Municipality Reform in 2007
In April 2004 the Danish government laid forth a proposal for a reform of the
municipalities and regions (“Amter”) in Denmark. The background for the pro-
posal was the report from the Structural Commission in January 2004. The idea
was to better exploit economies of scale by reducing the number of municipalities
from 271 to 98 and thus increasing the size of the municipalities. Furthermore,
the 13 regions (“Amterne”) were replaced by 5 bigger regions (“Regionerne”),
where the new regions lost the ability to levy taxes, and their main task would
be hospital services. The reform took effect from January 1st 2007.
In June 2005 the division of the new municipalities was established. Munic-
ipalities smaller than 20,000 inhabitants should merge with other municipalities
to create a new municipality of at least 30,000 inhabitants. 32 municipalities
did not partake in any merger. The new merged municipalities of course had to
set new tax rates.
From 2001 there had been a tax freeze in Denmark. This was still the case
during the municipality reform. The tax freeze meant that there could not be
municipal tax increases at an aggregate level, so if one municipality decided to
raise taxes another had to decrease their taxes by an equal amount. The result
was that municipal taxes remained almost completely constant from 2001 to
2007.
Two municipal taxes directly affect households in Denmark; the property tax
and the income tax. The municipal income tax is a tax on labor income, and
before the reform in 2006, the income tax rates varied from 15.5% to 23.2% as
seen from table 3.2. The municipal property tax is a tax on the assessed value of
the lot where a residential property is located. Residential real estate is assessed
in odd years. Thus, the only change in property taxes between 2006 and 2007 is
due to the reform, since the assessed lot values were not changed. The municipal
property tax rates in 2006 ranged from 6 to 24 as seen from the table 3.2.
Municipalities could not freely choose the tax rates. Instead they could
choose to set the rate equal to or lower than a maximum allowed rate. The
maximum allowed tax rates were calculated as an average of the merging munic-
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ipalities’ previous tax rates plus an addition due to the split of the region’s public
service responsibilities between the state and the municipalities and due to the
municipalities taking over some of the state’s public service tasks. To avoid the
political battles over the new tax rates, and to prevent dramatic changes in any
one municipality’s tax rate, almost all municipalities chose to set the tax rates
equal to the maximum allowed rate. Only 8 of the 98 new municipalities chose
to set the income tax rates below the maximum allowed rate, and only 11 chose
to set the property tax below the maximum. The old region (“amt”) income tax
rates were split as 8%-points to the state income taxes, and the rest to the max-
imum allowed rate for the new municipal income tax. The old region property
tax rates were uniformly 10, and they were added to the maximum allowed
rate of the new municipal property tax rates.
The changes in tax rates were a function of the previous tax rates in the
municipalities that happened to merge. The “choice” to merge was determined
by the municipal size. It seems reasonable to assume that the change in size of
the municipality is independent of factors affecting house prices, since the change
of geographical municipal boundary and the change in municipal size should not
affect house prices, when properly accounting for changes in municipal factors
such as taxes and service.
The selection of which municipalities to partake in a given merger depended
on which municipalities that were adjacent to each other. And since all merging
municipalities had to agree upon who to merge with, one could imagine that
merging municipalities would be similar in terms of tax rates and service levels.
This could potentially lead to very small tax changes. However, table 3.2 shows
that both property tax rates and income tax rates changed substantially due to
the reform. A few municipalities failed to find candidates to merge with, and in
these cases the national parliament decided which municipalities to merge.
Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that the reform instigated a change in
tax rates that was exogenous to house prices. Specifically, it seems obvious that
the tax changes were independent of the economic situation of the individual
municipalities, and thus serves as good experiment to examine how exogenous
changes in tax rates affect house prices. Figure 3.1 shows the geographical
distribution of the merging and non-merging municipalities. The merging mu-
nicipalities are located all over Denmark.
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3.4 Data
To conduct the study, we have collected a very detailed description of the
houses sold including house-specific characteristics and spatial data, the mu-
nicipal taxes, and the public service levels before and after the municipal reform
in Denmark in 2007. In the following sections we describe the data sources and
present summary statistics.
3.4.1 House Prices and Spatial Data
All Danish housing sales3 are recorded by the Danish tax authorities and are
available through the Danish public information server through www.OIS.dk. It
includes sales prices, size, number of rooms etc. for all Danish addresses back
to 1992. We use residential house prices from sales in 2006 and 2007. Our
regressand is the natural logarithm of the sales price.
We exclude family transactions. Family sales are easily identified in the
dataset, because all family sales are registered and marked as such. We also
exclude forced sales, and thus only include regular arms length sales in the
dataset.
We focus only on the three biggest housing types in Denmark; regular houses,
apartments, and townhouses4. This is done to avoid special house types, that
might be priced different than regular owner-occupied housing.
To deal with incorrectly registered sales we trim the data for the top and
bottom 1%. We have tried trimming the top and buttom 3, 2, and 0.5% instead,
and it did not significantly change the results. Some of the houses in the data
are listed as having been remodelled after the sale in either 2006 and 2007, and
since the database only records the current house characteristics, we exclude all
houses renovated after the sales date to avoid backdated values.
All the addresses of the sold houses are geocoded with latitude and longitude
coordinates, and the municipal affiliation before and after the reform of each
location is determined through the Danish Geodata Agency’s (Geodatastyrelsen)
mapping services “GeoVA” and “GeoK7”.
The house characteristics are supplemented by the distance to the nearest
3Except the housing type “Andelsbolig”, which is a Danish cooperative housing type, that
is governed by very different laws than regular home ownership.
4Villaer, ejerlejligheder, and rækkehuse in Danish.
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big city in Denmark. This spatial variable is meant to catch the effects of living
close to a big city, like bigger job opportunities, better shopping facilities, closer
proximity to schools etc.
3.4.2 Taxes and Public Service
In connection with the Danish municipality reform two tax rates affecting private
citizens changed, the municipal property tax rate5 and the municipal income tax
rate. Data on these two taxes before and after the reform are from the Danish
Ministry for Economic Affairs and the Interior available at www.noegletal.dk.
As part of the reform the previous regions called “Amter” were dismantled
and the income taxes previously collected by these regions were split between
national taxes and municipal taxes. 8 percentage-points of the regions income
tax were converted into an 8% national income tax, and the rest were added to
the municipal income tax rate. The added part is not an actual tax increase,
since it is exactly offset by the removal of the regional tax. Thus, when com-
paring pre-reform tax rates to post-reform tax rates, the added part needs to be
subtracted the post-reform tax rates to correctly identify real tax changes.
The old regions also had a property tax on the value of each private lot.
The tax rate was uniformly 10 and this was added to the municipal property
tax rate as part of the reform. Again, we subtract 10 from the post-reform
municipal property tax rate, since this addition was exactly offset by the removal
of the regional property taxes.
Table 3.1 shows a fictitious example of how the tax rates changed because
of the reform for households living in two merging municipalities, A and B. The
municipalities in the example belonged to different counties (“Amter”) before the
reform. The new merged municipality, AB, sets the income tax rate equal to the
average of the previous tax rates in A and B, plus the part of the county tax rate
above 8%, which is the part not transferred to the new state health tax. The new
municipal property tax rate is equal to the average of the previous municipal
property tax rates plus the county property tax rates (The county property
tax rates were uniformly 10 before the reform). However, the relevant tax
changes exclude the redistribution of the county tax rates. Hence, the relevant
5The municipal property tax is a tax on the current appraised value of each private property
lot.
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tax changes are shown in the last rows in table 3.1.
The two municipalities, Værløse and Farum, were excluded from the sam-
ple, since even though the two municipalities merged, the municipalities upheld
differential tax rates even after the reform. This was due to substantial debt
and subsequent tax increases in Farum brought on by fraud conducted by then
Mayor in Farum, Peter Brixtofte.
To proxy for the quality of public service in a municipality we use a calculated
measure from www.noegletal.dk. It equals the net expenses used on public
service divided by the calculated need of public service taking the demography
of the municipality into account. It should, thus be a better measure of public
service than simply the total expenditure per capita, since the latter for example
would overstate the service level in municipalities with many elderly. A value
of 1 indicates that the municipality uses the amount on service justified by the
demography and social needs of the municipality. A municipality could thus
for example spend a lot on the elderly, without it resulting in a higher service
level, if there are many elderly in the municipality. Hence, it should be a better
service variable than for example total expenditure per capita. A service value
higher than 1 indicates that the municipality uses more than its calculated need,
and a value less than 1 would indicate using less than the need. Our service
variable will most likely be measured with error. To alleviate this problem we
instrument it with the total expenditure spent on schooling per pupil and the
total expenditure spent on general education per pupil in the municipality.
3.4.3 Summary Statistics
The dataset includes 64,299 sales in 2006 and 67,500 sales in 2007. Thus signif-
icantly expanding the number of observations compared to the earlier studies.
As an example, Palmon and Smith [1998] relies on only 501 sales in the Houston
area. The reason why we focus on 2006 and 2007 is that the municipality reform
took effect on January 1st 2007. For each sales we have collected the market
price of the house, structural characteristics of the house such as the size, the
number of rooms, the age, and the distance to the nearest city center. Further-
more, we have collected the municipal property tax, the income tax, and the
public service level. The summary statistics are shown in table 3.2.
2006 and 2007 had similar amounts of sales. And in both years most villas
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were sold. The structural housing variables are distributed similarly in the two
years. The income tax rates in 2006 vary from 15.5% to 23.2% and the property
tax rates vary from 6 to 24, thus providing substantial variation to estimate
the tax effect on house prices. The reform led to 256 tax changes geographically
located all over Denmark as seen from figure 3.1. 32 municipalities did not
partake in a merger, and some municipalities were split, and the split parts
merged with different municipalities.
The service variable equals the total expenditure on service in the municipal-
ity relative to its calculated need given its demography. In 2007 the dispersion
of both property tax rates, the income tax rates, and the service levels were
lower than in 2006. This is a direct result of the merging municipalities setting
common rates and service levels.
Both the income tax rates and the property tax rates vary substantially due
to the reform. From the summary statistics in table 3.2 it is seen that the changes
in the income tax rates ranged from -2.97 percentage points to 3.76 percentage
points with a mean of -0.22 percentage points, and the changes in property tax
rates ranged from -12.76 to 13.86. Thus, the reform had substantial impact
on the tax rates in some municipalities. The large variation in tax changes will
help us in identifying the effect on house prices.
3.5 Estimation Strategy and Identification
To estimate the degree of tax capitalization we use a hedonic regression model
(see Rosen [1974]). The idea is that housing, even though being a differentiated
product, can be described by a vector of characteristics, over which individuals
have preferences. These characteristics can be house specific, location specific,
or relate to the local public taxes and services etc. The basic regression model
is the following
log(Priceijt) = α + βxijt + γIT ITjt + γPTPTjt + γSSjt + λk + ρt + εijt, (3.1)
where i indexes the individual sales, j indexes the municipalities, and t indexes
time. The variables contained in x describe the house specific characteristics
relevant for the price. ITjt denotes the municipal income tax, PTjt denotes the
municipal property tax, and Sjt denotes the public service level in the munici-
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pality. λk are dummy variables for each of the regional areas in Denmark called
“Amter”, and ρt are monthly dummy variables to capture the general time effect.
The εijt is the error term for each sale.
The semi-log specification in equation 3.1 is chosen because it provides the
best fit of the data. The interpretation of the parameters in the semi-log spec-
ification is the relative change in the selling price, Price, of a 1 unit of change
in the relevant explanatory variable as seen from a simple application of the
chain rule on equation 3.1. Shown below for the property tax effect (suppressing
subscripts for clarity):
γPT =
∂log(Price)
∂PT
=
1
Price
∂Price
∂PT
=
∂Price
Price
∂PT
The number of rooms, the size of the house and the distance to the nearest
city are in natural logarithms. This gives a better fit of the model. With the log
specification of the explanatory variables the interpretation of the coefficients
becomes (suppressing subscripts for clarity):
β =
∂log(Price)
∂log(x)
=
1
Price
∂Price
∂log(x)
=
1
Price
(
∂log(x)
∂Price
)−1
=
1
Price
(
1
x
∂x
∂Price
)−1
=
∂Price
Price
/∂x
x
Hence, a coefficients in front of a variable in natural logarithm equal to 0.5
means that a 1% increase in the explanatory variable results in a 0.5% increase
in the house price.
After the reform, the merging municipalities were allowed to set the new tax
rates lower than or equal to the average of the previous tax rates in the merging
municipalities plus an addition due to increased costs because the municipalities
took over some public service tasks that were previously handled by the state.
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This means that some of the non-merging municipalities actually raised their
taxes, and that the merging municipalities could set their tax rates higher than
the average of previous rates. Furthermore, municipalities could also choose to
set the tax rates lower than this calculated maximum. Using the actual tax rates
could introduce bias, if for example municipalities in a good economic situation
chose to set lower rates.
We therefore choose to instrument the tax rates by the average of the previous
rates in the merging municipalities. These instruments are functions of the
municipalities being bigger or smaller than 20,000 inhabitants, and the tax rates
in the merging/neighboring municipalities. The instrumental variables are thus
unrelated to the economic situation in the municipalities, and therefore pose
good instruments, if their are related to the actual tax rates. We estimate the
model by two stage least squares (2SLS).
The instruments are, however, not unrelated to the level of public service.
One could easily imagine that a municipality with high tax rates and high service
levels merging with a municipality with low tax rates and service levels, would
experience a drop in public service. We will thus need to control for the public
service level.
For the 2SLS regression we use median values of sales prices, sizes, number
of rooms, etc. for each of the municipalities. This is done to deal with error
correlation between sales within the same municipality. The specification hence
becomes:
log(Pricejt) = α + βxjt + γIT ITjt + γPTPTjt + γSSjt + λj + ρt + εjt, (3.2)
3.6 Results
The results from estimating equation (3.1) by simple ordinary least squares
(OLS) are presented in table 3.3. In the M1 column the standard errors are
clustered on the old municipalities, to deal with residual correlation between
sales within the same municipality. We include monthly time dummy variables
to pick up any common time series effect. To account for geographical differences
in the pricing of houses in Denmark a regional factor is included corresponding
the old Danish regions called “Amter”, which were replaced by 5 bigger regions,
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“Regionerne”, as part of the reform. Ideally the model should include fixed ef-
fects for each old municipality to isolate the pure effect of the reform (difference
over time), and not allow for any cross-sectional variation driving the results.
However, in unreported results include old municipality fixed effects, both the
income tax and property tax loose statistical significance. The model including
municipal fixed effects only has the time series variation to estimate the tax
effects. Unfortunately, we need the cross-sectional variation between municipal-
ities in order to get statistical significance.
It is noticeable that the model with an R2 of 44% does a reasonably good job
explaining the variation in the data, even though the dataset covers sales from
all of Denmark. This indicates that the housing characteristics explain most of
the house price variation, which is needed to pick up any tax effects.
All the housing characteristic have the expected signs. Not surprisingly, the
size of the house and the distance to the nearest city are most important in
explaining the sales price. A 1% increase in the distance to the nearest city
leads to a 0.097% drop in house prices. A 1% increase in the size leads to
an increase in price of 0.748%. The number of rooms also positively influence
the house price. The age of the house is negatively related to the price, but
the squared age is positively related, indicating that really old houses often are
better located and have more charm. Townhouses and villas sell at a discount
compared to apartments, but the effect of townhouses disappears in M1, where
the standard errors are clustered on old municipalities, and the discount on villas
is only barely significant at the 5% level.
In column M2, without standard error clustering, both the income tax rate
and the property tax rate are statistically significant and influence house prices
negatively. A 1 percentage-point increase in income tax rate leads to a 4.4%
drop in house prices. A 1 permille-point increase in the property tax rate,
leads to house prices falling by 0.3%. When clustering standard errors on old
municipalities (column M1), the property tax is no longer significant.
However, using the actual 2007 post reform tax rates might bias the results,
since municipalities were free to set taxes below the average of the previous
tax rates plus an addition due to municipalities taking over some public service
tasks from the state. This addition do not constitute a tax increase, but merely
a redistribution of taxes and tasks between the state and the municipal level.
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Furthermore, the freedom to set the tax rates below the threshold, might in-
troduce a bias, since municipalities in good economic situations might choose
to lower taxes. Becuase the overall economic situation in the municipalit also
directly affect house prices, this will lead to endogeneity.
The problem can be circumvented by instrumenting the tax rates by a vari-
able that for the 2006 values equal the 2006 tax rates, but for 2007 equals the
average of the previous rates in the merging municipalities. For municipalities
not participating in a merger, the 2007 values just equal their 2006 values. These
two instruments, one for the income tax and one for the property tax, will be
independent of the economic situation in each of the municipalities, since it is
simply a function of the merger rule (below 20,000 inhabitants), and the tax
rates in the neighboring municipalities. Intuitively, the instruments should also
be highly correlated with the actual tax rates, since the average previous tax
rates were also part of the actual 2007 tax rates.
Table 3.4 shows the 2SLS estimation instrumenting the income tax and the
property tax by the aforementioned variables. All variables are in medians per
old municipality, to avoid error correlation between sales in the same munici-
pality. The “First Stage” columns shows that the instruments are indeed highly
correlated with the actual tax rates conditional on the exogenous covariates.
We, thus, avoid the potential pitfalls in using weak instruments. The “First
Stage” regressions are only to show the correlation between the instruments and
the actual tax rates. The model is not actually estimated in 2 stages, since this
would lead to incorrect standard errors in the second stage.
The“Second Stage”column shows the results from the 2SLS estimation using
the two tax rate instruments. The housing characteristics all have the expected
signs and are of similar magnitude to the OLS results in table 3.3. Both the R2
and the adjusted R2 are 71%. The increased fit is due to the data being median
values per municipality in the 2SLS regressions as opposed to individual sales
in the simple OLS estimation. The effects of both tax rates are more significant
both economically and statistically compared to the OLS results in table 3.3.
A 1 percentage-point increase in income tax rate lead to a 6.8% drop in house
prices. A 1 permille-point increase in the property tax rate, lead to house prices
falling by 0.9%.
The results does, however, not control for differences in public service. To
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address this, we add a service variable to the specification. It equals the net
expenses used on public service divided by the calculated need, given the de-
mography of the municipality. Acknowledging that public service is hard to
measure, we instrument it by school expenditure per pupil and total educational
expenditure per pupil. The results are shown in table 3.5.
Again the “First Stage” columns show the conditional correlation of the in-
struments with the respective variables. It is noticeable that the two instruments
for service are not as strongly related to our service variable as the tax rate in-
struments. It is not a major concern for us, as we are not interested in the effect
of public service on house prices, but only wish to control for public service
differences.
The “Second Stage” column shows the results of the 2SLS estimation. Again,
all the housing characteristics have the right signs and similar magnitude as in
the previous regressions. The service level is positively related to house prices,
but is only significant at the 5% confidence level. The economic magnitude is also
quite small. Increasing the service level from 1 to 2, indicating spending twice as
much on service as the calculated need, only increases house prices 11.9%. The
low estimate is probably partly due to measurement error inducing attenuation
bias (estimate is biased towards 0), given that our service instruments are far
from perfect.
Controlling for service raises the estimates of both the property tax rate and
the income tax rate as expected. A 1%-point increase in income tax rate leads
to a 7.9% drop in house prices. A 1-point increase in the property tax rate,
leads to house prices falling by 1.1%.
One obvious question to consider when using a political reform as a natural
experiment, is whether people foresaw the tax changes prior to January 1st 2007.
The actual 2007 tax rates were announced on October 15th 2006, however, the
tax changes could have been incorporated into property values before this, if
people foresaw the changes. This could bias our results towards 0. The number
of Google searches related to the reform in figure 3.2) does indicate some peaks
in attention prior to January 1st 2007.
To control for this we have tried using 2003 as the pre-event period and
2007 as the post-event period. In 2003 there was no talk about the municipality
reform. The estimated coefficients in front of the income and the property tax
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rates become -5.6% and -0.9%, respectively. These estimates are in the same
order of magnitude (and actually a bit closer to 0) as the previous results. The
anticipation bias, hence, does seem to be a serious issue.
If people assume tax rates to be constant over time, then it is possible to
calculate the present value for a 1% tax difference by assuming a discount rate.
We can then compare this theoretical tax benefit/loss to the estimated results
in table 3.5, and find the degree of tax capitalization.
The present value for the median household of a perpetual 1%-point differ-
ence in the income tax rate, assuming constant household income, is
∆IT ∗median taxable income
r
=
1% ∗ 315, 043
0.3
= 105, 014.
We follow Yinger et al. [1988] and Palmon and Smith [1998] and use a dis-
count rate of 3%. With a median house price in 2007 of 1,500,000, this gives
a relative effect of -7,0% for a 1%-point tax increase6. This is very close to
the estimated -7.9 from table 3.5, and it corresponds to a capitalization of
−7.9/ − 7 ≈ 110%, indicating that the housing market fully incorporates the
effect of tax differences and changes into house prices. This result is in line with
Oates [1973], Reinhard [1981], and Gallagher et al. [2013] that all find close to
a 100% tax capitalization. They, however, focus on property taxes.
Assuming property taxes are paid out of sales prices, or equivalently, that
appraisal values equal sales prices, and infinite lifetime for properties, the present
value of a 1-point difference in property tax rate (assuming constant house
values) for the median household equals
∆PT ∗median house value
r
=
1 ∗ 1, 500, 000
0.3
= 50, 000
The relative effect of a 1-point increase in property tax rates thus equals
0.001
0.03
= 50, 000/1, 500, 000 ≈ 3.3%. This is indicates a degree of property tax
capitalization of 33%. This assumes that property taxes are paid on property
sales prices. In reality, property taxes are paid on the assessed value of the lot,
on which the property is placed. The true property tax capitalization will thus
probably be higher than 33%.
Another way to get the degree of property tax capitalization is by noting
6The 2007 median taxable income of 315,043 is from Statistics Denmark www.dst.dk
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that that the house price is a function of housing characteristics, f(x), ie. size,
location etc. less the property taxes
P = f(x)− αPT ∗ P
i
↔ P = f(x)
1 + αPT
i
where α is the degree of property tax capitalization, i is the relevant discount
rate, and PT is the property tax rate. By taking the natural logaritm of both
sides, this becomes
ln(P ) = ln(f(x))− ln(1 + αPT
i
) ≈ ln(f(x))− αPT
i
(3.3)
where the approximation works well for small values of PT
i
. Equation (3.3) corre-
sponds to the estimated equation, and the degree of property tax capitalization
can thus be recovered directly from our results as the coefficient in front of the
property tax rate divided by −i. This assumes that the approximation in equa-
tion (3.3) is accurate, and that property taxes are paid on property sales prices.
As previously mentioned, property taxes are paid on the assessed value of the
lot, on which the property is placed. Using this methodology the degree of tax
capitalization becomes
α =
−1.1%
−3% = 36.7%,
which is close the previous result. Since the precise degree of capitalization
is highly dependent upon the assumed discount rate, the overall conclusion is
that our findings are in line with predicted values, and suggest that the housing
market does incorporate taxes into house prices.
3.7 Conclusion
Everything else equal people should prefer lower taxes to higher taxes. So if one
municipality has higher tax rates than another municipality with the same level
of public service, people can “vote with their feet” and move to the municipality
with lower as argued by Charles Tiebout in Tiebout [1956]. This mechanism
should lead to taxes being capitalized into house prices.
We utilize the 2007 municipality reform in Denmark as a natural experiment
to estimate the effect of property tax rates and income tax rates on house prices.
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We are, hence, able to obtain exogenous cross-sectional and time series variation
in tax rates, yielding a dataset of about 600 municipal-year observations.
We find that a 1%-point increase in income tax rate lead to a 7.9% drop
in house prices, and 1-point increase in the property tax rate, lead to house
prices falling by 1.1%. Calculating simple present values of tax changes for the
average household yields effects of 7% and 3.3% for the income tax and the
property tax, respectively. Our results fall quite close to these, and indicates
that the residential housing market does incorporate taxes into house prices.
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3.8 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Map of merging and non-merging Danish municipalities under 2007 municipality
reform.
104
Figure 3.2: Graph of Google searches related to the reform over time.
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Table 3.1: A fictitious example of how the tax rates changed because of the reform for
households living in two merging municipalities, A and B. The municipalities in the example
belonged to different counties (“Amter”) before the reform.
A B
Municipal income
tax rate
20% 16%
Before the reform Municipal property
tax rate
8 10
County income tax
rate
12% 14%
County property
tax rate
10 10
AB
After the reform Municipal income
tax rate
20+(12−8)+16+(14−8)
2 = 23%
Municipal property
tax rate
8+10+10+10
2 = 19
A B
Relevant tax
changes
Municipal income
tax rate
23-20-(12-8)=-1% 23-16-(14-8)=1%
Municipal property
tax rate
19-8-10=1 19-10-10=-1
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Parameter M1 M2
Intercept
12.382 12.382
(35.83) (214.09)
Income Tax(%)
-0.044 -0.044
(-2.69) (-19.48)
Property Tax()
-0.003 -0.003
(-0.96) (-7.67)
log(No. of rooms)
0.094 0.094
(8.56) (12.76)
log(Distance to city) (m)
-0.097 -0.097
(-9.78) (-80.54)
log(Size) (m2)
0.748 0.748
(50.68) (99.65)
Age in years
-0.008 -0.008
(-25.47) (-68.07)
Age2 · 103 0.030 0.030
(21.13) (44.58)
Housing Type: -0.031 -0.031
Townhouse (-0.71) (-4.28)
Housing Type: -0.091 -0.091
Villa (-2.02) (-14.85)
Monthly dummy variable Yes Yes
Amt Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Municipality Error Clustering Yes No
R2 0.44 0.44
Adj-R2 0.44 0.44
Table 3.3: This table presents OLS panel regressions for period 2006-2007, where log house
price is regressed on the municipality income and property tax, and a vector of house charac-
teristics such as log number of rooms, log distance to the city, log size, age, squared age, house
type dummy variable (townhouse, villa and apartment). There is month fixed effect included
in both of the regressions. In the first model (M1) there is also amt fixed effect and errors are
cluster by each old municipality. In the second model (M2) there is amt fixed effect as well,
however the errors are not clustered. The t-statistics are provided in the brackets.
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Parameter First Stage Second Stage
Property Income
log(House Price)
Tax Tax
Intercept
0.562 -1.799 13.274
(0.73) (-7.39) (85.68)
Tax Income (%)
-0.068
(-14.86)
IV-Intended Income 1.046
Tax (%) (142.48)
Tax Property (%)
-0.009
(-10.90)
IV-Intended Property 1.007
Tax (%) (205.15)
log(No. of rooms)
-0.244 -0.011 0.063
(-1.51) (-0.27) (2.37)
log(Distance to city) (m)
0.062 0.012 -0.078
(2.97) (2.28) (-22.95)
log(Size) (m2)
0.145 0.124 0.675
(0.81) (2.78) (23.01)
Age in years
-0.002 0.000 -0.007
(-0.49) (0.39) (-11.96)
Age2 · 103 -0.005 -0.009 0.024
(-0.18) (-1.43) (5.62)
Housing Type: -1.220 -0.029 -0.115
Townhouse (-4.95) (-0.46) (-2.83)
Housing Type: -0.894 -0.121 -0.324
Villa (-4.49) (-2.41) (-9.84)
Monthly dummy variable Yes Yes Yes
Amt Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.92 0.85 0.71
Adj-R2 0.92 0.85 0.71
Table 3.4: This table presents two stage least square estimation with two endogenous variable:
income tax and property tax. The intended income and property tax are used as instrumental
variables for income and property tax, respectively. Amt and month fixed effect are included
in each of the regressions. The second and third column show coefficient estimates from the
first stage least square estimation, whereas the last column presents the coefficients from the
second stage where the median log house price in each old municipality is regressed on income
tax and property tax from the first stage and other covariates: median old municipality log
number of rooms, log distance to city, log size, age, squared age, house type. The two last raw
show the R2 and adjusted R2 for each of the regression. The t-statistics are provided in the
brackets.
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Parameter First Stage Second Stage
Property Income
Service log(House Price)
Tax Tax
Intercept
0.535 -1.794 1690.7 13.358
( 0.69) (-7.33 ) (3.91 ) (76.11 )
Income Tax (%)
-0.079
(-11.95 )
IV-Intended Income 1.045
Tax (%) (141.65 )
Property Tax ()
-0.011
( -7.66)
IV-Intended Property 1.007
Tax () ( 204.62)
Service·103 0.119
( 2.14)
Education Expenditure
-0.108
( -2.26)
State School -69.02
Expenditure (-5.59 )
log(No. of rooms)
-0.241 -0.011 84.050 0.049
( -1.49) (-0.28 ) ( 0.94) ( 1.65)
log(Distance to city) (m)
0.059 0.012 -38.96 -0.072
( 2.83) ( 2.31) (-3.38 ) (-16.19 )
log(Size) (m2)
0.156 0.125 -152.8 0.696
( 0.87) (2.77 ) ( -1.54) (20.88 )
Age in years
-0.002 0.000 4.602 -0.008
( -0.49) (0.39 ) (2.28 ) ( -10.99)
Age2 · 103 -0.005 -0.009 -13.681 0.025
( -0.21) (-1.43 ) (-0.95 ) (5.23 )
Housing Type: -1.232 -0.027 502.56 -0.153
Townhouse ( -4.98) ( -0.44) (3.67) (-3.13 )
Housing Type: -0.909 -0.120 534.616 -0.367
Villa (-4.54 ) ( -2.39) (4.84 ) ( -8.81)
Monthly dummy variable Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amt Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.92 0.85 0.32 0.67
Adj-R2 0.92 0.84 0.32 0.67
Table 3.5: This table presents two stage least square estimation with multiple endogenous variable: income
tax, property tax and service. The intended income and property tax are used as instrumental variables for
income and property tax, respectively. Service is instrumented by education expenditures and state school
expenditures. Amt and month fixed effect are included in each of the regressions. The second, third and fourth
column show coefficient estimates from the first stage least square estimation, whereas the last column presents
the coefficients from the second stage where the median log house price in each old municipality is regressed
on income tax, property tax and service from the first stage and other covariates: median old municipality log
number of rooms, log distance to city, log size, age, squared age, house type. The two last raw show the R2
and adjusted R2 for each of the regression. The t-statistics are provided in the brackets.
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Abstract
By using the 2002 case of fraud in the Danish municipality Farum as
an exogenous shock to public debt of about 125 million USD or 6600 USD
per capita, I estimate the effect of local public debt on house prices. I
find that the average home ownership lost between 13.6% and 16.0% in
the 3 months after the debt increase. The aggregate effect corresponds
to between 100% and 118% of the total debt increase. Also, I document
that the initial 1-month aggregate reaction equals about 175% of the total
debt increase, and that the reaction is dampened in the following months
to between 37% to 75% of the total debt increase. The speed at which
the housing market reacts to the increased public debt indicates a very
efficient housing market, and the initial overreaction can be fully rational
if the housing market initially fears further debt revelations.
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4.1 Introduction
The efficiency of the residential housing market, that is the ability to correctly
incorporate news into prices, have long been examined. Rayburn et al. [1987],
Case and Shiller [1989], Case and Shiller [1990], and Guntermann and Norrbin
[1991] all find that the lagged house price changes, to some extent, can predict
future house price changes. Had the residential house market been completely
efficient, then historical prices should not reveal anything about the future, since
this information would be incorporated in the prices. The existing literature on
housing market efficiency look at the aggregate housing market. This study fo-
cuses on one event in February 2002, in which municipal debt were exogenously
increased by approximately 125 million USD in 1 month, and examines whether
the housing market efficiently incorporate the new information. The increase
in debt was approximately 6600 USD per capita. The municipality in question,
Farum, had no long term debt prior to the increase, but the average long term
debt for the surrounding municipalities was about 1000 USD per capita in 2002.
Thus, the municipal debt increase was substantial. The degree of market effi-
ciency depends both upon the speed at which the market reacts, and whether
the reaction is correct/rational.
The residential housing market is naturally less efficient than financial mar-
kets such as stock and bond markets. The transaction costs associated with
housing sales reduces the potential rent, informed agents gain by acting on their
private information. Moreover, the long duration of a sale prolongs the time it
takes for news to be incorporated into prices. Finally, the inability to short sell
houses limits the agents who can benefit from negative news to current home
owners.
To assess the efficiency of the residential housing market, I examine the
price reaction to a sudden and large increase in the need for financing due to
the discovery of fraud in the Danish municipality Farum in February 2002. In
February 2002 journalists discovered that illegal accounting practices had led
to an artificially high liquidity buffer. An unreported loan of 250 million DKK
was uncovered, and the interior ministry granted Farum a long term loan of
750 million DKK, to recover from the financial distress. Effectively, the debt in
Farum rose by 1 billion DKK or about 125 million USD in the month of February
2002.
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The price reaction to major news events has been widely studied for financial
markets (see e.g. Bondt and Thaler [1985], Ederington and Lee [1993], or Brooks
et al. [2003]) but it has hardly been studied for the housing market. The only
exception to the author’s knowledge is Deng et al. [2013], which uses the 2008
Wenchuan earthquake in China to examine how the housing market reacts to
extreme events. They look at the relative price reaction of low and high floor
apartments after the earthquake, and find not only that prices fell, but that
prices of apartments on high floors decreased more than apartments on low
floors. They argue that the price drop is irrational, since the risk of future
earthquakes has not changed, and the fact that prices for upper floor apartments
decreased more than lower floor apartments, is even more irrational, because it
is not riskier to live on upper floors than lower floors in case of an earthquake.
Contrary to the earthquake in Deng et al. [2013], an increase in public debt
should, everything else equal, lead to lower house prices, because it increases
the probability for future tax increases and/or lower public service. In this way,
public debt can be seen as a signal of future taxes and public service. Hence,
this study is related to the empirical literature on tax capitalization (see e.g.
Oates [1969], Palmon and Smith [1998], and Gallagher et al. [2013]). However,
the tax capitalization literature relies on an arbitrary choice of discount rate to
discount the future value of taxes. Not surprisingly, the findings varies from
under capitalization, to full and even over capitalization. And so, it is hard to
take the degree of tax capitalization as a measure of the efficiency of the housing
market.
Since debt is a signal of future taxes, and because the value is easily observed,
I will automatically know whether the house price reaction is exaggerated or
understated. A rational drop in house prices should equal the expected part
of future tax increases attributable to home ownerships. It is, of course, hard
to define exactly how big a part of future tax increases is attributable to home
ownerships, since aside from property taxes, Danish municipalities also finance
public service by e.g. income taxes, which affect all residents in the municipality
and not just home owners2. Nonetheless, the aggregate price reaction should
not exceed the increase in debt. The public debt increase thus functions as a
2It should be noted however, that renters easier can move to another municipality than
home owners, and hence avoid the tax increase. And so, one could argue that home owners
will carry a larger part of the future tax burden.
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cap on a rational aggregate price effect.
I find that the average home ownership lost between 13.6% and 16.0% in the
3 months after the debt increase. The aggregate effect corresponds to between
100% and 118% of the total debt increase. Also, I document that the initial
1-month aggregate price drop equals about 175% of the total debt increase, and
that the reaction is dampened in the following months to between 37% to 75% of
the total debt increase. This shows that the housing market initially overreacts
to debt increases but quickly adjusts to long-run levels. The speed at which
the housing market reacts to the increased public debt indicates a very efficient
housing market, and the initial overreaction can be fully rational if the housing
market initially fears further debt revelations.
The results are contrary to the findings in the stock market, where among
others Bernard and Thomas [1989], Bernard and Thomas [1990] and Michaely
et al. [1995] find that stock returns, conditional on public events such as earnings
and dividend announcements etc., exhibit post-event drift in the direction of
the initial event reaction. That is, the stock market initially underreact to
news. However, where most explanations of underreaction in the stock turn to
behavioral biases, the reaction in this case could as mentioned be fully rational
if the market fears further debt revelations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the related
literature. Section 4.3 discusses the identification strategy. Section 4.4 describes
the data and presents summary statistics. Section 4.5 deals with the estimation
strategy. Section 4.6 presents the results and section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
There is a wide agreement in the capitalization literature that local taxes and
public service are capitalized into house prices - that is house prices tend to
be higher in jurisdictions with lower taxes and higher levels of public service.
However, the degree of capitalization is somewhat mixed. Chinloy [1978] and
Gronberg [1979] find limited capitalization effects, whereas Oates [1969], Edel
and Sclar [1974], Gustely [1976], and Yinger et al. [1988] report varying degrees
of tax capitalization. Oates [1973], Reinhard [1981], and Gallagher et al. [2013]
find close to full or even over capitalization.
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In addition to taxes, the literature suggests the capitalization of several other
factors. Greenstone and Gallagher [2008] analyze the impact of hazardous waste
sites on house prices. Davis [2004] examine the effect of a cancer cluster on house
prices, and Black [1999] shows that school quality is capitalized into house prices.
The relation between public debt and house prices has not received the same
attention. Banzhaf and Oates [2012] examine the relationship between the public
financing choice and the proportion of tenants versus owner-occupied houses,
and Stadelmann and Eichenberger [2012] hypothesize that debt capitalization
results in house owners have stronger preferences against debt than tenants, but
none of the two studies provide any direct test of the capitalization of debt into
house prices. To my knowledge, the only other study examining the impact of
public debt on house prices is Stadelmann and Eichenberger [2013]. However,
the current study differs from Stadelmann and Eichenberger [2013] in a few
ways. First of all, Stadelmann and Eichenberger [2013] uses data over several
years, and so have to control for all factors affecting house prices. The uses of
data over several years could potentially confound their results. I side-step this
problem by utilizing the increase in municipal debt by 125 million USD in the
month of February 2002 as an exogenous shock to debt. Secondly, the focus of
this paper is not on whether or not debt is capitalized into house prices, but
how the housing market reacts to news about public debt.
In this light the current study has more in common with studies of major news
events on prices and whether these reactions are exaggerated or understated.
This has been widely examined for financial markets (see for example Bondt
and Thaler [1985], Ederington and Lee [1993], and Brooks et al. [2003]). For the
housing market the only study to my knowledge is Deng et al. [2013]. However,
Deng et al. [2013] focuses on the house price reaction of earthquakes that alone
provide no new information on the occurrence of earthquakes, and so rationally
there should not be a house prices reaction.
In the current study the event indeed offers new information, and so the goal
is to examine how the housing market reacts to this new information.
118
4.3 Identification Strategy
I identify whether house prices over- or underreact to news by using the 2002
case of fraud in the Danish municipality of Farum by then mayor Peter Brixtofte
as a natural experiment. The national Danish newspaper BT reveals large ex-
penditures from dinners and very expensive wines by then mayor in Farum
Peter Brixtofte on February 6th, 2002. The initial scandal turns all the media’s
attention onto Farum, and on February 17th, an unreported loan of 250 mil-
lion DKK was uncovered. On February 19th, the interior ministry in Denmark
placed Farum under its administration due to a violation of municipal liquidity
rule in Denmark known as “Kassekreditreglen”, which states that the average
municipal liquidity over the previous 12 months has to be positive. The min-
istry granted Farum a long term loan of 750 million DKK, to recover from the
financial distress, contingent on future public service cuts and tax increases. Ef-
fectively, the debt in Farum rose by 1 billion DKK or about 125 million USD
in the month of February 2002. A substantial amount in a municipality of only
18,854 inhabitants. Prior to the fraud, Farum had listed no long term debt, but
the average long term debt in the 4 neighboring municipalities was about 1000
USD per capita in 2002. The discovery corresponds to a long term debt in-
crease of about 6600 USD per capita, so the debt increase was substantial. (See
Farum-kommissionen and Justitsministeriet [2012] for more on the scandal).
Since the value of the debt increase is observable, the setup poses a unique
possibility to assess the efficiency of the residential housing market, by examining
whether and how fast the house prices reacts to the increase in debt, and whether
the aggregate price reaction equals the total debt increase.
To control for unobserved factors influencing house prices but unrelated to
the increase in debt, I use the 4 neighboring municipalities of Værløse, Stenløse,
Allerød, and Birkerød as control group. A map of Farum and the municipalities
used as controls are shown in figure 4.1. The municipalities of Lyngby-T˚arbæk
and Søllerød are not included in the control group, because they are not com-
pletely adjacent to Farum, but separated by the lake Furesø.
Table 4.1 shows 2001 key figures for Farum and the surrounding 4 munici-
palities. It is noticeable that Farum has a lower overall tax level and still has
higher overall public service expenditures than each of the other four municipal-
ities. Only the “monthly child care fee” and the “net school expenditures” are
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more favorable in some of the surrounding municipalities. The high service/low
tax combination in Farum makes it hard to choose a perfect control group. In
fact, the service level3 in Farum in 2001 was 1.4 with a country average of 1,
and no other municipality in Denmark had as high a service level or as low a
tax-service relationship.
I use the three months prior to February 2002 as the pre-event period and
the 3 months after February 2002 as the post-event period. Hence, I leave out
February 2002, as an information discovery period. This is done to ensure that
no agents either buying or selling in the pre-event period could have known about
the debt increase, and all agents buying or selling in the post-event period knew
about the increase. The time line of the experiment is shown in figure 4.2. A
one month event window might seem like a lot especially when comparing to
classic policy studies in which the event is a change in law. However, it is hard
to define a precise date of discovery, since the size of the debt grew over several
days as more articles uncovered the fraud. The wider the event window, the
bigger the risk of other factors influencing the results. However, as long as the
factors affect both Farum and the control group equally, the results will still be
unbiased. It does not seem likely that something affecting house prices in Farum
(aside from the increase in debt), would not also affect the control group (the
surrounding municipalities).
4.4 Data
All Danish housing sales4 are recorded by the Danish tax authorities and are
available through the Danish public information server through www.OIS.dk. It
includes sale dates, prices, size, number of rooms etc. for all Danish addresses
back to 1992. The sale date is when the sales agreement was signed, and not
when the sale was registered in the public database.
I exclude family transactions. Family sales are easily identified in the dataset,
because all family sales are registered and marked as such. I also exclude forced
3The service level is defined as the net municipal service expenditure per capita divided
by the estimated municipal service expenditure need and then scaled by the average across
municipalities. Values above 1 hence indicate that the actual service spending relative to the
predicted need is above the average of the Danish municipalities.
4Sales of the housing type “Andelsbolig”, which is a Danish cooperative housing type, are
not recorded, so it is unfortunately not possible to say anything about the size of this market.
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sales, and thus only include regular arms length sales in the dataset.
I focus only on the three biggest housing types in Denmark; regular houses
(villas), apartments, and townhouses5. This is done to avoid special house types,
that might be priced differently than regular owner-occupied housing.
All the addresses of the sold houses are geocoded with latitude and longitude
coordinates, and the municipal affiliation of each location is determined through
the Danish Geodata Agency’s (Geodatastyrelsen) mapping services “GeoVA”
and “GeoK7”.
The house characteristics are supplemented by the distance to the nearest
big city in Denmark. This spatial variable is meant to catch the effects of living
close to a big city, like better job opportunities, better shopping facilities, closer
proximity to schools etc.
4.4.1 Summary Statistics
Table 4.2 shows the summary statistics for the houses sold in Farum and the
4 surrounding municipalities the three months before the event (November and
December 2001 and January 2002) and the three months after the event (March,
April, and May 2002).
One of the first things to note is the low number of sales in Farum both
before and after the debt increase of only 37 and 47 respectively. The control
group has respectively 218 and 342 sales in comparison. A few observations in
Farum could, hence, influence the results significantly. In fact, one sale taking
place in the month prior to the debt increase has a price/m2 of 87,500 DKK,
corresponding to more than 5.5 standard deviations above the mean.6 As a
control, I perform the analysis on a sample trimmed on the price/m2 variable
for the top and bottom 1%.
Both the mean and median price and price per square meter are higher in
Farum than in the control group. However, after the event, both the mean and
median price and square price drops in Farum, whereas it increases a bit in the
control group. This already hints to an effect of the increased public debt. This
could, of course, be driven by a change in the characteristics of the houses sold,
especially considering the low number of sales in Farum both before and after
5Villaer, ejerlejligheder, and rækkehuse in Danish.
6The sale is not a incorrect registration, but a villa with attached commercial properties.
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the event.
4.5 Estimation Strategy
I use the February 2002 increase in municipal debt of 125 million USD in the
Danish municipality Farum as an exogenous shock to debt, to examine the effect
of public debt on house prices.
To estimate the effect of debt on house prices I use the difference-in-differences
methodology. I do both simple difference-in-differences regression in the follow-
ing form:
log(Priceitj) = β0 + δ0 · 1Farum + δ1 · 1After + δ21After · 1Farum + uitj, (4.1)
where i indexes the individual housing sales, t indexes time, and j indexes the
treatment (Farum) and control group (the 4 surrounding municipalities). 1Farum
is a dummy variable indicating whether the sale took place in Farum (then
equalling 1) or in the surrounding municipalities. 1After is a dummy variable
equalling 1 if the sale took place after the debt increase and 0 otherwise. 1After ·
1Farum is the term of interest. It equals 1 if the sale took place in Farum
after the scandal, and captures the effect of the increase in debt. The semi-
log specification in equation 4.1 is chosen because it provides the best fit of
the data. The interpretation of the parameters in the semi-log specification
is the relative change in the selling price, Price, of a 1 unit of change in the
relevant explanatory variable as seen from a simple application of the chain rule
on equation 4.1:
δ2 =
∂ log(Price)
∂1After · 1Farum
=
1
Price
∂Price
∂1After · 1Farum
=
∂Price
Price
∂1After · 1Farum
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The OLS estimator of δ2, δˆ2, has the usual interpretation of
δˆ2 = (y¯Farum,After − y¯Farum,Before)− (y¯Control,After − y¯Control,Before), (4.2)
with the only difference being that y¯Farum,After denotes the average of the log
house prices in Farum after the debt increase. The other terms are defined
likewise.
However, the specification of equation (4.1) does not take into account that
the houses sold before the debt increase for the most part will not be the same
selling after the reform. Thus, I supplement equation (4.1) with the following
regression:
log(Priceitj) = β0 +βXitj+δ0 ·1Farum+δ1 ·1After+δ21After ·1Farum+uitj, (4.3)
where Xitj includes housing characteristics of the sold houses, to account for
possible quality differences before and after the event. The OLS estimator for δ2
no longer has the simple representation in equation (4.2) but the interpretation
is basically the same. I.e. the effect in equation (4.2) conditioned on information
about houses sold.
To examine the longer run effects of the debt increase I change the specifi-
cation of equation (4.3) to
log(Priceitj) = β0 + βXitj + δ0 · 1Farum + ρt +
m∑
t=1
δtρt · 1Farum + uitj, (4.4)
where ρt is a factor indicating the period in which the sale took place. With
this specification, the coefficient, δt, captures how the debt increase affects house
prices in m periods after the event.
4.6 Results
A first indication of the effect of public debt on house prices is seen in figure
4.3. The graph depicts the median residuals per quarter in Farum and the 4
neighboring municipalities (the control group) from running the regression
Priceitj = β0 + β1t+ β2Xijt + uitj (4.5)
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estimated on data from 1997 until the end of 2001. I.e. estimated over a period
ending before the increase in the municipal debt. t denotes time in quarters, and
Xijt includes housing characteristics such as size, number of rooms, distance to
nearest big city etc. The estimated model is used to predict values in 2002, and
the residuals are obtained by subtracting the predicted values from the observed
values. The graph clearly shows that until 2001 the model explains the sales
prices in Farum and the control group equally well, but when the model is used
to predict values for 2002, the sales in Farum are overestimated, while the sales
in the 4 surrounding municipalities are still well explained.
However, better estimates of the effect of the debt increase can be obtained.
Firstly, the fraud discovery were not made before February 2002, so January
should not be part of the post-event period. Secondly, stopping the estimation
analysis in the end of 2001 neglects the information in 2002. Hence, a proper
difference-in-differences analysis is more appropriate for capturing the effect of
public debt on house prices.
Table 4.3 shows the results of running the simple difference-in-differences
regression in equation (4.1) using the 3 months before February 2002 as pre-
event period and the 3 months after February 2002 as the post-event period. I
leave out February 2002 for people to receive the new information. As previously
mentioned, this is done to ensure that no agents either buying or selling in the
pre-event period could have known about the debt increase, and all agents buying
or selling in the post-event period knew about the increase.
The results show a large economic loss of -27.0% for the average home own-
ership, which is statistical significant even at the 1% confidence level. However,
the R2 is only 1.3% due to the missing housing characteristics relevant for prop-
erly explaining the house price variation. Hence, the estimate could be biases
by the missing explanatory variables.
A better estimate is obtained by including housing characteristics as in the
difference-in-differences specification in equation (4.3). The results of this re-
gression are shown in table 4.4. Most interestingly, the effect of the 125 million
USD debt increase is now much lower than in the simple difference-in-differences
estimation in table 4.3. However, the estimate is still -16.0% and it is still signif-
icant at the 1% level. Assuming that all home ownerships are equally affected,
the aggregate mean loss in house prices equals −16.0% · 3, 600 · 2, 060, 416 ≈
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1, 190, 000, 000 or about 148,000,000 USD, since Farum had a total of 3600 home
ownerships in 2002 (See www.dst.dk/en/), and the mean house price in Farum
the 3 months before the debt increase where 2,060,416 DKK (on the trimmed
data). This corresponds to 118% of the 125 million USD increase in debt. It
is probably unrealistic to assume that home owners will be carrying the entire
expected future tax burden and/or service reductions. Thus, the price reaction
is exaggerated compared to the 125 million USD debt increase.
Including the housing characteristics leads to a higher R2 of 63.6%, indicat-
ing that excluding the housing characteristics might lead to significant omitted
variable bias in the estimate of the debt effect. The coefficients related to the
housing characteristics all have the expected signs except the number of rooms
which has a small negative effect - probably due to the high correlation with
the size variable. Houses in Farum trade at a premium of 17.8% compared to
the control group, and villas and townhouses are on average significantly more
expensive than apartments. The age of the property has a negative (though eco-
nomically small) impact on the price. The squared age has a positive impact,
in line with old houses having charm and tend to have better and more central
locations. The size of the house is highly significant and positively related to
the selling price. The distance to the nearest big city is also very significant and
negatively related to the price. The coefficient in front of the dummy variable,
1After, capturing the time effect, is positive in line with the general appreciation
of houses in Denmark in the period.
The summary statistics in table 4.2 indicate that at least one extreme obser-
vation might influence the results. Looking at the standardized residuals against
the fitted values in figure 4.4 indeed confirms that especially one observation is
far from the predicted value. To examine the impact of extreme observations,
I run the regression in equation (4.3) on data trimmed on the price/m2 vari-
able for the top and bottom 1%. The results are shown in table 4.5. The R2
rises to 70.2% from 63.6% in table 4.4 using the full sample, indicating a better
fit without the extreme observations. The effect of the debt increase falls to
-13.6% but is still both economically and statistically significant. Hence, the ex-
treme observations influence the results, but they are not driving the debt effect.
The aggregate effect of the debt increase with this specification corresponds to
−13.6% · 3600 · 2, 060, 416 ≈ 1, 000, 000, 000 DKK or about 125,000,000 USD.
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This equals the entire debt increase. A large drop considering that home owners
are not likely to bear the entire future tax burden and/or lower public service.
Since the extreme observations are indeed real sales, it is not completely clear
that excluding these are the correct approach. However, leaving them in will
bias the estimates of the variance-covariance matrix of the estimates in regular
OLS, since the residuals do not exhibit constant variance, and thus might lead
to wrong inferences. In fact, the White [1980] heteroscedasticity test leads to
rejection of the H0 hypothesis of homoscedasticity even at the 0.001% confidence
level. The White [1980] heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are computed
in table 4.6 for the sample including all observations. The debt effect is still
statistically significant, though only at the 5% level.
4.6.1 Long Run Results
The economically large estimates of the debt effect in table 4.4 and 4.5 suggest
that the housing market do incorporate new information about local public debt
into prices quite fast, though the magnitude of the effect is exaggerated compared
to the total debt increase. However, to assess the efficiency one needs to examine
the long-run effect. Table 4.7 shows the results from running the regression in
equation (4.3) but expanding the post-event period to go from March 2002 to
and including December 2004. The estimated debt effect is now -8,4%, and
thus significantly lower than the -13.6% in table 4.5 with a 3-month post-event
period. This suggest that the initial exaggerated debt effect is diminished over
time.
To better examine whether the effect is temporary or permanent, I run two
specifications of the regression in equation (4.4); one where δt captures the time
effect in quarters and one in months. The estimated debt effect is depicted in
figure 4.5. From figure 4.5 it is seen that the debt effect is biggest in the beginning
and is lessened over time. In the 3-month specification, the initial effect is -
13.7%, but then falls to between 5 and 10%. From the 1-month specification
it is seen that the effect in the first month is as much as -23.6%, but already
in the following month recovers to -13.6%, and then also settling between 5
and 10% after the third month. The number of sales in Farum the month
before the debt increase and the months following were 14, 15, 15, 17, 9, 12,
10 respectively. Thus, even though the number of sales drop significantly when
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moving to 1-month periods, there are still about 15 sales each month, adding
some confidence to the reliability of the estimates.
The drop in the first month corresponds to an aggregate effect of −23.6% ·
2, 060, 416 · 3, 600 ≈ 1, 750, 000, 000 DKK or about 175% of the total debt in-
crease. The long-run effects corresponds to an aggregate effect in the range of
(−5%·3, 600·2, 060, 416/1, 000, 000, 000 ≈) 37% to (−10%·3, 600·2, 060, 416/1, 000, 000, 000 ≈)
75% of the total debt increase. This further indicates that the housing market
initially overreacts to the debt increase, but quickly adjust to more rational
levels.
This suggests an overreaction, since home ownerships should not rationally
be expected to carry the entire future tax burden and/or service reductions due
to the increased debt. Rationally, renters and corporations in Farum should
carry some of the burden through for example income tax increases or increased
taxation of corporate properties (dækningsafgift in Danish). It should be noted,
that the initial overreaction might still constitute rational behaviour if the mar-
ket fears further debt revelations in the first month after the event.
The result that public debt affect house prices is in line with Stadelmann and
Eichenberger [2013] who also find that public debt influence house prices. The
speed at which the housing prices react to the increased public debt indicates
a very efficient housing market. The initial overreaction could be in line with
the results of Deng et al. [2013] who find that the housing market irrationally
reacts to news on earthquakes even though the news contain no new relevant in-
formation on the risk earthquakes, however it could also indicate a fully rational
housing market, if the market initially fears further debt revelations.
The results are contrary to the findings in the stock market, where among
others Bernard and Thomas [1989], Bernard and Thomas [1990] and Michaely
et al. [1995] find that stock returns, conditional on public events such as earn-
ings and dividend announcements, exhibit post-event drift in the direction of
the initial event reaction. That is, the stock market initially underreact to news.
However, where most explanations of underreaction in the stock turn to be-
havioral biases, the reaction in this case could be fully rational as previously
mentioned.
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4.6.2 Robustness Checks
One concern regarding the analysis, is the choice of control group. One way
to examine this is buy looking at the median residuals per quarter from the
regression
priceijt = β0 + βXijt + uijt (4.6)
for Farum, each of the 4 surrounding municipalities, and the 4 surrounding
municipalities grouped together. In equation (4.6) i indexes individual sales, t
denotes time, and j municipalities. Xijt are housing characteristics such as size,
number of rooms etc. Figure 4.6 depicts the residuals, i.e. the part of the prices
unexplained by the housing characteristics. This indicates that the sales in the 4
surrounding municipalities grouped together tracks the prices of the houses sold
in Farum better than each of the municipalities individually, when controlling
for the characteristics of the houses sold. Using the group of all 4 surrounding
municipalities as control group thus seems like a reasonable choice.
Another potential concern with the results is the choice to include Værløse
in the control group. The concern stems from the fact that Farum and Værløse
merged as part of the municipality reform that took effect on January 1st 2007.7
And even though the municipality reform was not presented until 2004, there
was still a debate about the need for a reform in 2002. Hence, a potential
concern could be that houses in Værøse were affected by the debt increase too.
To ameliorate this concern, Værløse is excluded from the control group in the
results in table 4.8. Excluding Værøse from the control group, the estimate
of the debt effect is 15.4% compared to 13.6% when including Værøse. Thus,
including Værløse - if anything - understates the debt effect, further confirming
the large initial debt effect on prices.
Figure 4.7 shows that the long-run results are not significantly different when
excluding Værløse, and resembles figure 4.5, though the first month effect is
higher.
Overall I document that local public debt do affect house prices. Further-
more, I find an effect in the 3 months after the debt increase between -13.6% and
16.0%, depending on the whether the data is trimmed or not. The aggregate
7The Danish municipality reform stated basically that municipalities with less than 20,000
inhabitants should should merge with neighboring municipalities to have at least 30,000 in-
habitants to better harvest economies of scale benefits.
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mean effect corresponds to 100% and 118% of the total debt increase.
Also, I find that the house price reaction in the the first month after the debt
increase exceeds the total debt increase by about 50%, but that the reaction is
dampened over time.
4.7 Conclusion
By using the 125 million USD increase in municipal debt in the Danish mu-
nicipality Farum in February 2002 as an exogenous shock to public debt, I am
able to directly examine the efficiency of the residential housing market’s price
reaction to the increases in local public debt. I find that the housing market
initially overreacts to the debt increase, but that the overreaction is lessened
over time.
Specifically, I document that local public debt do affect house prices. In the 3
months after the debt increase the house prices drop between -13.6% and 16.0%
due to the debt increase, depending on the whether the data is trimmed or not
and the choice of control group. The aggregate mean effect ranges from 100%
and 118% of the total debt increase.
Moreover, I find that the house price reaction in the the first month after
the debt increase exceeds the total debt increase by about 75%, but that the
reaction is reduced over time. The long-run effect lies in the range of 37% to
75% of the total debt increase.
The result that public debt affects house prices is in line with Stadelmann and
Eichenberger [2013] who also find that public debt influence house prices. The
speed at which the housing prices react to the increased public debt indicates
a very efficient housing market. The initial overreaction could be in line with
the results of Deng et al. [2013] who find that the housing market irrationally
reacts to news on earthquakes even though the news contain no new relevant in-
formation on the risk earthquakes, however it could also indicate a fully rational
housing market, if the market initially fears further debt revelations.
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4.8 Figures and Tables
Figure 4.1: Map of Farum (treatment group) and the surrounding municipalities (control
group).
Treatment group
Control group
Legend
Figure 4.2: Time line of the experiment.
Pre-event period Discovery
of Fraud -
debt increase
Post-event period
November 2001 -
January 2002
February
2002
March 2002 -
May 2002
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Figure 4.3: The median residuals per quarter from Farum and the 4 neighboring municipal-
ities (the control group) from running the regression Priceitj = β0 + β1t+ β2Xijt + uitj from
1997 till the end of 2001. From 2002 the estimated model is used to predict values and the
residuals are obtained by subtracting the predicted values from the observed values.
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Figure 4.4: The graph shows the standardized residuals against the fitted values of the
regression presented in table 4.4.
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Figure 4.5: The graph shows difference-in-differences estimates from running the regression
in equation (4.4). The event time, t = 0, is February 2002. ** denotes rejection at the 1%
confidence level of the H0 hypothesis that the effect of debt is equal to 0.
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Figure 4.6: Median residuals per quarter from the regression priceijt = β0 +βXijt +uijt for
Farum, each of the 4 surrounding municipalities, and the 4 surrounding municipalities grouped
together. Xijt are housing characteristics such as size, number of rooms etc. The graph hence
shows the part of the prices unexplained by the housing characteristics.
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Table 4.1: 2001 values on select municipal tax and public service figures for Farum and the 4
surrounding municipalities in the control group. The overall tax level is a weighting of all the
municipal taxes including income taxes, private property taxes, and corporate property taxes.
Net public service expenditure pr. capita is the total expenditure used on public service in the
municipality in relation to the number of inhabitants. The service level is a relative measure
of how much the municipality spends on service compared to the average municipality (an
average municipality has a service level of 1). Monthly child care fee is the user payment for
child care. Net school expenditure pr. pupil are the total expenditure used on public schools
(age 6 to 16). Cultural expenditure pr. capita is the money spend on libraries, Arts and
Theater etc. Expenditure on sport and leasure pr. capita covers subsidies for children’s soccer
practice etc.
Farum Birkerød Værløse Allerød Stenløse
Overall tax level (%) 19.36 20.27 20.68 21.54 22.04
Net public service expenditure pr. capita 38275 26186 27375 27079 26470
Service level 1.4 1.06 1.1 1.09 1.15
Tax-service relation 0.78 0.89 0.92 0.94 0.93
Monhtly child care fee for 0-2-year olds 2189 2095 2432 2075 2030
Monhtly child care fee for 3-5-year olds 1451 1274 1346 1415 1320
Net school expenditure pr. pupil 50747 48120 43715 48796 53696
Cultural expediture pr. capita 884 286 196 533 228
Expenditure on leasure pr. capita 3291 1075 1023 1143 1049
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Figure 4.7: The graph shows difference-in-differences estimates from running the regression
in equation (4.4) but excluding Værløse from the control group. The event time, t = 0, is
February 2002. ** denotes rejection at the 1% confidence level of the H0 hypothesis that the
effect of debt is equal to 0.
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics for the housing sales in Farum (treatment group) and the
surrounding municipalities (control group) the 3 months before the revelation of the scandal
(November and December 2001 and January 2002) and the 3 months after the scandal (March,
April and May 2002).
Before
Farum
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. S.D.
Distance (m) 18468 19471 19781 19913 20442 21572 793
Rooms 2 4 5 4.865 6 10 1.7
Price 785000 1580000 2025000 2450638 2557495 17500000 2633547
Size (m2) 61 120 136 146.7 171 350 57.6
Price/m2 5243 13110 14465 16514 16244 87500 12484
Age 6 30 35 40.35 42 142 25
No. of sales Apartments Townhouses Villas Total
5 9 23 37
Control group
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. S.D.
Distance (m) 2084 4713 17778 16579 25270 27538 9184
Rooms 1 4 4 4.491 5 10 1.5
Price 372000 1320314 1731811 1852258 2375000 4777777 727099
Size (m2) 46 105.2 129 133.1 159.8 267 45.4
Price/m2 3543 12255 13858 14203 16247 43074 4122
Age 1 26 33 36.8 41.75 201 23
No. of sales Apartments Townhouses Villas Total
39 52 127 218
After
Control group
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. S.D.
Distance (m) 18244 19612 19742 19787 20079 21582 672
Rooms 2 3 5 4.574 5.5 8 1.7
Price 824230 1144365 1720000 1669357 2083063 2573180 500161
Size (m2) 53 82 125 124.6 165.5 195 41.5
Price/m2 5558 12203 14254 13870 15656 21534 2887
Age 4 32 37 37.17 40 122 18
No. of sales Apartments Townhouses Villas Total
13 16 18 47
Control group
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. S.D.
Distance (m) 2066 4775 17873 16904 25480 27555 9242
Rooms 1 4 4 4.36 5 10 1.5
Price 515722 1450000 1825000 1874154 2256750 5750000 684604
Size (m2) 44 99.25 129 128.79 154 295 43.6
Price/m2 4500 12911 14791 14880 17059 24475 3445
Age 1 28 35 41.56 43 192 27
No. of sales Apartments Townhouses Villas Total
79 62 201 342
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Table 4.3: Results of a simple difference-in-differences regression of equation (4.1) without
housing characteristics for the properties sold 3 months before and after the debt increase. The
regressand is the log sales price. The log sales price is regressed against a constant, a dummy
variable equalling 1 if the sale is in Farum and 0 if it is in the control group, a dummy variable
equalling 1 if the sale took place after the debt increase and 0 otherwise, and a interaction
between the dummy variable indicating treatment (Farum) and the dummy variable indicating
whether the sale took place after or before the debt increase. The regression is estimated by
Ordinary Least Squares. *** denote significance at the 0.1% confidence level, ** significance
at the 1% confidence level, and * denotes significance at the 5% confidence level.
Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value
Intercept 14.347*** 0.027 522.100 0.000
1Farum 0.175* 0.072 2.421 0.016
1After 0.027 0.035 0.775 0.439
1After · 1Farum -0.270** 0.096 -2.813 0.005
R2 1.3%
Table 4.4: Results of difference-in-differences type regressions with housing characteristics
as in equation (4.3) to account for quality differences in the houses sold 3 months before
and after the increase in debt. The regressand is the log sales price. The log sales price is
regressed against a constant, a dummy variable equalling 1 if the sale is in Farum and 0 if it
is in the control group, a dummy variable equalling 1 if the property is a townhouse and 0
otherwise, a dummy variable equalling 1 if the property is a villa and 0 otherwise, the age of
the property, the age of the property squared, the size of the property, the number of rooms,
a dummy variable equalling 1 if the sale took place after the debt increase and 0 otherwise,
and a interaction between the dummy variable indicating treatment (Farum) and the dummy
variable indicating whether the sale took place after or before the debt increase. The regression
is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares. *** denote significance at the 0.1% confidence level,
** significance at the 1% confidence level, and * denotes significance at the 5% confidence
level.
Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value
Intercept 12.312*** 0.272 45.325 0.000
1Farum 0.178*** 0.045 3.985 0.000
1townhouse 0.174*** 0.037 4.642 0.000
1villa 0.225*** 0.038 5.970 0.000
log(Age) -0.099*** 0.018 -5.645 0.000
Age2 0.000*** 0.000 4.406 0.000
log(Size) (m2) 0.752*** 0.053 14.073 0.000
Rooms -0.025* 0.011 -2.201 0.028
log(Distance) (m) -0.143*** 0.014 -10.240 0.000
1After · 1Farum -0.160** 0.059 -2.709 0.007
1After 0.064** 0.022 2.977 0.003
R2 63.6%
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Table 4.5: Results of difference-in-differences type regressions with housing characteristics
as table 4.4 but where data is trimmed on the price/m2 variable for the top and bottom
1%. The log sales price is regressed against a constant, a dummy variable equalling 1 if
the sale is in Farum and 0 if it is in the control group, a dummy variable equalling 1 if the
property is a townhouse and 0 otherwise, a dummy variable equalling 1 if the property is a
villa and 0 otherwise, the age of the property, the age of the property squared, the size of
the property, the number of rooms, a dummy variable equalling 1 if the sale took place after
the debt increase and 0 otherwise, and a interaction between the dummy variable indicating
treatment (Farum) and the dummy variable indicating whether the sale took place after or
before the debt increase. The regression is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares. *** denote
significance at the 0.1% confidence level, ** significance at the 1% confidence level, and *
denotes significance at the 5% confidence level.
Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value
Intercept 11.954*** 0.242 49.339 0.000
1Farum 0.137*** 0.040 3.454 0.001
1townhouse 0.151*** 0.033 4.571 0.000
1villa 0.172*** 0.034 5.094 0.000
log(Age) -0.090*** 0.015 -5.912 0.000
Age2 0.000*** 0.000 3.415 0.001
log(Size) (m2) 0.802*** 0.047 16.953 0.000
Rooms -0.020* 0.010 -2.014 0.044
log(Distance) (m) -0.130*** 0.012 -10.626 0.000
1After · 1Farum -0.136** 0.052 -2.624 0.009
1After 0.063*** 0.019 3.312 0.001
R2 70.2%
Table 4.6: Results of difference-in-differences type regressions with housing characteristics as
table 4.4 but using the White [1980] heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimation
method. The regressand is the log sales price. The log sales price is regressed against a
constant, a dummy variable equalling 1 if the sale is in Farum and 0 if it is in the control
group, a dummy variable equalling 1 if the property is a townhouse and 0 otherwise, a dummy
variable equalling 1 if the property is a villa and 0 otherwise, the age of the property, the age
of the property squared, the size of the property, the number of rooms, a dummy variable
equalling 1 if the sale took place after the debt increase and 0 otherwise, and a interaction
between the dummy variable indicating treatment (Farum) and the dummy variable indicating
whether the sale took place after or before the debt increase. The regression is estimated by
Ordinary Least Squares. *** denote significance at the 0.1% confidence level, ** significance
at the 1% confidence level, and * denotes significance at the 5% confidence level.
Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value
Intercept 12.312*** 0.308 39.941 0.000
1Farum 0.178** 0.062 2.868 0.004
1townhouse 0.174*** 0.035 5.000 0.000
1villa 0.225*** 0.038 5.989 0.000
log(Age) -0.099*** 0.017 -5.846 0.000
Age2 0.000** 0.000 2.625 0.009
log(Size) (m2) 0.752*** 0.058 12.866 0.000
Rooms -0.025* 0.011 -2.197 0.028
log(Distance) (m) -0.143*** 0.014 -10.504 0.000
1After · 1Farum -0.160* 0.067 -2.367 0.018
1After 0.064** 0.022 2.903 0.004
R2 63.6%
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Table 4.7: Results of difference-in-differences type regressions with housing characteristics to
account for differences in the houses sold 3 months before and all the time through 2004 after
the debt increase. The regressand is the log sales price. The log sales price is regressed against
a constant, a dummy variable equalling 1 if the sale is in Farum and 0 if it is in the control
group, a dummy variable equalling 1 if the property is a townhouse and 0 otherwise, a dummy
variable equalling 1 if the property is a villa and 0 otherwise, the age of the property, the age
of the property squared, the size of the property, the number of rooms, a dummy variable
equalling 1 if the sale took place after the debt increase and 0 otherwise, and a interaction
between the dummy variable indicating treatment (Farum) and the dummy variable indicating
whether the sale took place after or before the debt increase. Data is trimmed on the price/m2
variable for the top and bottom 1%. The regression is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares.
*** denote significance at the 0.1% confidence level, ** significance at the 1% confidence level,
and * denotes significance at the 5% confidence level.
Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value
Intercept 11.944*** 0.094 126.415 0.000
1Farum 0.112** 0.038 2.930 0.003
1townhouse 0.199*** 0.014 14.725 0.000
1villa 0.238*** 0.014 17.169 0.000
log(Age) -0.073*** 0.006 -12.113 0.000
Age2 0.000** 0.000 2.999 0.003
log(Size) (m2) 0.736*** 0.019 38.773 0.000
Rooms -0.009* 0.004 -2.260 0.024
log(Distance) (m) -0.110*** 0.005 -23.505 0.000
1After · 1Farum -0.084* 0.040 -2.119 0.034
1After 0.090*** 0.015 6.017 0.000
R2 71.8%
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Table 4.8: Results of difference-in-differences type regressions leaving out Værløse of the
control group with housing characteristics to account for differences in the houses sold 3
months before and after the debt increase. The regressand is the log sales price. The log sales
price is regressed against a constant, a dummy variable equalling 1 if the sale is in Farum and
0 if it is in the control group, a dummy variable equalling 1 if the property is a townhouse and
0 otherwise, a dummy variable equalling 1 if the property is a villa and 0 otherwise, the age of
the property, the age of the property squared, the size of the property, the number of rooms,
a dummy variable equalling 1 if the sale took place after the debt increase and 0 otherwise,
and a interaction between the dummy variable indicating treatment (Farum) and the dummy
variable indicating whether the sale took place after or before the debt increase. Data is
trimmed on the price/m2 variable for the top and bottom 1%. The regression is estimated by
Ordinary Least Squares. *** denote significance at the 0.1% confidence level, ** significance
at the 1% confidence level, and * denotes significance at the 5% confidence level.
Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value
Intercept 12.221*** 0.269 45.479 0.000
1Farum 0.169*** 0.041 4.140 0.000
1townhouse 0.141*** 0.037 3.842 0.000
1villa 0.175*** 0.037 4.693 0.000
log(Age) -0.093*** 0.017 -5.463 0.000
Age2 0.000*** 0.000 3.688 0.000
log(Size) (m2) 0.746*** 0.054 13.906 0.000
Rooms -0.017 0.011 -1.558 0.120
log(Distance) (m) -0.133*** 0.013 -10.541 0.000
1After · 1Farum -0.154** 0.053 -2.908 0.004
1After 0.076*** 0.022 3.469 0.001
R2 67.8%
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Conclusion
This thesis contains 4 essays concerning real estate finance. The topics of the
4 essays range from trying to understand the commonalities and differences be-
tween publicly and privately traded commercial real estate and macroeconomic
risk, through utilizing the special institutional nature of Real Estate Investment
Trusts (REITs) to estimate the effect of corporate taxes and agency problems
on the capital structure of companies, to the effect of local municipal taxes and
debt on residential house prices. All 4 essays are empirical.
The first essay examines the relationship between public and privately traded
commercial real estate and macroeconomic risk. I use a large macroeconomic
dataset of 122 time series and extract the underlying factors. I find that the
macroeconomic dataset can be efficiently described by 4 fundamental factors,
which I interpret as a Recession factor, a Housing and Credit factor, an In-
flation factor, and an Interest Rate factor. I use these factors along with stock
market factors to explain the time series variation of publicly traded Real Estate
Investment Trusts (REITs) and direct and privately traded real estate proxied
by the MIT trade based index (TBI).
I find that REITs are driven by stock market factors and the interest rate
factor. REITs lead private real estate, and private real estate also reacts with
a lag to the interest rate factor and a recession factor. REITs and private
real estate are thus related both directly through their lead-lag relationship and
indirectly through a common exposure to US interest rates.
The second essay analyzes the effect of the tax advantage of debt and the mit-
igating effect of debt on free cash flow agency problems on firm capital structure
choices. Specifically, I examine how the two effects affect the level of leverage
and the tendency of firms to have dynamic target leverage ratios that they revert
to as predicted by the dynamic Trade-off theory.
I do this by comparing publicly listed real estate investment trust (REITs),
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which are effectively tax exempt and not prone to free cash flow agency problems,
because they are required to pay out at least 90% of the taxable income as
dividends and can deduct the dividends from their taxable income, to regular
listed real estate companies without the REIT status (non-REITs).
I find that REITs have similar or even higher leverage ratios than similar
non-REITs real estate firms. More so, I document that REITs have higher
target leverage ratios than non-REITs and that the speed at which they revert
to the targets are equal for the two groups. This is not line with the largest
benefits of debt being the tax advantage and the reduction in free cash flow
agency problems, as is often mentioned in the literature, and could suggest that
firms have other benefits of debt.
The third essay is co-authored with Aleksandra Rzez´nik from Copenhagen
Business School. It deals with the effect of municipal income and property tax
rates on residential house prices. By utilizing the 2007 municipality reform in
Denmark as an exogenous shock to municipal income and property tax rates,
we are able to estimate the influence of taxes on house prices.
We find that a 1%-point increase in the income tax rate lead to a drop in
house prices of 7.9% and a 1-point increase in the property tax rate lead to
a 1.1% drop in house prices. The simple present value of a 1%-point perpetual
income tax increase and of a 1-point property tax increase, relative to the
median house price correspond to 7% and 3.3%, repectively. Our findings are
thus in line with predicted. This indicates that the housing market efficiently
incorporates taxes into house prices.
The fourth essay examines the efficiency of the residential housing market by
utilizing the 2002 case of fraud in the Danish municipality of Farum as an ex-
ogenous shock to municipal debt. Using a difference-in-differences methodology
with the surrounding municipalities as a control group, I find that the average
house price dropped between 13.6% and 16.0% due to the debt increase in the 3
months after the debt revelation. The aggregate effect corresponds to between
100% and 118% of the total debt increase. Furthermore, I document that the ini-
tial 1-month aggregate price drop equals about 175% of the total debt increase,
and that the reaction is dampened in the following months to between 37% to
75% of the total debt increase. This shows that the housing market initially
overreacts to the debt increase but quickly adjusts to more rational levels. The
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speed at which the housing market reacts to the increased public debt indicates
a very efficient housing market, and the initial overreaction can be fully rational
if the housing market initially fears further debt revelations.
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